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12 April 1985

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

WALLOON SOCIALISTS HOLD CONGRESS, GIVE VIEWS

Brussels LE PEUPLE in French 18 Feb 85 p 2

[Article by Christian Binon: "At Administrative Congress of PS Guy Spitaels and Guy Coeme Reelected Almost Unanimously"]

[Text] A very large number of Walloon Socialist Party [PS] members and sympathizers participated in the Administrative Congress of the party which was held on 16 February in the large auditorium at Passage 44 in Brussels. On the program were several party elections but also the speech of party president Spitaels, who was almost unanimously reelected.

Guy Coeme: 98.5 Percent

The work of the congress began with the election of the president of the Permanent Committee of the Walloon Socialist Federations. There was a single candidate: Guy Coeme, the president who had just completed his term. He was reelected without the slightest problem, receiving 98.5 percent of the vote.

Speaking to the congress, he said that this vote constituted a demonstration of confidence. However, he said, this vote was also the expression of a wish to continue the policy of openness toward other progressive groups and the radical federalism advocated by the PS.

Looking to the next elections, he expressed his desire to popularize socialist ideas and objectives.

Prevent the Establishment of a 6th Martens Cabinet

Presiding over the congress with Irene Desama, Roger Delizee defined the purpose to be achieved in the next elections as preventing the establishment of a new Martens cabinet through the adoption of a concrete program defined in clear language.

Roger Delizee said that the PS must remain the party of manual and intellectual workers and also the party of youth and women, engaging in a dialogue marked by tolerance.

New Impulse to Militant Membership

Then Roger Gailliez, the secretary general of the party, presented his report to the party, a "brick" that was about 180 pages long.

He brought out the following main themes: the organization of the different government services, the application of the laws, actions to be taken to strengthen the activity of the PS, and, clearly, preparations for the events of this year, from the point of view of the elections next December.

In this administrative report we noted that, with regard to membership, there was a drop of 10,000 units [individual and group memberships] for all of the federations of the party in 1983, compared to 1982. Only the federations in Brabant Walon recorded a small increase in the number of its members!

Moreover, Roger Gailliez emphasized the need to modernize the equipment available to the federations, to develop computer programming and propaganda efforts, and to go out and meet people.

He also drew attention to the return to militant party membership, thanks to training, the initiation of emulation programs, and the remotivation of party members.

His conclusion was that: "We must provide a new impulse to the PS."

Bringing Thinking Up to Date

Those attending the congress were to hear three other speeches in the latter part of the morning.

First, Pascal Deville, the secretary of the Committee on Company Sections of the PS, stated that the 90 sections of this type constitute a means of strengthening the party and an additional advantage for it.

Later in his speech he issued a warning: "Our message must be clear to public opinion because there is a great risk of returning to a society marked by social impoverishment and of privileges for a minority. The neo-liberal Right is using the present economic context to attack the social security system."

He continued, "this risk will be all the greater if, due to misunderstandings or a lack of information, even a small number of workers provide the Right with their support."

Finally, in his view, providing information to the workers is the principal role of the company sections of the PS.

Then Ralph Couckelberg, speaking for the Socialist Solidarity group, mentioned the numerous difficulties encountered in providing aid to the Third World, with the greatest problems created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Nevertheless, Socialist Solidarity has more than 100 projects under way in different countries, particularly in the field of agriculture.

Finally, Marc Thommes, secretary general of the Confederation of Young Socialists, recalled that 1985 is the year of youth. He considered that the PS must be available to youth. It has the means of doing so, but he also denounced a certain form of organizational attitude: it is necessary to bring our thinking up to date and to improve the administrative management of the party.

He announced that his confederation has established five working groups to modernize the structure of the organization and to take action on the ground.

Later in his speech Marc Thommes expressed appreciation for the aid provided by the French speaking community, which is participating in programs to ensure greater distributive justice.

Referring to the situation in which young people find themselves, he said that today they are faced with difficulty in finding their social and professional place within a dual economy.

The speaker considered that only action in several fields could improve their situation and that the PS should coordinate their efforts.

Guy Spitaels Receives 95 Percent of the Vote

Before the end of the first part of the congress, Irene Desama announced the results of the vote for the presidency of the party.

Guy Spitaels, the only candidate, was reelected without discussion, receiving 95 percent of the votes of the party members.

He was decorated with a wreath of flowers and received a long round of applause from an audience clearly satisfied with his reelection.

We also note that Francois Guillaume and Guy Coeme were reelected by acclamation to their positions as vice president of the party and as president of the Walloon Federations, respectively.

Positions of the PS

The high point of this Administrative Congress was clearly the speech by President Guy Spitaels, which he devoted to the present situation within the party, the initiatives undertaken toward other progressive groups, the educational situation, the missile question, the failure of the neo-liberals, and the relations of the PS with the FGTB [General Federation of Labor of Belgium].

Quoting statistics to support him, he demonstrated that the PS is clearly the leading political force within the country, coming before the CVP [Flemish Social Christian Party].

The PS has 150,000 members and is supported by 770,000 voters. Therefore, one socialist voter out of five is affiliated with the party. He emphasized that this is an exceptional situation in Western Europe.

Although, in fact, the party lost members in 1983, this was a problem which affected certain, party-affiliated groups in particular, such as workers and the unemployed.

However, since the beginning of the present crisis, the number of affiliated members has increased by 10,000 units.

Later in his speech he expressed pleasure over the application of the new party rules (on simultaneously holding more than one position of responsibility, financial contributions to the party, the control commission, etc), which were approved in Namur in June 1984.

Guy Spitaels emphasized the continuing development of company sections of the party (there will soon be 100 of them) and the more important role of women and young people in party offices. From now on the party leadership will include five women. He asked: "What other political group can say as much?"

Regarding the initiatives undertaken toward other progressive groups, Spitaels noted that they had made possible an improvement in the quality of the electoral lists presented by the various federations of the party. He said: "They are coming toward us, and we are going toward the other groups."

And at that point he applauded the appeal issued by Ph. Moureaux to the progressives in the FDF [Francophone Democratic Front], among other groups.

Affirming his support of the state educational system, he expressed concern over the consequences of the policy followed by Minister of National Education (for French speaking groups) Bertouille.

As demonstrated by the statistics, this policy has led to a loss of 7,000 students and 600 jobs in the state schools, whereas the private educational system has gained 800 jobs and only lost 2,700 students. And he deplored the attitude of the SP [Flemish Socialist Party] and the PRL [Walloon Liberal Party] regarding this policy.

Regarding the SP, Spitaels said: "I would have liked to see the SP display as much conviction in defending the state educational system as in opposing the installation of the Euromissiles." Regarding the PRL, he said: "The French speaking liberals who criticize the PSC [Walloon Social Christian Party] for striking out in all directions, from the Left to the Right, regarding social and economic questions, are doing the same thing with the schools question.

"The PRL president from Brabant Wallon is dreaming of working over a broad area, to the point where we might ask ourselves some questions: does the PRL want to line up in the future with the unitary state position preached in the Rue Guimard?

He asked: "Are those who established the state educational system in the 19th century still potential allies on the schools issue?"

Guy Spitaels also announced that a broad program of sensitizing the people to the educational issue has been launched by the PS and the Association of Socialist Teachers. An individual letter has just been sent to all teachers in the state schools.

With regard to the Euromissiles, he presented the position of the PS and termed the visit of Prime Minister Martens and Foreign Minister Tindemans to Washington "a shameful affair." He added: "And I am not quite sure that the Americans have fully understood the position of the Belgian Government."

He recalled that negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States will resume on 12 March, and he demanded the same 6 months' moratorium which he had asked for in October 1983, to determine whether there is a desire on the part of the two super powers to reach an agreement.

He also emphasized that in the Western camp it is possible to be loyal to the alliance while keeping one's own personality and not submitting in advance to the point of view of the dominant partner.

Later on in his speech President Guy Spitaels dealt with the alleged successes of neo-liberalism, whereas, he said, such policies had failed in the Netherlands, in Germany, in Great Britain, and in Belgium, with its historic record of 530,000 unemployed and a substantial loss in purchasing power.

And today, he said, the government is facing a budget deficit of 30 billion Belgian francs. However, some people are speaking of a deficit of 40 billion and more!

Other evidence of the failure of the policies carried out by the Martens-Gol cabinet may be found in the reduction of the length of the working day, the increases in taxes, the discontent among the workers, etc.

He ended this section, attacking the hypocritical attitude of the PSC which, while carrying on a noisy campaign against poverty, is actually doing nothing, while the socialists are doing something.

He told the following joke: "It is said that the PSC is looking for a new party name. I propose it be renamed the PDB, the party of bluffing."

In any case Guy Spitaels, who mentioned the idea of negotiations with his party, said that it would be necessary to know, before anything could begin, the exact extent of these negotiations. He said: "We must clarify the situation." However, he added, "there will be no puerile, imprudent exclusiveness on the part of the PS."

The PS will fight on two fronts: for socialism in an atmosphere of fraternity and for a radical form of federalism.

The last point of his speech dealt with relations between the PS and the FGFB, in the framework of contacts in institutional and social and economic terms.

He made several comments on this subject: the PS wishes to assume governmental power, whereas the FGFB has the essential function of demanding concessions for the workers. As the future is uncertain, it would be appropriate to avoid becoming involved in too limited a program. Nevertheless, there is room for a different policy between the two institutions, "but not as different as night from day."

Guy Spitaels then stated that the PS wants to reach an agreement with the FGFB: another policy might be possible on the basis of radical federalism and a recovery of employment.

He emphasized once again the importance of the trade union movement in the socialist family, "even if some people are uncomfortable at times."

Finally, he ended his speech, mentioning "the gleam of hope, if, beyond the elected Walloon leaders, the people themselves place their confidence in us, feeling that our policy is not only so many words. If they would come to us and if we were to go beyond our 38 percent of the vote, many things would change in this country." There was prolonged applause in the auditorium.

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

RELATIONS BETWEEN FLEMISH, WALLOON SOCIAL CHRISTIANS

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 21 Feb 85 pp 1, 3

[Article by Jean Daloze : "PSC-CVP: a Modern Family?"]

[Text] From the 1 600-meter heights where a mountaineering escapade took us, it is no doubt easier for us to cast a critical look at the congresses of the PSC [Christian Social party (Walloon)] and the CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] which were held several days ago in Belgium. We had thought of entitling this article "The First Cousins," but gave up the idea so as not to shock the modesty of the French-speaking citizens. On the other hand, "Les Parents Terribles," as Jean Cocteau might put it, seemed in other respects excessive to us. So we finally settled on "The Modern Family," namely, this new and regrettable fact of society constituted by the cohabitation of couples living more or less together for an unspecified time, each of the partners maintaining his or her own life-style, come what may.

In the electoral campaign that followed the scission of the University of Louvain, we published a stern editorial entitled "The CVP Must Be Punished." We shall not write the same thing today, since the legislative elections of 1981 have reduced to 43 the number of its delegates, in contrast to the 57 delegates this party boasted at the end of 1978, the figures gravitating around 50 in the previous ballots. We are profoundly saddened, in fact, that the present crisis of society, which is particularly shaking the Christian world, is responsible for reducing the ranks of the CVP in Flanders to the level of the PSC in the French-speaking regions, which lost the game a long time ago; namely, when Catholics of the Manchesterian brand of liberalism committed a mortal sin of omission. In the north, the Christian authorities did not make the same mistake at that time, whence their long-lived influence, at times threatened and deviating, but still substantial and profound, which today tends to be brought into question.

It is difficult to know whether the recent congress of the CVP is preparing a recovery plan. Since momentum is irreversible, the observer evidently took note of the fact that Social Christians of both linguistic genders, in Ghent as well as Woluwe -Saint-Lambert, had the same reactions and manifested the same convictions as to the merits of the Martens V policy: 1) the necessity of pursuing it against a background of less threatening economic crisis; 2) the demand for a mitigated fiscal policy, in proportion to our reduced potential; and

3) the promotion of persons and families. If the prime minister had been in Woluwe as well as in Ghent, he could have said the same thing to the sound of the same volume of applause: "What is at stake in the coming elections is not knowing whether the policy of recovery will be backed by a majority of the electors. Are we going to live out the end of the crisis, or will we be gratified by a majority, which, in the least possible amount of time will render the efforts accomplished useless?"

Thus the CVP, in the grip of what looks like an upheaval of society, is forced into a basic strategy that is unavoidable, namely a renewal of the "driver's license" issued to our national politics. Nevertheless, the party led by Mr Swaelen, but enfleshed in the person of Mr Martens, in the course of its congress of 9 February, faced up to the problems of its state of soul in the emotion-laden matter of the missiles. If the fact that Flemish Social Christian spirits are troubled by an international problem and not by some linguistically-based fever, is highly significant of the crisis of society that the CVP is undergoing, this still solves no problems. A certain anti-militarism has always made Flemish Catholic hearts beat faster, but not at the accelerated rhythms of the present pulsations. The CVP congress was not able to take a position on the missiles because this party would have burst asunder in doing so. Such is the visible sign of its disarray as it comes to grips with a Flemish world in the process of declericalization and dechristianization and finds itself engaged in a struggle with a demagogic and corrosive socialist party. The case of Limburg is especially evocative of this "mutation of chromosomes." Where is the time when this province was daily blessed by Bishop Broeckx and journalistically catechized by Senator Leynen?

We would have wished to wax eloquent about the often constructive statements made at the PSC congress, but we must get to what is most pressing, that is the alternatives presented by President Deprez. If we concede, in the name of loyalty, that the Social Christian leader is asking the PRL [Party of Liberty and Walloon Reform] not to double-cross them after the elections, by renewing the present coalition on the national level while allying itself with the socialist party on a par with Walloon power, it is difficult for us to applaud a penchant for shutting themselves up rigidly within the domain of the communes in the perspective of the future governmental coalition. Mr Deprez will put the PSC "in the penalty box" if there is question of the communitization of education and if the renewal of the present government becomes arithmetically impossible. It is politically unrealistic to freeze the political arena in this way.

As far as the communitization of education is concerned, we prefer the thesis of Minister Maystadt, turned down by vote of congress, which evidently did accept his hypothesis in the perspective of a rigorous and satisfying negotiation. It is not unimaginable, in fact, to obtain tempered-steel guarantees within the framework of the school pact, for example, to benefit the Catholic schools of the French-speaking population. If it is true that, in this matter--and in the terms of a Walloon proverb--one can no longer trust the French-speaking socialists any more than one can "a child's bottom," it is possible to envisage hopes and certitudes based on the liberal family and the CVP, this latter being unable--one would like to believe--to go so far as to cry out a second time: "Out with the Walloons!" The ministerial departments of national education are already substantially communitized, and a certain logic based on cultural autonomy urges

the strengthening of this movement. Stressing the centrifugal force in this matter, moreover, could render impossible a calamitously accentuated explosion in economic, social, monetary and regal areas, though stupidly, for want of funds. The other noon, on RTBF [Belgian Radio Broadcasting and Television System (French-speaking)], Mr Geens, head of the Flemish administration, curbed his appetite by demanding only five percent supplementary means within the framework of 107-4.

The PSC has already revealed its predilection for a stiff dose of opposition, should there be a governmental coalition to which it is allergic. That is an untenable position on the long term, and one which would almost be tantamount to an overly lengthy government crisis. The program of the party must constitute the criterion of its governmental participation, if the electorate has not subjected us to too severe a penance, and if the policy of national recovery can be pursued; if, too, the relative balance between the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking elements of the majority coalition on the national level is not insufferably broken.

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POLITICAL

CYPRUS

KYPRIANOU'S RIGHT TO REPRESENT CYPRUS CONTESTED

Parliament's Rights

Nicosia 0 FILELEVETHEROS in Greek 21 Feb 85 pp 1,10

[Article by Khristofis Oikonomidis, economist and publicist]

[Excerpts] The UN secretary general's report to the Security Council, dated 2 February, which has now circulated, lets it be understood, even if in a concealed way, that the responsibility for the failure of the summit meeting belongs to Kyprianou.

It Is Anti-Democratic for the President to Handle the Cypriot Problem By Himself

When we take into consideration that, in the eight years he has been president of the Cypriot Republic, Kyprianou has lost four opportunities to promote an amicable solution to the Cyprus problem--the 1978 U.S., British and Canadian Proposals, the 1980 Waldheim Proposals, the 1983 De Cuellar "Indicators" and the 1985 Summit Meeting--we must ask ourselves how much it is in the national interest, or how democratic it is, for the president to continue to decide about the fate of Cyprus by himself. His argument that the Cypriot Constitution, which adopted the presidential system, gives him that right does not stand up, I believe, for the following reasons:

1. It is a fact that our constitution adopted the presidential system. However, in all democratic presidential systems--as, for example, in the United States--the constitution contains provisions for "checks and balances" of the president's powers with the powers of the legislative body or bodies. In Cyprus, however, since the system adopted was presidential and "bicomunal," the Greek and Turkish composers of the constitution gave their entire attention to "checks and balances" of power between the two communities instead of between the executive power and the House. Thus, for example, there was provision in the constitution for a balance of the Greek president's powers with the right of the Turkish vice-president to give a final veto on certain basic issues, such as foreign affairs. But when the Turkish vice president left the government, the president's powers remained without "checks and balances" and became essentially "absolute," which is contrary to democratic principles.

The Council of Ministers' Role Unclear

2. According to the constitution (Article 54), the government's general policy must be decided collectively by the Council of Ministers in sessions in which the president takes part and presides, but without the right to vote (Article 48). Since, however, the president appoints and dismisses, whenever he wishes, the members of the Council of Ministers, and whichever minister disagrees with him is forced to resign--as happened with Rolandis--in practice the government's general policy is decided and exercised personally by the president alone, which is also contrary to democratic principles.

Representation of the Greek Community at the Intercommunal Talks

3. According to the UN resolutions, the negotiations to find a solution to the Cyprus problem--such as the recent summit meeting--are conducted between representatives of the two communities. Kyprianou, however, is officially president of all of Cyprus, not a representative of the Greek community. The most qualified body to represent the Greek community is, I believe, the Cypriot House of Representatives which has been since 1964 the successor to the Greek Communal Chamber which represented only the Greek-Cypriot community.

Very Dangerous for Critical Decisions to be Taken Personally, Not Collectively

4. Worldwide historical experience teaches that critical decisions which decide the fate of a country must be taken collectively, not personally, not only because the former is more in accord with democratic principles, but also because one person, no matter how intelligent he may be, is more apt to fall into more mistakes than many people together.

Here in Cyprus, if in the last 25 years critical decisions of the Cypriot Government had been taken collectively instead of personally, maybe we would not have arrived at the present tragic situation. Our misfortunes must become our lessons, however, if we wish, even if belatedly, to save Cyprus from worse misfortunes.

House Representatives Should Participate in Summit Conferences

For all these reasons, I recommend that representatives from the House should participate in intercommunal negotiations, and, more particularly, in the next summit meeting. This could happen, on general lines, as follows:

The House should elect a nine-member parliamentary committee, which will be occupied with the Cyprus problem, with a make-up proportionate to the parties' force in the House: AKEL, three members; DISY, three; DIKO, two; and EDEK, one. This committee will work closely with the government in determining our community's policy for solution of the Cyprus problem. In summit conferences, two members of this committee, along with the president of the republic, will represent the Greek-Cypriot side.

When this happens, I believe the Turkish side can be persuaded to quickly participate in a new high-level meeting which will begin at the point where the 17 January meeting began, not where it ended on 20 January.

I hope President Kyprianou will accept such an arrangement, which not only will give new impetus to solving the Cyprus problem, but also will restore real unity in our national front, as he himself sought in his latest appeal to the leaders of the other parties.

Thus we will avoid a break of the president of the republic with the republic's House of Representatives, which will end up either in the president's resignation and new presidential elections or in the House's dissolution and new parliamentary elections, in which the people will seek for the new House to be empowered to amend certain amendable articles of the constitution with a two-thirds majority so the Cyprus problem can be handled on the Greek-Cypriot community's part with House representatives participating.

I hope that what I suggested above will happen so that it will not be necessary for premature presidential or parliamentary elections to occur.

No Presidential Role

Nicosia O FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 21 Feb 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Kyprianou's Capacity In the Talks"]

[Text] The House of Representatives is meeting today in the most critical session of its life. As things stand, the two different lines for solution of the Cyprus problem will come face to face against each other today and tomorrow in the the legislative body. The president of the republic, Spyros Kyprianou, says he remains firm in his positions. He will not be influenced by the results of the debate in the House. The two large parties, AKEL and DISY, also are sticking to their positions. Therefore, we are being led to a frontal clash.

It is a fact that the presidential system does not oblige the president of the republic to be accountable to the House. But another viewpoint is being expressed, which is included in the article by Khristofidis Oikonomidis published today in O FILELEVTHEROS. It says that, in the case in question, that is of the "proximity" talks and high-level meeting in New York, Kyprianou did not take part as the president of the republic but as the representative of the Greek-Cypriot community. Proof of the truth of this viewpoint is the fact that, in the meetings with all members of both sides, presided over by the UN secretary general, Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgios Iakovou, who always accompanies Kyprianou on his trips to New York, did not take part. Nor did Andreas Khristofidis as government spokesman.

Therefore--according to this viewpoint--when Kyprianou, as the representative of the Greek-Cypriot community, handles the Cypriot problem at the New York levels, he is acting as the representative of the Greek-Cypriot community, not the government, and not as president of the republic. To what body is he--with this capacity--accountable? Oikonomidis maintains that he is accountable to the House which since 1964 has basically spoken for the Greek-Cypriot community.

Following this argument, we think that the stance of the House and, by extension, the political parties, cannot leave the president of the republic indifferent. And they do not, no matter how right he is in his opinion that our presidential system constitutionally is not controlled by the legislative body.

Our interest at this moment is turned to how actions and developments which will lead us to abnormal situations, and gradually to division, will be avoided. Division must be averted.

9247

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POLITICAL

CYPRUS

INFLUX OF ARAB PROPERTY BUYERS PROTESTED

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 20 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Katia Khristodoulou]

[Excerpts] In the biggest tourist area of Limassol, Germasogeia, it does not take long for a new settlement to shoot up, only this time it is clearly Arab. The whole time we were going from the seashore to the center of the city, we saw new centers with Arab inscriptions rising--to the point that you begin to wonder if you are in a seaside area of Limassol or someplace in Lebanon. And it is not only in Limassol this is being seen, but in many other areas in Cyprus.

With this situation, we will become, in the end, guests in our own home: The foreigners will become masters in our country. Forty percent of Cypriot land in the north is illegally occupied by the Turks who seized it by force, while in the south a large part belongs to British military bases. Whatever remained, we have sold off to various foreigners.

Indicatively, we mention that: During the last decade, 2,358 applications by foreigners to buy property on the island were approved!

In addition, within the first half of 1984 alone, 277 permits to foreigners were approved.

It is noted that during the same period [1974-1983], the number of approvals granted amounts to 1176, 550 applying to Britains and 580 to Arabs coming from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. The rest are American, West German, Swiss, Greek, Australian, French, etc.

9247

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POLITICAL

CYPRUS

SAMPSON ALLEGEDLY RETURNS SECRETLY TO NICOSIA

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 24 Feb 85 pp 1,11

[Text] According to persistent rumors which have been circulating for several days in Nicosia and other cities, the coup d'etat "president," Sampson, has arrived in Cyprus.

According to our absolutely accurate information, which has been checked and double-checked, last Saturday night to dawn on Sunday, a strong police force was at Larnaca Airport, with a clear and specific order apparently to take additional strict security measures during and after the landing of a specific airplane. This was a French Airlines flight, which landed at Larnaca at 0230 on Sunday, 17 February. The police force, headed by an officer from Nicosia, actually lined up around the airplane.

It had been declared that 17 passengers with Cyprus as their destination would disembark (the rest would continue the flight to other countries), but only 16 people came off the airplane. The French Airlines say, from what we know, that they brought 17 passengers.

And something else strange and irregular: The 16 cards filled out by the same number of passengers who disembarked in Cyprus and underwent the customary inspection, "disappeared" mysteriously, as it was verified later.

And, as we know, police officers from Nicosia were concerned about the "disappearance" of the cards and are still searching for them.

What "unseen hand" made the 16 passengers' cards disappear, and why?

In addition: Did the police force which was sent to the airport go there to prevent Sampson from disembarking?

This is more or less excluded because formerly there was talk about a request for his extradition. So maybe they went there to arrest him when he got off the airplane?

But if this is true, it is as if they were telling him with their presence to remain on the airplane which was French "territory." And the police surely had thought about such a possibility. So this case must logically be excluded. Then why did the police go to Larnaca?

But the "curious" and "mysterious" do not stop here. The same night, a person on friendly terms with the "eight-day president" was seen walking around the area of Larnaca Airport. Is this another coincidence?

The Rumors

According to the rumors we referred to:

One of the 17 passengers was the "eight-day president," Nikolaos Sampson, who either disembarked in disguise or left the airplane sometime later, that is, when the airplane's supplies were being replenished.

In any case, one thing is certain: The rumors and whispers--which possibly were put into circulation on purpose, just as possibly the "mysterious events" at the airport were allowed to be noted--are running wild. The government ought to communicate whatever it knows about the matter.

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12 April 1985

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

AKEL-DISY SUPPOSED COOPERATION PROTESTED

Cooperation Denied

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 24 Feb 85 p 12

[Text] The criers of the renunciative front and President Kyprianou's bad advisors are revocalizing, maintaining that they have discovered coordination and cooperation between the two large and politically-opposed parties, DISY and AKEL. Not because they believe it, but because they are desperately and dishonestly trying to influence public opinion with lies and deceit. Fortunately, however, our people's high political level is neutralizing their efforts to distort reality.

Our people know the line of the two largest and most senior parties in the country on all the issues. The positions and oppositions of AKEL and DISY on most economic, social and political issues are well-known. Nor does any Cypriot expect to learn now what AKEL and DISY believe, represent and support in the country's political life. Even in the 22 February debate in the House, where similar opinions and positions about the handling of the Cyprus problem were expressed, the differences of opinions on issues between the two parties were obvious and many.

Do not let the adherents of renunciative circles, following the House's condemnation of their policy, try to fish in troubled waters. And above all, do not let them try to seek a general and complete splitting on the "national issue," which concerns the people as a whole. The AKEL deputies, of course, after the majority vote against their own resolution, had no other option and possibility of helping the House express its will than voting for that resolution which had the most points in common with their own. Explaining the reason for the AKEL-Left parliamentary group's vote, AKEL Secretary General Papaioannou said clearly and in the most official way:

"Since essentially the resolution introduced by DISY contains the basic points of our own resolution, and in order for the will of the House to be expressed more strongly, we will vote in support of this resolution."

It is fruitless for the president's bad advisers to try to find new "ghosts" because the people stopped fearing them long ago, particularly when it concerns an issue which relates to the people as a whole.

Cooperation Condemned

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 22 Feb 85 p 3

[Excerpt] We perceive the embarrassment of the AKEL leadership and KHARAVGI and Kliridis and his printed matter.

The Cypriot people have a doubt:

With what the two parties are doing today, to what purpose was AKEL's "anti-imperialist" explosion and Kliridis' "anti-communist" hysteria before the elections?

The present situation has been created because the AKEL leadership--as it told its adherents--chose Kyprianou to be president of the republic in order to obstruct the course of Kliridis' black fascism.

And Kliridis dropped bombs against Kyprianou because he allied himself with AKEL on the national issue.

Now AKEL and Kliridis are quoting one another, maintaining they are the "majority."

But they received their votes not from the positive approval of their common line, but from the negative polarization of their false--as is being shown--opposition.

Do they have nothing to say about the people's perplexity?

Can AKEL explain: Does it insist upon using the "majority" it maintains it composes together with Kliridis' black fascism for imposition of an imperialist or anti-imperialist solution?

9247

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POLITICAL

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

SOVIET ARMED FORCES DAY--Limassol, 23 February (from our correspondent)--The Limassol Cypriot-Soviet League organized yesterday in its quarters a program in honor of the anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. The principal speaker was Andros Genethliou who referred to the background of the establishment of the Red Army, which he characterized as a defender of peace and peoples. The league's president, Dr. V. Pouppis, thanked Genethliou for his fine speech. [Text] [Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 24 Feb 85 p 12] 9247

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

PROGRESSIVE PARTY VIEWS FUTURE AS GLISTRUP ENDS PRISON TERM

Chairman Sees Party Revival

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard]

[Text] Tomorrow Mogens Glistrup will move from Horserod to Christiansborg. He has been hired as a consultant for the Progressive Party. That will return him to a central position in the party with direct and decisive influence on party policy. But can he restore the party?

"Regardless of the motivation behind it the result of the treasonable vote in Folketing by the others is that Islam will gain increasing influence in Denmark. Religion is not a trivial private matter for them. They have been brought up to wage a holy war against infidels--including the Danes. And we all know that they have many more children than Danish families do. That is a statistical fact which Danish citizen A. Th. Riemann, among others, has clearly documented."

Mogens Glistrup certainly has started hunting for Progressive voters. The above statement is part of an editorial, "Denmark for the Danes," in the Progressive Party's paper, DET NY FREMSKRIDT, in which Mogens Glistrup sharply criticizes the passage of the Alien Act.

Starting tomorrow he will change his headquarters from Horserod Prison to Folketing. Mogens Glistrup is being released from jail and will act as a consultant for the Progressive Folketing group with an office in Folketing and a salary of around 200,000 kroner. That will restore him to a central position in the party with direct and decisive influence on party policy.

And there will be a lot for the party's founder to clean up. When Mogens Glistrup began serving his sentence on 31 August 1983 the Progressive Party had 16 seats in Folketing. Tomorrow he will return to a Folketing group of four, a greatly diminished party apparatus and devastated local party groups. However Mogens Glistrup himself played no small part in pushing the party downhill. The fight between the hardliners, led by Glistrup himself, and those who wanted to take a more relaxed line totally enervated the party over

the years so that there was not much fighting spirit in his party comrades during the time Glistrup was serving his sentence in Horserød.

But the party's national chairman and chairman of the Folketing group, Helge Dohrmann, is quite confident that the restoration of the party has begun. That is why he has arranged a press conference with Mogens Glistrup tomorrow in the Progressive Party's old group room, room 2 in Folketing, where on 8 December 1973 Mogens Glistrup welcomed 27 other new Folketing members--among them Helge Dohrmann--to the party's first triumphant group meeting.

Clean Slate

"Although I think Glistrup's sentence was political and unjust it is clear that the mere fact that the party's founder received a sentence has caused many members and voters to leave us because they felt this was something terrible. But now that Glistrup is getting out the slate has been wiped clean. We can begin all over again," said Helge Dohrmann.

On the other hand he does not think that this shows that the Progressive Party cannot exist in Glistrup's absence.

"But just as Erhard Jacobsen has a central role in CD [Center Democrats], Glistrup has one in the Progressive Party. First and foremost because he founded the party. But we should not ignore the fact that Glistrup is very intelligent and for that reason he will be a very valuable asset for the party.

"Now he can take part every time we need to work out legislative proposals and he will be a central figure especially when it comes to tax reform. When Glistrup was a member of the group we saved a lot of time when we had to find out what was in old laws, for example. Glistrup knows the text of these laws by heart. But one of the best things about Glistrup's return is that I have noted that he has become a little like the old Glistrup. In the sense that in the last year before the trial ended he was rundown and out of balance. Today he is much better balanced and calmer.

"And since the group is so small the four of us have a lot to do. There are many situations in which we could use good advice and guidance. But it is no secret that in many situations it might be easier for Glistrup to make an impression on the public than the rest of us have been able to.

"We are now hiring Glistrup as a consultant and paying him a salary. But--if they want to--other parties will also be able to consult him. When he was sitting in Folketing one often saw people like Bernhard Baunsgaard going to him for advice--although not when anyone from the press was looking. They will still be welcome to do so, even though Glistrup will now be sitting up in his office. They will be welcome to do this and they will not have to pay for it, whether we are talking about Bernhard Baunsgaard or anyone else."

Two Possibilities

That is how the current group chairman views the future of the Progressive Party. But how does the former group chairman see it?

Of course Uffe Thorndahl is no longer a member of the party, but he still talks to a number of the people left on the local level of the Progressive Party and last year he published the book, "High Treason--the Glory and Decline of the Progressive Party," as a kind of political testament. "The Progressive Party is worn out. Even when Glistrup gets out of jail he will not be able to put the party back on its feet. The Progressive Party is no longer worth anything as a political trademark," Uffe Thorndahl said then.

Today he says: "The Progressive Party has perhaps two possibilities that are more obvious than they were when I looked at the party a year ago and Glistrup may be able to utilize them.

"One is the debate on refugees and immigrants. There is no doubt that the Progressive Party--when it speaks with reasonable moderation on the subject--is in line with a clear majority of the population. If they tackle this in a sensible way and if Glistrup refrains from quoting Riemann's statements about foreign workers who breed like rats there is some chance of outlining a political profile. A profile that appeals to those people who on a moderate foundation are really dissatisfied with the fact that there are so many non-Danes in the country at the moment. There just might be three, four or five seats in this.

"The other possibility, which I did not see clearly then, is the lack of agreement the press has noted among the government parties. If Glistrup and the Progressive Party play their cards right they could attract disappointed voters, especially from the two big government parties, back to the Progressive Party.

Bull in a China Shop

"But can Glistrup make use of these two opportunities? I don't really think he can. During the 6 1/2 years I was a member of the Progressive Folketing group I never saw Glistrup act in a tactical, politically smart way. He always barges around like a bull in a china shop. The opinions he has presented in recent months both in interview form and in articles in the party's paper certainly do not suggest that he has become politically wiser. On the contrary. So even if there is a chance that the party could score perhaps 10 or 12 seats I do not think Glistrup is up to it."

Uffe Thorndahl's book about the glory and decline of the Progressive Party has been called a very truthful description of events in the party. But what did Thorndahl's old party comrades think of it?

"Aside from Glistrup, whom I would like to keep out of this, everyone said it was a good book although of course some of them wish I hadn't written

it. It is regarded as an honest account of the way things were. I have made an effort to be scrupulously fair. This was not an act of revenge.

"Many people in the party have told me that they wish Glistrup had learned something from the book. But he has not. One can say the same thing about him as they said about Charles X, the French king who returned to power in 1824. It was said of him that he had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. He had not learned anything at all about why the French Revolution took place and what had precipitated it. But neither had he forgotten the humiliations he had endured. Glistrup has not learned anything at all from the events in the Progressive Party. But neither has he forgotten that he was stepped on. That must be avenged."

The political decline of the Progressive Party, especially in recent years, is striking when one counts seats. With 28 seats the party swept into Folketing in the landslide election of December 1973--the election that gave the Conservative Party 16 seats, cutting it in half, and handed the Social Democrats a loss of 24 seats. It is true that the other new party, the Center Democrats, helped deprive the old parties of their voters but the Progressive Party got most of them.

In the January 1975 election the party got 24 seats and 2 years later it got 26. But then things went downhill. There were 20 seats in 1979, 16 in the election of December 1981 and six in the election of January 1984. The six seats have now shrunk to four after Ole Maisted left the group to form the Free Democrats and John Arentoft was given a place in the Conservative Folketing group.

Behind the declining number of seats lie many defections from the Folketing group through the years and several new party formations, internal controversies in the group, in the executive committee and in the party apparatus as well as noisy quarrels between party members at many levels. Last year was not a peaceful one either, since Glistrup succeeded in retaining the major candidacy in the EC election--even though he had been voted out of Folketing after the sentence in the summer of 1983 and did not get his seat approved by Folketing after the election on 10 January 1984. If Glistrup had been elected to the EC Parliament, Folketing would not have approved that seat either. But he is still a Folketing candidate for the Progressive Party in the Lyngby district.

Glistrup Tells Plans

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Mar 85 p 7

[Article by Dorte Myhre]

[Excerpt] Mogens Glistrup is back as consultant for the Progressive Party. His opinions have not changed

in the year and a half he has spent in Horserod State Prison. His first day as a free man was occupied with fiery speeches, a party and a flying visit to the Supreme Court.

"Income taxes must come down, the national debt must be eliminated and the refugees must go," said the Progressive Party's consultant, Mogens Glistrup, when he was released from Horserod State Prison yesterday after having served an 18-month sentence.

There were cheers and a strong police presence when Glistrup was let out of the gates at exactly 7 o'clock when a group of Progressive supporters arrived to receive their guru.

Mogens Glistrup was met by his wife Lene who did not conceal her surprise that the scrub brush she gave her husband for his coffee cup when he moved into the state prison barracks was completely unused.

"He has never been the domestic type," chirped a happy Lene Glistrup while she patted her husband on the stomach and announced that now he would have to go on a diet. So now "Mogge" will have to do without his Coca Colas and his marzipan.

At Horserod Glistrup was squeezed into a greenish sports car that had seen better days. Behind the wheel was his loyal party colleague, Marianne Lorensen, who had issued an invitation for coffee and rolls behind closed doors in Hornbaek. Only some of the press was allowed in and the superstrong female politician gave BERLINGSKE TIDENDE's photographer a strong shove. Inside everyone stood like sardines in a can and listened reverently to Glistrup's first official speech, which rang out over Radio Lorensen.

"The Progressive Party must clean things up, I will take care of that," said Glistrup. "Income taxes must come down and the refugees must go. We will not have our country overrun by a swarm of Moslems who stab people and sell narcotics. Otherwise what will become of our distinctive character and Danishness?"

Later, at home in his easy chair on Hummeltoftevej in Virum, Glistrup put on his new work clothes, a brandnew bathrobe and a pair of Greenland slippers that he did not have the heart to wear in Horserod. "I am my own man, like Kumbel's cat on the road," declared Glistrup while he praised the kitchen at Horserod which operates with a diet plan from 1934 with good oldfashioned Danish food. "French cooking is not for me. I dread the Spanish food when Lene and I take off for Gran Canaria on Friday."

The trip is a present to Lene Glistrup on the occasion of her recent 60th birthday.

"I may miss the food up there but I will not miss the place itself, for it is incredible how much money the authorities throw around on prisons."

Did he have any regrets about coming out with his zero percent scheme?

"No, none at all. Someone had to do it and people became aware that something has to be done about income taxes," Glistrup went on. He said he expects to get a seat in Folketing in 1986 unless an election is called ahead of time.

"But I will certainly run in both the municipal and county council elections. Things have to be cleaned up in the businesses called Denmark.

"It is quite incomprehensible that the voters are allowing Poul Schluter to pursue Social Democratic policy with good help from the Radical Liberals. But even Bernhard Baunsgaard is finally starting to get some understanding of our tax policy into his thick head."

There were also flags and banners in the Progressive group's room at Christiansborg where Helge Dohrmann and Kristen Poulsgaard were happy to see their consultant again as a free man.

They had celebrated Poulsgaard's 50th birthday over the weekend with many songs and speeches. "One of them was based on the tune of 'I Have My Horse, I Have My Lasso,'" Glistrup laughed.

The Progressive press conference was a fairly tame affair. A number of people attended and made a noise, especially when guru Mogge issued his dictum on the refugee problem in Denmark, which the party does not regard as a problem at all: "They just have to get out."

Glistrup continued his trek through the courtyard of the prime minister's office building and ended up at the Supreme Court where he had two cases postponed until 15 April.

"That is just what I expected," said Glistrup before he and Lene gave Janni Spies a big hug at the reception for Spies man Povl Moller Taasinge, who was 70 years old. Glistrup walked in with Pierrot and the Vedbaek Guards. There was a lot of kissing and handshaking as though Mogens had been away on a journey for several years.

We asked Mogens Glistrup about his future plans.

"As I said before there is a lot that needs to be done. And I have stored up on sleep in Horserod where for the first time in my life I finally got acquainted with the inside of my eyelids for a long period of time. And our party, which does not live beyond its means like the others, has plenty of money. It is true that I have been disbarred but I can advise people and I have my consultant job with the Progressive Party. Things can only go forward and I have a lot to do when Lene and I come home from Gran Canaria."

6578

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

BRIEFS

PLO OPENING OFFICE IN COPENHAGEN--The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) expects to find office space in Copenhagen this month for its new representative's office in Denmark. PLO headquarters in Tunis has already named 40-year-old Omar Kitmitto as the Palestinian representative in Denmark. "Since there is no question of diplomatic representation this is not a matter that concerns the Danish authorities," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said. "Everyone has the right to rent office space and call it a representative's office. But like anyone else a PLO representative in Denmark must have resident status and a work permit," the Foreign Ministry said. Since the appointed PLO representative, Omar Kitmitto, is married to a Norwegian and has Norwegian citizenship there will be no problem about getting permission to work and live in Denmark as a result of the agreements on unrestricted mobility between Nordic countries. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Mar 85 p 7] 6578

SDP DEPUTY CHAIRMAN STAYING--Radio Council chairman Birte Weiss wants to return to Folketing. Before the election in January 1984 she left Christiansborg--her place of work for 11 years--to take a political break. During that period she was elected as deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party at the party congress in September. But she almost gave up the post as deputy chairman recently when she considered applying for the post of head of the radio system's cultural and social division. But Birte Weiss withdrew her application because in her opinion the job as division chief and the deputy chairmanship could not be combined. Instead she will actively enter politics again and it is rumored that she has been offered Knud Heinesen's political district in Amager. The district is regarded as a safe one which means that she will have a big chance of getting elected. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Mar 85 p 3] 6578

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

COMMUNISTS' EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS SEEN STEP IN FINAL SPLIT

Toward Final Separation

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 Mar 85 p 8

[Commentary by Kyosti Karvonen]

[Text] The time of a final split in the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] is almost at hand. The expulsion of the Taistoite [Stalinist] minority is already an axiom; only the date is open and whether the executor is the majority or the minority.

Chairman Arvo Aalto declared in no uncertain terms that even the remainders must be purged from the turgid waters before the parliamentary elections, in which a continuation of a stalemate would erode even otherwise dwindling support.

It is being rumored in the party leadership that the minority will be forced to make a move within a year. Otherwise, it can expect a nearly total defeat in the elections.

On the other hand, the minority will not necessarily move anywhere, but will remain in the party until the last minute. An election win is not an important issue for an orthodox communist.

The role of a disrupter is not enviable and neither faction would like to be identified as such.

The SKP's regulations, however, give the majority, which controls the organizational machinery, an opportunity to adopt measures by which the situation can be made at least to appear better.

An exchange of membership cards, which would place the Taistoites before a real choice, has risen to prominence in recent weeks. The alternatives are either not to renew one's membership card and thus leave the party or to renew one's membership card and thus submit to the will of the majority.

The exchange has been talked about in the party leadership, but no decision has been made. A decision may be made in May already, but it may be postponed even until December.

The exchange of membership cards is a complicated process, but it apparently can be accomplished in such a way that the majority's 16 districts would be given the right to exchange cards. At the same time the minority's eight districts "will be forgotten".

An exchange of cards would appear to be nicer to the outsider than expulsions, which would give the Taistoites a chance to gain some loose points. The exchange could include expulsions from party organizations and purges at the personal level.

The third alternative is that the minority will react to the majority's policy line and will leave on its own. This is improbable at least for the time being.

Since last May the minority's arsenal has in practice been empty. Resigning from the party's leadership positions was a decisive mistake, which was eagerly taken advantage of by the majority.

The minority apparently believed that the majority will reverse its strict decisions as it has done before. The majority has not reversed these decisions even though it knows full well that the road to Moscow is at the least damaged by frost.

In recent months the SKP leadership has carried out an active organizational policy. Voices have been heard even from within the majority ranks that organizational reform will be followed by political reform.

Criticism has been presented by MP Terho Pursiainen and former General Secretary Jorma Hentila of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League], among others, who having waited in vain for political reform left the party.

The majority leadership considers Hentila's warnings to be unjustified. But is there smoke without fire?

New Secretary Vainionpaa Profiled

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Kyosti Karvonen and Anneli Sundberg: "Vainionpaa -- A Man from the Back Room"]

[Text] It can at least be said of the new general secretary of the Finnish Communist Party that he cannot be accused of ideological misinterpretation as Chairman Arvo Aalto has been accused.

The reason is simple.

Sociologist Esko Vainionpaa has a better command of percentage calculations than Marx.

At least this is what is being said.

An old friend, who is forced to admit that Vainionpaa is no more colorful than any of his other friends, calls the new general secretary of the SKP a solid Ostrobothnian.

"I do not even remember what kind of liquor he drinks," admits the friend in embarrassment.

Effective was the most general opinion about Vainionpaa among the voters -- effective and straightforward.

In American movies men like him come out of the back room after the blood bath is over. They appear in a clean suit and without a flicker of change in their expression they open a black bag and collect the bundles of money off the floor, snap the bag shut, and step carefully over the bodies.

Upon returning home they absentmindedly pat the children on the cheeks and when the wife asks what kind of a day they had, they answer: "The usual".

Thus it is in the movies.

There is less blood and money in the reality of Finnish political life, but there are more back rooms.

From before Vainionpaa has the stern countenance of a driver of hard bargains and such individuals are not seen. They have clean-cut haircuts, a clean suit, clean fingernails, and an expense account and a sauna at their disposal. Without saunas democracy would have won in many parties.

Vainionpaa possesses all the outward marks of a tough bargainer including invisibility and enemies.

A lot of enemies appeared in the beginning of the 1970s when as political chief of the Youth League Vainionpaa adopted some tough measures so that the Youth League would not fall into the hands of the Stalinists and their spiritual compatriots.

To his enemies Vainionpaa is a climber, who got what he wanted on Saturday at the Cultural House in Helsinki, the general secretary's position.

"I did not aspire to this post," argues Vainionpaa himself. "I could not refuse when worthy candidates said no for personal and completely valid reasons."

Not even his friends deny Vainionpaa's ambitious nature. Already as a pioneer he wanted all the possible merit badges before the others.

After the Youth League Vainionpaa ended up on the sidelines and in the background in politics.

He received a good job as the information chief of the LEL [not further identified] employee pension fund and he became an exceptional pension politician.

He was a political secretary for a couple Communist ministers, but there was no real use for him in the party until there was a need for good disrupters.

In spite of a middle-class bearing, Vainionpaa is not a Kajanoja-type late bloomer. He is a third generation Communist. The path to the paper plants in Helsinki began from public school in Jalasjarvi. Vainionpaa received his ideological education from the Sirola Institute -- an education that is assumed to be sufficient for his lifetime -- and his academic education from the education department of Tampere University.

A Long Commitment

Vainionpaa must now finish the work begun by his predecessor, Aarno Aitamurto, whose goal is the settlement of accounts and the ideological as well as organizational defeat of the minority.

He believes the commitment to this will last 5 years.

And after this?

Vainionpaa shrugs his shoulders. He cannot yet exactly imagine taking Aalto's place. In his own opinion he is not a sufficiently colorful party leader.

After his election Vainionpaa conducted himself just as peacefully, just as cold-bloodedly, and just as taciturnly as before his election. He is not overtaken by surprise. It will be easy to continue Aitamurto's work as long as he can accomplish his own plan. Vainionpaa is the brains of the SKP's settlement of accounts.

Vainionpaa talks about relations with Moscow with the same small letters as the rest of the SKP's majority leadership. Even in Vainionpaa's opinion there is not much to brag about in them.

He got along just fine with a four-word Russian vocabulary in youth delegations and in Moscow's nights.

Apparently, not even the language of angels would be sufficient today.

10576

CSO: 3617/ 98

POLITICAL

FINLAND

BRIEF

FOREIGN AID FUNDS DISTRIBUTED—On Wednesday the Foreign Ministry distributed about 24.4 million markkas for development aid projects. It granted 12.3 million markkas for Tanzania's Mtwara-Lind water supply and sanitation project. For the same project 13.3 million markkas were set aside for next year and 11.9 million markkas for 1987. The Foreign Ministry provided 11 million markkas for expenses incurred in UN mass activities for assistant specialists, programs and assistants and set aside 13.7 million markkas for the same purpose for next year and 14 million for 1987. Finland's Free Foreign Mission, Ltd, received over a million markkas to cover aid consignments shipped to Ethiopia. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Feb 85 p 9] 11466

CSO: 3617/87

POLITICAL

FRANCE

ASPECTS, RISKS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION ANALYZED

Paris ETUDES in French Mar 85 pp 311-322

[Article by Jean Rivero: "Revise the Constitution?"]

[Text] For a long time the French people have believed that a change of constitution would be enough to resolve the problems facing the country. Between 1791 and 1870 they tried about 10 constitutions, not including stillborn proposed constitutions. The long life of the constitutional laws of 1875, which were the basis for the Third Republic, marked a long pause in this tradition. However, between 1940 and 1958 this tradition resumed a certain amount of life. The constitutional laws and the draft Vichy Constitution; the draft constitution rejected by the referendum of 5 May 1946; the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, amended in 1956 and then abolished in 1958--these constitutions reflected a return to the mobility which characterized French political institutions during the 19th century. In view of this tradition, we might have expected that, with the arrival in power in 1981 of the political figures and parties which, since 1958, steadily denounced the regime created under the De Gaulle Constitution, there would be a basic review of the system established under the 1958 Constitution.

That hasn't happened at all. Leaving aside the proposal for an expansion of public freedoms in the referendum proposed at the beginning of the summer of 1984, no change in the present constitution has been undertaken. The present constitution has been respected, not only to the letter but also in terms of the interpretation which previous practice had given to it. Does this mean that the debate concerning our institutions has been definitively closed and that France has finally found, with the institutions of the 1958 Constitution, a form for the exercise of the powers of government likely to end the constitutional debate and the conflicts which France has experienced in this field during what will soon be 2 centuries? The attitude of the parties and of the figures involved in political activity would perhaps support a prudently affirmative answer to this question. Which French political figure now asserts

that there is a need for constitutional reform?*

However, among the analysts of our institutions there are many who, after examining the present system, have found a number of malfunctioning areas and possible future risks. They have suggested reforms which are appropriate, in their view, to remedy these defects or to deal with them. Therefore, the debate has not been closed. To try to clarify this debate, we would like to make some remarks on the very principle of constitutional reform, before examining the principal revisions which have been proposed.

Constitutional Revision: Prudence Is Necessary

Any revision of a constitution demands a great deal of prudence, for two reasons, at least. A constitution is a complete document. Even when it contains some elements of compromise, it reflects an overall view of the conditions for the exercise of power, clarified and adjusted in application, when it has been in effect for a sufficiently long period of time. You don't change a part in a motor without making sure in advance that the new part is compatible with the rest of the motor. If the new part was developed through the use of another kind of technology, a breakdown is inevitable. In a constitutional structure you do not bring in a rule which disregards the basic logic of the document, without exposing the constitution to imbalances in the conduct of government.

The risk is all the greater since it is always difficult to anticipate exactly what the secondary effects of the change under consideration will be. What life will do with a constitutional provision, whether it is part of the original document or included later on, depends very largely on what cannot be anticipated. By "reaffirming," in an apparently unimportant phrase included in the preamble to the draft Constitution of 1946, the attachment of the French people "to the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic," by proclaiming, in a phrase having no juridical significance, this same attachment to human rights in the Declaration on the Rights of Man of 1789, "confirmed and further developed by the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946," neither the 1946 Constituent Assembly, nor the Constituent Assembly of 1958 for one instant thought it was turning these "principles" into real constitutional rules. However, without realizing it, without wishing to do so, they opened the door to one of the most profound changes ever introduced into our political system: the control by the Constitutional Council of whether laws conformed, not only to the rules of competence and procedure raised by the respective Constituent Assemblies, but also to the fundamental principles which define the moral philosophy of our society. We could give other examples of constitutional formulations whose authors did not suspect what future developments would bring.

* Postscript of 11 February 1985: today is becoming yesterday. Between the drafting of this article and the correction of the proofs, the consensus which seemed to have developed between the major parties that this is not the time for a change in the constitution has been broken. Georges Marchais, in the course of the 25th Congress of the French Communist Party, again took up the criticisms which all of the parties of the Left had made prior to 1981 of the institutions of 1958. However, this minority view has not seriously changed the consensus which we believed had developed.

Inversely, we could list the constitutional formulas which political life has abrogated in fact, without taking into account the importance which they had in the mind of their authors. For example, the power of dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies which the constitutional law of 25 February 1875 entrusted to the president of the Republic, and which did not last beyond its first use by Marshal MacMahon.

Our inability to anticipate the secondary effects of a constitutional reform, which are so evident that they become its primary result, can only lead us to adopt a prudent attitude. This is true in most areas. For example, let us consider the right to work, where such a measure, which is intended to protect the workers, turns against them by making it difficult to find a job. This is even more true in the constitutional area, where the interplay of the political parties, the personalities of the actors on the political scene, and the impact of chance developments increase the uncertainty which weighs on the secondary effects of a law.

Prudence does not mean taking no action at all. Clearly, there are reforms whose consequences are relatively foreseeable. For example, there is the possibility recognized in 1974 by 60 deputies and 60 senators of raising a constitutional question with the Constitutional Council. It was clear that the parliamentary opposition was being offered a final chance to oppose a law which it had fought against in vain. And this is what was confirmed subsequently. There are also reforms included without controversy in the institutional structure because they respect and even strengthen the logic of events. The election of the president of the republic by direct, universal suffrage, which the 1962 reform brought in, is no doubt better suited to the extent of his powers than would have been the case if he was initially elected by a college of prominent figures. Only the shadow of Louis Napoleon, whose direct election to the presidency led to the coup d'etat of 2 December [1851], influenced General de Gaulle to reject direct elections to the presidency in the 1958 Constitution. There are possible reforms, and there are desirable reforms. However, in the case of the Constitution now in effect, prudence, which is always necessary in connection with constitutional reforms, is now more needed than ever.

The first reason for a constitutional reform is the ambiguity of the text of the constitution and the possibility, unless it is changed, of reading it in several different ways. In the view of others, in order to reduce the swollen powers of the presidency, it would be enough to interpret literally the first sentence of Article 20: "The government determines and leads the political life of the Nation." In this view this means the cabinet and not the president. Another example: if the responsibility of the government to Parliament has been ineffective in practice, thereby accentuating the powers of the president under the present system, the cause is not in Articles 49 and 50, which define the procedures for the application of this responsibility without restraining it in any abusive way. Rather, the cause lies in the existence, new to France, of stable and relatively coherent majorities like those which, in Great Britain, make the principle of government responsibility to the House of Commons a theoretical point also. Thus, changing the text of the constitution is not needed.

To make this relationship of the cabinet to Parliament a reality, it would be enough to change the political realities which do not reflect what the Constituent Assembly wanted.

Another consideration operates against a basic revision of the 1958 Constitution: the consensus which has developed in support of it. Some 2 years ago we celebrated the 25th anniversary of its promulgation. Now it is more than a quarter of a century old. In terms of age it is second only to the Constitution of 1875, whose 65 years in force are largely explained by the general tone of the three laws which concerned themselves with setting out its major themes. Moreover, these major themes were quickly changed in practice, through the interplay of government institutions. The text of the present constitution is fairly compact. In addition, it has withstood several tests: the departure from office in 1969 of the man for whom people thought for a time that this constitution was made to measure [reference to General de Gaulle]. The succeeding presidencies of two men who did not have much in common with each other, the unrest in the streets in 1968, an economic crisis which led to profound changes in society, and finally and above all the major test of changes in the parties in power—who could have imagined that the most determined opponents of the "permanent coup d'etat" would focus their activities within a Gaullist framework, without any hesitations or problems? To measure the length of the path we have travelled, it is enough to refer, not even to what these opponents of the constitution have written, but rather to the writings of the majority of the specialists in constitutional law and political science, following the referendum of 1958. The memory of the "delights and poisons of the system," which General de Gaulle had denounced, was too vivid in everyone's mind for it to be possible to believe in the long life of a system which had broken so sharply with a tradition of parliamentary sovereignty. In the eyes of many people, this tradition was inherent to the French conception of democracy.

The times and people's attitudes have changed. The national debate has moved away from the constitutional area to concentrate on other matters, such as the economy and society. To some degree the institutional changes brought by the 1958 Constitution have been accepted by public opinion. Today people challenge the role of the state rather than its institutions. Apart from the reaction of the politicians, the weak response to the referendum proposal in July 1984 reveals a great deal. Constitutional reforms no longer are of passionate concern to the people as a whole, whatever their political preferences. They are more concerned about knowing who will hold power than about changing the rules for the exercise of power. Is this a well-chosen time to awake a drowsy constitutional debate, when political Manicheism has tended to become the rule of the game in all other areas, if indeed we may call a "dialogue" the juxtaposition of two monologues, each of which denounces the other across the board?

The Changes Under Consideration

However, we may draw a conclusion from the foregoing which is absolutely contrary to respect for the status quo. Since there is a consensus, since political passion seems no longer to affect the area of state institutions, perhaps it is possible to ask ourselves serenely about them and, without questioning the essential aspects, to consider the changes which could make up for the

weaknesses of the system. Perhaps we could anticipate the difficulties which the system could encounter in the short or long term future. These weaknesses may be grouped around two themes: on the one hand, the gross inflation of presidential power and its personalization in a single figure; and, on the other hand (the two are connected), the excessive decline in the status of Parliament.

Reducing the Length of the Presidential Term

No one challenges the fact that today power essentially rests, not in the Matignon Palace [office of the prime minister] but rather in the Elysee Palace [office of the president]. During the presidency of General de Gaulle there was an "area reserved to the president" where he assumed sole responsibility, more or less leaving the other areas to the cabinet. During the following presidential terms the power of the president extended beyond this reserved area and became involved in all questions, even individual appointments, which the presidents considered appropriate to decide themselves.

"The solitary exercise of power" cannot fail to arouse concern. First, because it involves one person. The person holding power, because of the demands of the position and despite the efforts he might make, is shut off from contact with the realities experienced by the mass of the citizens. With a sovereign, a dialogue or consultations are hardly acceptable. Furthermore, and above all, whatever his gifts and virtues, he remains a human being, with everything which that word implies in terms of fragility. The risk is a clear one. However, most states accept this risk today: the personalization of the power of the president in the United States, illustrated by the Reagan phenomenon; by the prime minister of Great Britain under the "Iron Woman"; by the first secretary of the Communist Party in the USSR under the successive gerontocracies. We could extend the list of republican and even communist "monarchs." The frequency with which this phenomenon is seen cannot fail to make us think. Since this phenomenon extends across national borders and affects a variety of regimes, doesn't this reflect a present necessity whose terrible symbol is the action--necessarily solitary, necessarily instantaneous--of pushing the fatal button of nuclear terror? This fact and the increase in the number of summit meetings can justify to a certain extent the need to provide a country with a single voice in international discussions. However, this does not eliminate--quite to the contrary--the fear inherent in any overinflation of personalized power.

Hence the suggestion--considered by Parliament during a preceding presidency, later set aside, but raised from time to time--of reducing the extent of the powers of the president by shortening the period of time during which they may be exercised. The 7 year presidential term in French constitutional tradition provides this office with a period of power hardly ever duplicated outside of our country. On the one hand, it is true that the problem does not come up in parliamentary monarchies, where the continuity of the state is personified for life in a monarch who has no power other than his influence. On the other hand, by fixing the length of the presidential term of Marshal MacMahon at 7 years, the drafters of the 1875 Constitution still had a monarchical model in mind. Consequently, the powers which they intended to confer on the president

were reduced. However, the length of the presidential term, which had become traditional, survived the grant of these increased powers under the 1958 Constitution, thereby renewing the basic aspects of the problem.

Nothing requires the continuation of the practice of a 7 year presidential term. Should it be reduced to 5 years? That is 1 year longer than the term of the president of the United States. However, the fact that he is eligible for election to a second term brings the total, possible length of his presidency to 8 years, or 1 year longer than the present French presidential term. In most of the Latin American countries a term of 4 years has been adopted, but immediate reelection has been rejected, leading to a lack of continuity in the conduct of government. The danger would be similar to a term of 5 years with no eligibility for reelection. Moreover, would it be possible to find every 5 years a person having the necessary scope and authority to direct the nation's affairs? On the other hand, a term of 5 years, with one reelection permitted, could lead to the same president serving for 10 years. The risk of personalizing the powers of the president would be increased.

So, a 7 year term, with no reelection? Basically, this would mean confirming the experience of history. None of the few presidents called on to serve for another 7-year term has completed his second period in office. The fact remains that in 7 years public opinion can change and regret the choice it has made. General de Gaulle, aware of the risk and wishing to be sure that he was always in tune with the French people, found a remedy in recourse to the referendum. His opponents criticized these "referendums in the form of plebiscites" in which the question raised was less important than the personality of the figure who raised it. However, the idea could be justified. It transposed to the relations between the president and the people the question of confidence which the cabinet addresses to Parliament. The departure from office of the General, after his defeat in the referendum of 1969 confirmed the fact that this was the way he understood this institution. Since then, the procedure has lain dormant. Apparently, in the mind of Georges Pompidou, the referendum of 1972 did not involve a question of confidence. President Giscard d'Estaing ignored the possibility of a referendum. Perhaps President Mitterrand dreamed of making the referendum proposed in July 1984 into a question of confidence, along the lines of the Gaullist precedent. However, there was no follow up on this intention.

A 5 year term with no possibility of reelection is no doubt too short. A 5 year term with the possibility of reelection threatens to be too long. A 7 year term without the possibility of reelection would perhaps be a reasonable solution, particularly if, in the course of his term, the president would make sure, through a referendum on which he would stake his continuing in office, that he still has the confidence of the people. However, that would imply that the possibilities for recourse to a referendum, as contained in Article 11 of the Constitution, are clarified and broadened. It would also be necessary for the president to have the courage--sometimes under difficult circumstances--to make use of these provisions.

The length of the presidential term cannot be considered in isolation. The National Assembly is elected for a term of 5 years. By holding these elections

at the same time, wouldn't this involve the often mentioned risk of a conflict between a president, elected by a majority who later was supported only by a minority, and the National Assembly, which was a reflection of this change in public opinion? This is one of the arguments advanced by those advocating a 5 year presidential term, linked to the life of a National Assembly. This argument is in conflict with a harsh reality. The guard who stands on watch at the gates of the Elysee Palace, to borrow from Malherbe, is not defending the presidents from the threat which hangs over every human life. In 5 years a president may die. To maintain the principle of simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections, should it be accepted that the death of the president would involve the dissolution of the National Assembly, at the risk of thus creating a vacuum at the highest levels of the state for the entire length of a dual elections campaign? Following the American example, should we provide the president with a vice president who would replace him, in case of his death, for the duration of his term? However, the American example shows precisely how uncomfortable is the position of the vice president, whose only reason for being is to wait for the possible death of the president. Moreover, the situation of a vice president who is called on to complete a presidential term which is largely over hardly provides an answer to the need for continuity in the state which is inherent in the position of the president. Finally and above all, the simultaneous election of members of the National Assembly and of the president would make the latter the uncontested leader of the new majority. The personalization of his power would be increased, and his position as "president of all the French" would be diluted by his belonging to a political party.

Do we have to accept the risk of a divorce between a presidential and a parliamentary majority? If such a divorce results from the election of a president hostile to the National Assembly in the course of its term, the 1981 experience shows that one solution is still open. The dissolution of the National Assembly by the new president made it possible for the majority which had elected him to reestablish peace and harmony between the two branches of government. The reverse case, which it would be inappropriate to ignore, involves a parliamentary election bringing into office a majority hostile to the president in office. It must be recognized that none of the provisions now in force deals with this situation. It is hard to see what device would make it possible to handle this situation, apart from the old dilemma presented by Gambetta to Marshal MacMahon: submit or resign. However, can we expect that a constitution will have foreseen all of the possibilities in the political game and ways to deal with them? The Constitution of the Third Republic, as well as the Constitution of 1958, did not provide for giving a parliamentary majority the power to terminate a presidential term. However, in 1924, when members of the Left bloc in Parliament considered coexistence between them and President Millerand no longer possible, they found ways to force him to resign. Even in the absence of specific constitutional provisions, a solution was found for the problem.

Strengthening the Authority of Parliament

At this point we return to the second main line of reforms which may be considered: strengthening the authority of Parliament. Reducing this authority;

terminating the sovereign powers of those directly elected by the people, as the Third and Fourth Republics did in practice; and thereby restoring, to the benefit of the executive branch, the balance between executive and parliament which had previously been on the side of parliament--no doubt this was the principal purpose which guided the authors of the Constitution of 1958. There is no doubt that a balance in the opposite direction replaced the one which they intended to correct. As a result, in the two essential areas involving, on the one hand, the control of the government and, on the other hand, the drafting of legislation, Parliament experienced a considerable reduction in its authority.

However, does the responsibility for this state of affairs rest with the provisions of the constitution, and would reform of the constitution make it possible to reestablish the situation? We have recalled that there are two possible interpretations of the text of the Constitution of 1958, and one of these could have led to a largely parliamentary system. Although this latter possibility was rejected, this was less the result of the text of the Constitution than of political developments and circumstances. The present constitution opens up broad possibilities for parliamentary control of the government. Once "the determination and conduct of national policy" is a matter for the National Assembly, through a motion of censure or by refusing to provide the approval that the government requests, Parliament can force the government to resign. Only "national policy" approved by its representatives then seems able to inspire cabinet action. At that point we would be in the pure parliamentary tradition of the Third and Fourth Republics. If this possibility is rejected, it is first of all because the conduct of national policy has passed, in fact, from the prime minister to the president, and Parliament has no role in this matter, under the law. Then, and particularly, this is due to the fact that successive elections have brought into the National Assembly relatively coherent majorities which are faithful reflections of the majorities which brought the president into office and which are too much in agreement with the president's political decisions to dare to censure the government appointed by him. Changing the text of the constitution would not change this state of things. However, a majority in disagreement with the president, on the other hand, could make its own policies prevail, by forcing the government, the instrument of the chief of state, to resign, unless Parliament would accept the risk of dissolution. As a result, the people would be called on to decide, in accordance with the precedent of 1962.

Clearly, an elections law which, through the use of the proportional representation system, would substitute for the two relatively compact blocs of the majority and the opposition a spectrum of various political attitudes, would change the basic facts of the situation. However, an elections system does not relate to the constitution! Moreover, would the National Assembly regain its authority from its fragmentation into many groups and small factions?

On the whole, it appears that the suspension of parliamentary control over the government reflects political factors on which the letter of the constitution has no impact. The same factors explain, in part, the reduction in the role of the National Assembly in the enactment of laws, even though this is its reason for existence. A docile majority in the National Assembly will not refuse

to vote for proposals which the government considers necessary, and the opposition would think that it is not playing its proper role unless it introduces constructive proposals in the debate which, by improving the text of the laws, would leave the government less exposed to criticism. However, other, and non political considerations work in the same direction: the more highly technical subject matter involved in drafting laws, in many areas, often requires that laws be drafted by the "experts" in the various government ministries. When a draft bill comes to the National Assembly, it is difficult to change it in accordance with the practices of parliamentary debate. Furthermore, when the opposition wishes to appear to be working in a systematic way, the debate provides it with the means of slowing even further a process which is already rather slow and ill adapted to the need for action. Hence the recourse by governments to accelerated procedures which cut short the debate but which reduce the National Assembly to the role of a legislative body concerned with merely registering the laws. Also, is the legislative function essential in the eyes of those assigned this task? The empty benches in the National Assembly when there is a discussion of this or that draft bill, even when it concerns an important matter, would lead the citizen, whom television brings into the Palais Bourbon [National Assembly's meeting place], to believe the contrary. There also, the solution should be sought more particularly in a basic reform of the working methods of legislative assemblies, which are still marked by the style of the 19th century and by the speech-making tradition, than in the reform of the text of constitutions.

Could a reform of the Senate contribute to reestablishing the damaged balance between executive and legislative branches, to the benefit of Parliament? If so, what kind of reform? The Left, hostile by tradition to bicameralism, has seen in the reduction of the powers of the upper house--or even its abolition--the most effective way of strengthening the powers of the only representatives elected directly by the people. In proceeding along this path the 1946 Constitution had taken away from the Senate any power other than a consultative function--and had even taken away its name as the Senate. By 1956 the National Assembly had regained some of its previous powers. The 1958 Constitution, moving in the opposite direction from the anti-senatorial tradition and by reestablishing the prestige of the chamber that meets in the Palais Luxembourg [Senate's meeting place], created an obstacle to the temptation for the National Assembly to try to regain its former dominant position. As we know, events have upset the arrangements made in 1958. In the face of the members of the National Assembly, a majority of whom support the president, the Senate rapidly became the single center of opposition to the government. The constitutional reform of 1969 tried to break down the Senate as a focus for the opposition by radically changing the method of selection of the upper chamber. The failure of the referendum in 1969 cut short this attempt. Thus, since 1981 the Senate, faced with a pro-Mitterrand majority in the National Assembly, has been able to resume the role of counter balance which it played against the Gaullist majority in the National Assembly prior to 1969.

Hence, a reform which would again attempt to reduce the role of the Senate would, in theory, increase the authority of the National Assembly. However, if the assembly remained entirely submissive to the president, it is the Senate which, in a definitive way, would be the only winner from such an operation.

The only, at least potential obstacle which parliamentary institutions could use to confront the power of the cabinet would have disappeared. There also, the secondary effect of the reform would be opposite that which was intended.

A critical examination of the changes most often proposed to our constitution, as we have presented above, may result in the conclusion that these would be of slight, or even negative value. Does this mean that we are under estimating the weaknesses of the present system and, in particular, the risk of an over-inflation of the power of the president, the single person who benefits from it? Apparently, the real remedy for this risk would be giving up the direct election of the president by the people, which is the essential foundation of his authority. Now, no democratic regime has considered it possible to take away from the people the rights they have obtained. Furthermore, and in particular, restoring to the National Assembly its status as the sole legislative body directly elected by the people would open up the temptation for its members to assert their restored authority to the detriment of governmental stability. This is because that is the essential achievement of the 1958 Constitution. To appreciate its proper value, we need to recall the repeated cabinet crises which marked the years of increasing peril under the Third Republic and the process of decolonization under the Fourth Republic. It is not a small achievement for the present constitution to have relegated to the historical museum of government institutions the replacement of cabinets every 6 months as a result of implementing the dreams of key parliamentary groups which used to make and unmake government majorities.

Preserving the essential aspects of this achievement, the foundation of the consensus which seems to have been developed regarding our institutions, clearly does not exclude any efforts to improve them. However, in constitutional matters, and despite the proverb, although the best is not necessarily the enemy of the good, perfectionism is hardly something to be sought after. The constitutions in effect in Europe between the two world wars, including the Weimar and the Austrian constitutions, inspired by a "rationalized parliamentary system," carefully drafted by experienced jurists, were unable to foresee the storms which carried them away. In the political game, our inability to foresee developments, the personality of human beings, and the changes in public opinion have too large a role for us to hope to avoid them by the sophistication of the procedures we adopt. Those are the developments which have the last word in the development of constitutional structures. It is those circumstances, more certainly than utopian changes in the text of the constitutions in force, which can, by changing certain aspects of the application of the 1958 Constitution, correct weaknesses while safeguarding the essence of the achievements we have made.

5170

CSO: 3519/213

POLITICAL

FRANCE

GOVERNMENT TAKES MEASURES TO SUPPORT PART-TIME JOBS

Paris LES ECHOS in French 21 Feb 85 p 5

[Article by Philippe Eliakim: "For Employment, Part-time Jobs"]

[Text] Yesterday the Council of Ministers decided upon a series of provisions to launch part-time jobs again, incentive measures involving both businesses and individuals that LES ECHOS had been the first to reveal on 11 February.

Work less in order to work better. Confronted with the necessity of turning the unemployment curve downwards, the government is rediscovering the old principle of work sharing. A piece of cake: if, each time a job is created, the companies hired two workers part-time instead of one for 39 hours [full time] the number of unemployed seeking jobs would miraculously decrease.

Of course, there is no question of putting France on part-time. But the extension of the practice of part-time should at least make it possible to safeguard the jobs that are threatened.

That is not all. In France there are 145,000 unemployed seeking part-time work. Thousands of companies are reportedly ready to hire them. But there are obstacles between the two, both psychological and financial. The objective of the government is to remove them.

The first of the three measures decided upon yesterday by the Council of Ministers involves individuals: in order to encourage the unemployed to accept a part-time job, the government will pay them a stipend to compensate for the possible loss of income they could suffer (in case the salary to be collected is below the unemployment compensation being received).

Thus the unemployed will no longer be penalized. The next step is to give companies incentives to play the game. The government has decided to grant them a subsidy of Fr 6,000 (Fr 3,000 starting 1 January 1986) for each part-time employee hired (this aid is contingent upon the absence of economic layoffs in the 3 preceding months).

These new jobs must also involve either people receiving unemployment compensation or "job seekers no longer receiving unemployment benefits and still signed up with ANPE [National Agency to Promote Employment]" or, the last solution, unemployed persons enrolled for over a year with ANPE.

Mixed Reception

Why should a list of priority beneficiaries be established in this way? "We are targeting our anti-unemployment measures," responds the ministry of labor explaining that, this time, it is the long-term unemployed who are directly involved. Of course. Still, the government has calculated very carefully by automatically excluding from the provisions non-working women who, although not signed up with the ANPE, would still accept a part-time job.

Under this measure, although they are potential job seekers, they will not be tempted to infiltrate the working population. And get counted in the unemployment figures.

The third measure adopted by the Council of Ministers is the contract for "rationalization of working time and modernization." The companies who collectively reduce the work week while still offering their employees opportunities for part-time employment will be eligible to receive financial aid from the government by so doing. The amount will be "proportional to the amount the work week is reduced as a result of lowering individual and collective schedules." The government's purpose here is to give companies the incentive to reflect upon their organization and, if necessary, to safeguard in this way the jobs threatened.

The provision for launching part-time employment again has met with mixed reactions from both labor and management. The CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] and the CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel] more or less favor it. But the other unions are, on the whole, sceptical. "The institutionalization of part-time work does not constitute a real answer to the problem of long-term unemployment," Andre Bergeron noted yesterday.

There is also scepticism at the CFDC [French Democratic Confederation of Managerial Personnel] which is asking that quotas be established in order to avoid "abusive recourse to part-time work."

As for the CGL [General Confederation of Labor], it is constantly attacking the "dangerous and unacceptable" measures of the government which, in their opinion, have as their only purpose to make employment precarious.

Cost: 800 Million

The CNPF [National Confederation of Employers] is also hesitant. The employers organization reproaches the government with not having revised

the rules for calculating employment statistics. Currently a part-time employee counts as a full employee among those working if he works over 20 hours a week.

Another complaint being made by the CNPF: The absence of "prorating" of the ceiling for calculating payments to the supplementary retirement fund.

The government, aware of these two problems, has been careful to encourage management and labor to negotiate them more flexibly. The CNPF would prefer that the administration "take responsibility itself."

The last point mentioned at Avenue Pierre-ler-de-Servie is the increase of management costs caused by reliance on part-time labor, a question they emphasize the government has not "answered satisfactorily."

Nonetheless, the government is expecting beneficial results from this series of measures. At a time when Jean-Claude Paye, secretary general of the OECD, says he "sees the light at the end of the tunnel" because of the economic improvement observed in all of the countries, the administration is beefing up the arsenal of public treatment of unemployment by creating a new weapon. Relaunching part-time employment could involve 40,000 persons this year. That is not negligible.

The fact remains that the provision created yesterday and which will take effect 1 March will be expensive. The price tag, supported by the FEN [National Employment Fund], should reach Fr 80,000 this year. No matter. The fight against unemployment has no price.

9969

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POLITICAL

ICELAND

STRONG RISE IN SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRATS EXAMINED

People's Alliance Cooperation Rejected

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 31 Jan 85 p 9

[Commentary by 'Staksteinar]

[Text] Throughout the years the Social Democratic Party (A) has had to contend with more fluctuations in its public following than is common with other political parties, often verging on total instability. Recent opinion polls, however, show an impressive upswing in the party's fortunes. Today 'Staksteinar' will scrutinize these frequent and interesting fluctuations a bit, besides pondering the fortunes of the People's Alliance.

Frequent Fluctuations

Not too long ago it seemed as if the Social Democratic Party [A] was about to kick the bucket, at which time one of the leaders of the People's Alliance [AB] spoke excitedly of AB's role in "filling the empty space" (!) left by A. But there is no permanence. A's ranks are now swelling--at the expense of AB, and Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson now needs a magnifying glass in order to spot Svavar Gestsson!

Nevertheless one must remember that A has always had to contend with more severe and frequent fluctuations in its following than is common with other political parties. Let us look at the party's voting record during three recent elections:

1974	9.1 percent of votes
1978	22.0 percent of votes
1983	11.7 percent of votes

Opinion polls taken during the past 2 years express support ranging from a low of 6.2 percent to a high of 20 percent obtained by DV's poll a few days ago. How long we can expect this momentary upswing to last is, of course, another matter.

'Constant Change in Strength'

Not everyone is happy about A's present upswing. AB and THJODVILJINN are particularly unhappy, no doubt because of their own shaky health. NUTIMINN [NT], the organ of the Progressive Party (F), also finds the grapes sour according to an item noted yesterday about unequal strength of imitation beer sampled in the city's various pubs:

"These conclusions indicate that the mixing of imitation beer is more difficult than expected, discounting the unlikely possibility that the public houses are deliberately shortchanging their patrons one way or another. Perhaps it would be safer, after all, to allow Icelanders to drink the real thing. "So finally we have the answer to this item's headline ["What do the Social Democratic Party and Imitation Beer Have in Common?"]. Constant change in strength is what A and imitation beer have in common--either too much or too little!"

Poor Old AB

Let us now turn to poor old AB, crowned with a dunce's cap by the opinion polls and, according to NT's leader yesterday, "now trying desperately to reclaim its former position by calling for a discussion among the opposition parties of a new government power."

To quote NT verbatim:

"The discussions of the opposition parties are doomed. There is a lack of common interest. A sees no ground for discussion with AB, but rather wishes, in cooperation with the Social Democratic Alliance [BJ], to become a leading party with 30 to 40 percent support, leaving AB hanging on the extreme left cosying up to old Lenin and Stalin.

"BJ has no business joining these discussions since, despite a few of its members seeing eye to eye with AB, as a whole the party is a liberal democratically thinking unit and has more in common with the more liberal elements in the Independence Party (SJ).

"The Women's List (KL) has to stay away from AB in order to preserve its political existence...

"Therefore, as pointed out by the chairman of AB's Labor Committee, Throestur Olafsson, the discussions are not based on 'realistic evaluation'." Interesting changes are happening to the extreme left, where AB has taken under its wing various extremist elements, such as the FYLKING [The Phalanx] etc, at the same time losing touch with the common citizen and, according to NT, "losing the role of leadership of which it could boast for a while, becoming again a little commie party." Which suits it perfectly.

Internal Party 'Battle' Viewed

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 6 Feb 85 p 9

[Commentary by 'Staksteinar']

[Text] Yesterday the media reported a major battle within People's Alliance Labor Committee. The committee's ex-chairman even uses the term "major disaster"--hardly needed to add to their present internal problems. The Social Democratic Party has had its problems, too: Birgir Dyrfjord, a close supporter of Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson, was picked parliamentary leader after a major skirmish, tumbling the women's candidate, Jona Osk Gudjonsdottir.

Social Democratic Parliamentary Leader

Ever since 1940 the Social Democratic Party has had a special parliamentary leader, representing in the Althing the party's leadership. This representative has always come from the party's labor arm, most recently he was Haukur Helgason of BSRB [Union of State and Municipal Employees]. Social Democratic women were eager to get Jona O. Gudjonsdottir in the job, but the party's newly elected chairman had other ideas.

THJODVILJINN, still smarting from the ugly battle within People's Alliance Labor Committee, naturally attempting to point out the similarities with the Social Democrats, comments yesterday: "Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson suggested a particular role for the party's representative, making him at the same time parliamentary leader, thus making the job a full time one and excluding candidates not able to take on such a full time position. A great deal of disagreement on this erupted at the meeting, but the chairman was adamant on this change. His motion was finally passed, and, upon voting, Birgir Dyrfjord received 10 more votes than Jona Osk Gudjonsdottir, the women's candidate for the position. Bjorn Fridfinnsson, a relative of Jon Badlvin Hannibalsson, had suggested Birgir Dyrfjord for the position."

Obviously, both Social Democrats and People's Alliance--both of whom are courting the Social Democratic Alliance these days--do have their problems. BJ, refusing to get involved, has spurned both parties.

"Split Confirmed"

NT's leaders are frequently mysterious. For example, NT's comments on BJ's meeting yesterday:

"Looking at the results of BJ's general meeting, the emergence of a strong political alliance/to the left of center/seems unlikely. The general meeting released statements to the actual effect that the party declines discussions of cooperation or possible political alliances with any parties/left of center/ in Icelandic politics" [Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics].

NT continues:

"Icelanders concerned with social reform are anything but happy to confirm the increased split among the leftist Icelandic political parties. But the split seems to be a fact. Recent opinion polls show that the new parties, The Women's List and BJ, have had it, and the groping attempts made of late to find a basis for cooperation among socially concerned political elements seem once again doomed to defeat."

We can only conclude that NT's editors regret BJ's spurning of both Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson and Svavar Gestsson. This "political organ" seems to regret the failure of Svavar Gestsson's attempt to rally the opposition parties under AB's banner. The editor is distraught because of "the total leftist split" and because "the emergence of new parties and alliances to the left of center has only added to the confusion."

"Left of center" is the slogan of Jan Baldvin Hannibalsson, A's party chairman. This slogan is utilized five times in NT's leader quoted here. This same leader over and over again refers to social democratic influences in Scandinavia as desirable goals. On the other hand there is no mention of Steingrímur Hermannsson's government policy statement reportedly about to be disclosed.

Perhaps Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson should aim his courtship at SIS [Union of Icelandic Cooperative Societies] and Madame Progress [The Progressive Party]. We used to have a "fear alliance" which resulted in a government "left of center". It is obvious that NT's editor's heart is "left of center" and its rhythm does not follow that of Party Chairman Steingrímur Hermannsson.

9981

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POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

VVD MEMBERS DIVIDED ON VAN AARDENNE, NIJPELS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Feb 85 pp 1,3

[Article: "Rank and File Divided on Position of Vice Prime Minister Van Aardenne: Large Amount of Dissension Among VVD Members on Party Leadership"]

[Text] Contributors to this article on dissension within the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] were editors Els Flipsen, Peter ter Horst, Max Paumen and Ben van der Velden and correspondents Marien Abrahamse, Geert Jan Driessen, Joop Meijnen and Dick Wittenberg.

Rotterdam, 28 February--Across the country, from Terschelling to Maastricht, there is a large amount of dissension among VVD members on the party's leadership. Criticism of parliamentary fraction leader Ed Nijpels is universal, although practically nowhere is there pressure for him to step down. The rank and file is divided on the position of Vice Prime Minister Van Aardenne. The question of the P. C. Hooft Prize is considerably less of an issue in VVD local branches.

This emerges from conversations with local VVD directors in nearly every province.

Next Saturday, the Wassenaar local branch (950 members) is sending a disturbing letter to the executive committee, the caucuses in the First and Second Chambers and the Liberal cabinet members. According to branch chairman Dr P. Enthoven, the letter speaks of "great anxiety" in the local branch about the fact that prominent VVD members are publicly "fighting and tearing each other to shreds." Intended here in particular is the controversy between Queen's Commissioner Vonhoff in Groningen and Minister Smit-Kroes of Transport and Public Works, concerning the PTT [Post, Telegraph and Telephone] move. There is also uneasiness about publicizing "conflicting opinions" on the P. C. Hooft Prize and the position of Minister Van Aardenne, among other things.

The letter also addresses "an incomprehensible squabble" with the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] on the issue of double earners.

It states that "the VVD is not availing itself enough of the power to name Liberals to important posts in society" and that "Liberal policy has been inadequately promoted."

Scuffle

In the Den Helder local branch as well, criticism was expressed at a meeting last Monday of leading VVD figures who criticize each other in public. However, a proposal to ask the VVD executive committee "to put an end to the scuffle" did not receive a majority vote, according to secretary C. de Jong.

The secretary of the Utrecht local branch, Mr A. J. A. M. van Dommelen, is surprised at the statements by the VVD leadership that Van Aardenne must re-think his position. "It's a zigzag policy: first he doesn't have to step down, then he has to reconsider it. Not a great way to treat a fellow party member."

In this respect, VVD secretary J. Elbersen in the Limburg town of Heythuysen speaks of "a ferryboat policy: it just goes back and forth." Mrs H. Sengers-Van Gijn, chairman of the VVD caucus in the North Brabant provincial parliament, calls the position of her party's national parliamentary fraction "not fair and square; after all, it won't do to stand solidly behind him at first and then slowly withdraw support."

J. Miedema, secretary of the Sneek local branch, describes--voicing the general tone within his branch--the statements by party chairman Kamminga, Senator Zoutendijk and former minister Geertsema as "sowing dissension." There is perhaps indeed electoral damage at hand, but that is no reason to attack the vice prime minister in this way. The party is best served by tranquility, and this is certainly not being promoted by these statements, Miedema said.

"No one is happy with this extensive blabbing. We are very loyal to the authority of the VVD, there is no revolt of the masses from us," chairman R. A. E. De Haze Winkelman of the local branch in The Hague says. However, he adds that he has noticed "some amount of dissension" within his branch.

According to him, the image of caucus leader Nijpels has grown increasingly negative since last year, but he has heard no calls for him to step down. According to the chairman, most VVD members in The Hague think that it is outrageous that 15 years of faulty RSV [Rijn-Schelde-Verolme] policy is now being projected entirely on Van Aardenne.

Opinions are divided on whether the minister should not in fact step aside for electoral reasons. Opinions are also divided within the VVD in The Hague concerning the decision not to award the P. C. Hooft Prize. Some agree wholeheartedly with Minister Brinkman (Welfare, Health and Culture), while others would have thought it better for the prize to be awarded, De Haze Winkelman says.

Mrs J. H. Jonker-Wormgoor, secretary of the Groningen local branch, says that Nijpels should present his policy more clearly. "It's been a series of blunders from the opening of parliament up to the present day." Most of the members of her branch feel that an end should be put to it. But with an eye to next year's elections it would be "extremely tactless to change caucus leaders right now."

Some members in Groningen feel that Van Aardenne should step down, while others maintain the opposite. However, the predominant feeling is that the VVD does not need more problems. "Elections are coming, so better to have no uproar." The Groningen secretary says that it is "absolutely clear" that 99 percent of her members feel that Minister Brinkman should have awarded the P. C. Hooft Prize to Hugo Brandt Corstius. Thus far in Groningen, one member has left the party over this issue.

The Den Helder local branch of the VVD passed a motion last Monday by a vote of 28 to 12, calling on the Second Chamber caucus to continue to support Van Aardenne. "I personally don't agree with it. I don't find him to be suited to politics. But the majority thinks that he is threatening to be dropped with empty hands as a scapegoat. It is felt that he should stand his ground," branch secretary C. de Jong says.

According to him, caucus leader Nijpels is felt to be "mischievous" in De Helder. "The members have the idea that he is starting to panic. Still, opinions of him are mostly favorable." Chairman of the Wassenaar local branch Enthoven is also critical of Nijpels.

He agrees with Geertsma, who said that the young man "has been thrown into the fray too early." Enthoven: "He lacks sufficient 'elder statesmanship,' but he doesn't need to step down yet for this reason. He would indeed do well to listen to more experienced party members."

Scapegoat

The majority in Wassenaar feels that Van Aardenne does not need to step down, in accordance with the slogan "Not one scapegoat for 150 others." The decision not to award the P. C. Hooft Prize is felt in Wassenaar to be just. "Someone who makes so many people, leading figures in our country, look a fool should not be given a state prize," Enthoven says.

"Nijpels is a brat, and I'm not so wild about him anymore. He should step down, just as Van Aardenne," J. Hellinghuizen, until a few months ago the chairman of the Amersfoort local branch, thinks. He proposed to the party leadership new candidates to succeed Nijpels: Wiegel, Johan Cruijff and local party leader Ruud Luchtenveld.

"The party leadership has underestimated how powerful the Van Aardenne affair is among ordinary members in the local branches," the VVD fraction leader in the Overijssel provincial parliament, Mr A. Hertog, says. "Many VVD members

here said months ago that it would be much better for him to resign. Not because we feel that he's at fault or is the only one at fault, but because he has become much too vulnerable politically."

Blunders

Mrs H. Sengers-Van Gijn, VVD caucus leader in the North Brabant provincial parliament, thinks that her party colleagues in The Hague "have all topped one blunder with another. Naturally this reflects negatively on the party. We will have to work hard to make it clear to people that many good things have been brought about thanks to the VVD." On the P. C. Hooft Prize she says, "There is no one preventing Brandt Corstius from writing his pieces, but to reward his work with a state prize is an entirely different matter. That man simply does not qualify as a person."

Tilburg VVD caucus leader Mr L. M. J. I. Stok: "Van Aardenne should step down. A member of the government who has inaccurately informed parliament cannot stay." On the VVD's problems: "You can do your best on the local level, but your drawing power is indeed determined by events in The Hague. It's painful to see how much of the VVD's good work is undone by these affairs."

Dismay is rampant on Terschelling. "What has happened recently is very, very bad. We can no longer restore what has been destroyed by those higher up," local branch secretary P. Stuut-Jansema thinks. She fears "a terrible blow" to her party in the next elections, and about Nijpels she says, "Perhaps he started too young, but he will have now become wiser through his mistakes."

Secretary Miedema from Sneek suggests that the rejuvenation of the party has perhaps gone too quickly, although he continues to find Nijpels a suitable leader. "But I don't think that this would have happened if Mr Wiegel were still in the leadership. We as Frisians now know how much strength radiates from this man."

Mrs N. van den Broek-Laman Trip, VVD deputy in Gelderland, says of Nijpels, "A good guy. He should be receiving much more support from the caucus. We should damn well continue with him as the top man, licking our wounds here and there."

She says that there was initially a tendency among VVD members to say that Van Aardenne would better be able to save face by stepping down. But now the opinion prevails that it is not right to make the vice prime minister a scapegoat.

According to her, VVD members in Gelderland are generally of the opinion concerning the P. C. Hooft Prize that the minister has the right to test a work for its content; the jury should only pass literary judgement.

In the VVD in Limburg, the decision not to award the prize is felt to be "entirely unacceptable," according to Dr T. Schreinemaker, VVD caucus leader

in the Limburg provincial parliament. "When you couple with that the settlement of the whole RSV affair, you see mental light bulbs coming on among the rank and file. The party leadership is being asked, what in God's name are you people doing?"

Unacceptable

Schreinemacher feels that caucus leader Nijpels' position should be brought up for discussion. "He doesn't yet have the Liberal antenna in the right place. He is indeed young and enthusiastic. But the enthusiasm of Wiegel, under whom the VVD tripled its ranks during the 1970s, was supported by the necessary experience and wisdom."

On Van Aardenne he says that he himself must simply make a decision on whether or not to step down. "However, he won't provide a single bit of help electorally. In that respect he is of absolutely no importance to the VVD anymore."

According to the VVD caucus leader in the Rotterdam council, W. Baggerman, the VVD members in his city also feel that Van Aardenne must decide for himself.

Churchyard

Groningen Queen's Commissioner H. Vonhoff feels that if Van Aardenne cannot be reproached on constitutional grounds, then there is not a single reason for stepping down. "I feel that the electoral argument should not be getting the emphasis that it is now getting in the discussions. I don't believe that a political approach can perpetuate itself if based only on--to put it ungraciously--populism." On the hubbub within his party, Vonhoff says, "We used to be a tranquil party, where the tranquillity of a churchyard prevailed. One misfortune rides on the back of another in politics. But the same is true for successes."

Frisian parliament member W. Blaauw, 29, feels that the electoral effect should not be looked at when examining Van Aardenne's position. "Van Aardenne hasn't been a big drawing card in elections anyway and he never will be. On the other hand, he has been of merit within the party as well as in the government. Thus, it is not proper to push him aside for electoral reasons."

The only VVD branch that does not wish to publicly put forward an opinion on the difficulties is the one in Amsterdam. According to secretary J. A. de Jong, the branch leadership committee decided last night in conference in favor of a general silence.

12271

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POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

SOCIALIST DEPUTY ON RELATIONS WITH NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 25 Feb 85 p 9

[Article by development economist and member of Suriname commission of the PvdA [Labor Party] J. van der Straaten: "Approach Antilles Maturely"]

[Text] Mr J. W. M. van Gent's "alternative" for the unfavorable developments in the Netherlands Antilles (NRC HANDELSBLAD, 11 February) reveals, just as so many of these well-intentioned proposals for the Antilles (and Suriname), a persistent error in reasoning. In 1954, when the Kingdom Statute [controlling relations with the overseas colonies] went into effect, the Antilles (and Suriname) became internally autonomous. There remained responsibility only for defense and foreign relations of the Dutch territories, while development aid was also initiated. The Antilles are thus responsible for their own internal affairs. An adequate appropriation of development aid can also be counted on.

Thirty years and countless Dutch proposals later, a basis for economic self-sufficiency has yet to be laid. If we now assess the present situation, after 30 years of Antillean local responsibility, we must ask ourselves whether an entirely different policy must not be pursued.

Anyone who has studied the reports by the Vonhoff commission knows that all sorts of intermediate levels have been created in the Dutch public enterprise which are crippling the functioning of the apparatus. Such an intermediate level has also come about in relations with the Antilles (and Suriname). Because we feel so sorry for the ups and downs of the (former) colonies--fill in every gap--the local authorities are put into comfortable doldrums.

The recent threat by Aruban authorities to open an airlift to the Netherlands is a striking example of this. After 30 years of local responsibility, the consequences of the refinery closing still constitute a score that must be settled with the Netherlands. This is a misunderstanding of local responsibility. Such a proposition evokes the predictable criticism: Dutch development aid has been insufficient, the interests of Dutch and international trade and industry have brought the country to the brink of disaster.

The best Antillean policy is a different Antillean policy, in some respects even diametrically different. The member of the government who is currently

responsible, Minister De Koning, appears to be giving important impulse to this as well. Aid to the Antilles is fixed at a set percentage of the total Dutch development aid and thus depoliticized. Lately program aid has been extended instead of project aid. These are intelligent steps, although one might have reservations about the failure to couple the amount of aid with the capacity for absorption and about the lack of, say, a joint financing clause that presumes local effort.

There is no need for a jointly effected plan for making the Antilles economically independent. This is in contradiction to what Van Gent thinks. Because, all energy notwithstanding, it will lead nowhere other than where, for example, the Multiyear Development Program for Suriname led, which came about in the manner suggested by Van Gent. The Antilles are best served by a genuine, local diagnosis of economic problems and local responsibility for effecting changes in them.

There is no need for a local analytic approach, with local means [as published]. One will have to find directions for solutions for oneself, relative to Antillean reality and local possibilities. One will have to practically distill a policy out of it oneself. There is a role for non-native assistance only in the implementation phase, under Antillean direction. At issue is Antillean policy, no matter how inefficient in our eyes.

The Netherlands will have to make ways and means available for a long time, but in dimensions that in the future protect the Antilles from the "Dutch disease" (living too grandly, in our case making use of natural gas revenues). Development aid should be parceled out, in the interest of the recipient country.

Dutch interference in the spending of development funds should be strongly resisted. Certainly in relation to the Antilles there can only be indirect verification: an Antillean can exert influence and control through his elected representative. The example of Suriname shows that this global verification is better delegated to a third party.

There are plenty of parallels with Suriname. Contrary to Mr Van Gent's opinion, the Antilles' problems are not the result of a Dutch policy of tolerance in all areas, but rather of distance that has been too small. Through this, Antillean policy has ended up in an undesirable position, and political independence has become increasingly hard to discern. It has had a devastating effect on that which a future independent country certainly cannot do without: a mentally independent vanguard.

12271

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

SOCIALIST-LEFT PARTY CONGRESS PREPARES FOR ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Image of Labor 'Support Party'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Mar 85 p 5

[Article by Lars Hellberg: "Can Socialist-Left Make Itself Visible?"]

[Text] Trondheim, 6 March--The parliamentary leader of the Socialist-Left Party [SV], Hanna Kvanmo, will not allow it to be said that the party is some kind of a "support party" for the Labor Party. The congress here in Trondheim will be an indication that SV is going into the election as an unpredictable "red-green" alternative, as a party which both participates and remains apart from what those on the leftwing like to call parliamentary games.

In a parliamentary situation where it only occasionally makes any difference, it is not important where SV places itself. It would be different if there were an eventual socialist majority in the Storting. But as of today, SV's big problem is that its Storting group members have mostly been observers of the conflicts between the main political opponents.

The Labor Party has succeeded for a long time in reducing the visibility of SV on the political landscape. To the extent that a political conflict can be expected at a national congress which is at the same time celebrating SV's 10th anniversary, it will also concern how the party leadership and the Storting group has handled the opposition role. In that case it will be a repeat of the debate which has characterized the party during the entire past 10 years, and which characterized the Socialist People's Party [SF] before it became SV.

Center of Gravity

Where should the center of gravity be in a party which has long been carried by anti-parliamentary currents? The need to tie the Storting group together and place increased emphasis on the extraparlimentary work is an old requirement. Today there is no doubt that in the minds of the people, SV is the Storting group, not to say Hanna Kvanmo.

12 April 1985

Besides she finds a part explanation for the modest role that SV plays today to be that "the Labor Party in the opposition has taken SV's viewpoint." By that she means the child-care law, housing and tax policies, or for that matter the position on the boycott of South Africa. It is also clear, which she does not mention, that the Labor Party's security policy movements have also contributed to making SV less visible.

As for the draft party program for the next 4 years, this year's national congress will hardly vote for the excited changes of opinion. The nomination conflict with Finn Gustavsen in the leading role earlier this year was more nearly an expression of personal conflict and different political methods than it was a deep disagreement on principles.

The program proposal which will probably cause the strongest debate is the proposal for shorter worktime and/or lower pension age. According to the party leadership there is room for both suggestions, but a choice between them will expose the opposing views to the light of day.

Theo Koritzinsky, who wants to characterize the party as a "green, or more correctly a redgreen alternative," will undoubtedly be reelected. So also will be the vice chairman Tora Haug, the women's political leader Kirsti Nost and the union leader Einar Nyheim. On the other hand party secretary Erik Solheim has asked to be replaced, and he will be succeeded by Hilde Vogt.

Rally Around Antinuclear Stand

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Lars Hellberg: "SV Speakers Ask Labor Party to Invest More in Election Victory"]

[Text] Trondheim, 7 March--"Our greatest problem is not SV's, but the Labor Party's lacking profile and will to win," said the former chairman of the party, Berge Furre, during the party's national congress today. "Unless the Labor Party really invests in capturing government power we will remain in the same fix," said Furre, and others agreed.

According to Furre, the great opposition party is being quiet as a mouse in the hope that power will fall into the party's lap like a ripe fruit. Also he used the occasion to carry on the controversy with AFTENPOSTEN about that paper's pointing out that SV has visibility problems in the shadow of the Labor Party in the opposition. "It has been a difficult problem to live in the 'valley of the shadow,' but we have overcome it. It also tends to make Hanna (Kvanmo) invisible," said Furre.

Earlier in the day Kvanmo had mildly expressed satisfaction with the policy that the Labor Party is following in the opposition. On behalf of SV she took

pride in "having created divisions in the solid unity on defense and security policy."

But she did not fail to notify the congress that there is reason to fear that the Labor Party in the government position "could fall into the NATO relationship again for reasons of convenience." According to Kvanmo the difference between the big parties in Norwegian politics is "while Stray and Willoch believe in 'the bomb' and Reagan, the Labor Party remains in doubt." The goal is to press the Labor Party harder.

As for more concrete goals, SV hopes to be able to introduce a lower--free choice--pension age and a 6-hour working day with the help of the Labor Party. "These are goals which appear to be possible to achieve under a Labor Party Government, but which Willoch flatly rejects because he cannot afford it. But if a nonsocialist government cannot afford reforms now, will it ever be able to?" said Kvanmo, referring to "our wonderful foreign economic trade freedom."

'We Chose Inflation'

To the amazement of many she drew arguments for greater public investment from Reagan's United States. "In the choice between less inflation and greater unemployment, we chose inflation. Just look at the United States--with a deficit of 170 billion dollars last year, prices did not rise. Neither did unemployment rise," she said.

The debate here in Trondheim leaves no doubt that SV feels comfortable as both activist and unpredictable supporter of the Labor Party. "We have everything to lose and nothing to gain in a new Storting period with a nonsocialist government. The Labor Party Government is a better alternative. The developments which the party has gone through in the opposition--the policies it has followed in the last 4 years--obligate a Labor Party Government to continue as long as the economic resources last," said Kvanmo.

Double Morality

"Previously I said that the Conservative Party looks after capital, while the Christian People's Party looks after morality. Now the Christian People's party is looking after double morality," she said, which caused great jubilation among the youthful assembly.

This is an entirely different SV which is winding up its national congress these days in Trondheim than the party which was founded in the same place 10 years ago. Only a small minority of this year's delegates participated in the founding of the party; among them are the party's first chairmen, Berit As, Finn Gustavsen and Berge Furre. None of them have central roles in today's SV.

The political debate at the congress leaves no doubt that SV intends to appear as the long arm of the antinuclear weapon movement. It is a strategy which assembles those remaining, but does not appear to give the party more voters.

Nuclear-Free Naval Visits Urged

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Bjorn Talen: "SV Congress Wants Several Expensive Reforms--Six-hour Day Before 1992!"]

[Excerpts] Trondheim, 10 March--No to nuclear weapons, fight against unemployment and a fairer distribution of the goods of society. This is how SV will prioritize its most important campaign issues. The most central point in this program is the 6-hour day, which the congress demanded before 1992.

The congress approved a number of declarations which were not on the agenda.

"It is a disgrace to our country, a violation of freedom of expression and an insult to the Palestinian people that the government refuses to allow the representative of the PLO to carry out his work as the head of the PLO information office in Oslo," said one of the declarations. In another the government's family report was called "an insult to many of the values on which the women's struggle is built." SV said that the report is a long step backward for the policies of daily life, and does not take into consideration the fact that steadily fewer live in traditional marriage, and steadily more women have jobs.

SV also supports action to make Norwegian harbors nuclear weapon free. No warship must be allowed to visit Norwegian ports if it is not announced that it does not have nuclear weapons aboard. According to SV, the conflict between the United States and New Zealand on this question is proof that the main issue for the United States is not the defense of New Zealand, but its own strategic interests.

Another declaration about industrial policy was dominated by the desire for stronger state control of business. SV wants the nationalization of key industries and credit institutions. As to the boycott of South Africa, SV believes that it is the government's responsibility to see that individual businesses and local communities are not harmed by the boycott measures.

Paper on Party's Influence

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 Mar 85 p 2

[Editorial: "SV's Influence"]

[Text] The serious women and men beyond the Labor Party are not subject to self-irony. If one believes SV's own forecasts, there will be a socialist-left majority in the Storting in 2208. In other words the nonsocialists will have several generations in which to reflect.

That does not prevent SV from confronting the rest of us with urgent problems. In the first place it is a problem for the Labor Party, but the consequences affect our political environment and thereby the entire nation.

Because it is correct, as party secretary Erik Solheim pointed out during the weekend congress, "that SV's influence can not be measured in our number of election votes alone," as he put it. Before his fellow believers he referred to the "countless issues that SV has pushed forth, and others have harvested the benefits."

As for the most important of all issues, foreign and security policy, it appears to us to be directly wrong to designate the fruits which the Labor Party has harvested as benefits. But it serves no rational purpose to deny SV's actual influence on the social democratic opposition.

Hanna Kvanmo is correct in saying that her party has created divisions in the solid unity in defense and security policy. In this way SV's influence is greater and more dangerous than the party's five percent of the voters would indicate. As to the NATO nuclear strategy, the position of the alliance on negotiations and the demand for a Nordic nuclear free zone, the opposition Social Democrats are in operation.

Kvanmo correctly fears that a Labor Party Government following the elections next autumn "would fall into the NATO relationship for reasons of convenience." If it should unfortunately happen that the nonsocialist majority loses in September, we can only hope that she is correct. But is that any reason to take a chance on it?

Besides we would like to know long before the election how far the Labor Party is ready to stretch itself in relation to SV--beyond a judgment of what is profitable election tactics. The Labor Party's solid opposition to a new and more just election system has given SV a starting point which it has never previously had.

In both parties strong forces believe that electoral pacts can prove to be the only possibility for the socialist parties to get a majority in the Storting. That is probably correct. And both SV and the Labor Party argue that electoral pacts are only a practical arrangement without political consequences.

We must wait and see. Against the background of the growing influence of leftwing forces on parts of Labor Party policies, it is not unreasonable to assume that an electoral pact between the Labor Party and SV can have political effects in a definite direction. In that case it will be a development which conservative forces in the Labor Party will have very little reason to applaud.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

NEW PRD'S FOUNDATION STIRS UP POLITICAL WATERS

Party Principles Enunciated

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 2 Mar 85 pp 6-7

[Article by Margarida Viegas]

[Text] In Troia, they chose a name, they carefully avoided any ideological definition, they waved the banner of morality and they approved some statutes; they propose to save the present system, making it function in a different way. Where would the difference lie? In themselves. In their patriotism, moral rigor, democratic spirit, clarity of procedure, capacity for dialogue, dignity, honesty and competence (we quote). However, not a single prominent Eanist has yet decided to commit himself to this noble project--much less Eanes himself, whose patronage seems very uncertain. With its formal constitution only 3 months away, the only big names in the Democratic Renewal Party are Herminio Martinho and Jose Carlos Vasconcelos.

At 0430 hours last Sunday, in Troia, what was formerly known as the "future Eanist party" lost the only subtle link with Eanes himself, choosing to call itself the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD).

This week, then, when we queried some prominent figures about the new entry in the party system, we could ask: "What do you think of the PRD?" And people were confused: "The PR what? Oh, the Eanes party...."

No longer. Between jubilant hand-waving and bursts of applause, the Eanists dropped the label, albeit cautiously: the PRD label will temporarily maintain the appendage CNARPE [National Committee to Support the Reelection of President Eanes].

Be that as it may, the fact is that a new party is emerging which is intended, moreover, to be a new kind of party. Already restless because of the long wait, the former CNARPE members who propose to form the party have set a maximum period of 3 months for the convening of the National Convention by which it will be institutionalized. So the birth of the party is not far away. Come to think of it, this is the only statement that can be made with any assurance about this political entity.

It is one thing for a group of citizens--precisely how many is not known--to conclude that there is a political vacuum, or a poorly filled space, in Portugal.

It is quite another thing to offer General Eanes a party by which, after 1986, he can satisfy his announced intent to remain active in politics.

The two lines of reasoning can cross so easily as to create a truly lamentable short circuit.

Publicly, the PRD justifies itself by the alleged inability of the other parties to solve the nation's problems.

What does this have to do with Antonio Rangel Eanes?

Strictly speaking, nothing.

However, as Herminio Martinho said months ago, the promoters of the movement are aware of the decisive importance of a flesh and blood leader to attract and persuade--or not--flesh and blood voters. Principles are all very lovely, but they are not enough. "Since we recognize this, we take, as a point of reference, the only man who, by his profile, by his political capital, can generate a spirit of hope in the Portuguese society," Martinho added.

Eanes Reluctant

Officially, the theory is that the party will go forward with Eanes or without him: "If he does not sponsor us," say the former CNARPP members, "this does not mean in itself that we have failed, that we were not equal to the mission."

According to sources that are certainly well informed, Eanes may be leaning toward this verdict, voicing serious reservations about the way in which the PRD essayed its first steps. There are plenty of people in Belem who do not have the least enthusiasm for the political gifts of the energetic Martinho. Thus, the possibility of a presidential alienation--if one can speak of alienation when there has never been any involvement--with regard to "his" party is emerging as a probability.

It is certain that, in some ways, Eanes is in a cosy position: the very exercise of office imposes a comfortable silence. His hosts were obviously encouraged when, in a speech offered at the last luncheon commemorating his reelection, the president promised to remain in politics in the future, "within the parameters which inspired his candidacy for reelection." But didn't "party independence" head the list of those principles?

In any event, if the president can hide behind the scruple of his commitment to the electorate, the same is not true of other figures who continue to avoid open involvement with the PRD.

The only names that rang a bell in Troia were those of Vasco da Gama Fernandes--a moral supporter who was greeted with a long ovation--and Jorge Sa Borges, a PSD [Social Democratic Party] dissident in 1976.

Who, Me?

As for other names who were not at the meeting but who were still featured in the press as the possible leaders of the party, without exception, they all considered any conjectures in this regard as premature. Not to be taken as assured or assumed "renovadores," they invariably referred us to Herminio Martinho: "He is the one who knows about the party."

Engineer Jose Botequilha told us: "I have had no specific news about what went on in Troia." Botequilha is generally considered, rightly or not, a figure who is not only very close to Ramalho Eanes but is the liaison between the president and the embryonic party. "My name could only be associated with the spirit of the former CNARPE, in which I have many friends. I supported the campaign to reelect General Eanes, whom I very much admired and still admire, and that's all. There is no foundation, at least for the time being, to the reports that link my name with the new party."

For his part, Dr Miguel Caetano, the target of speculation similar to that surrounding Botequilha, repeated the same speech, almost verbatim. No idea what went on in Troia. Not a clue as to why the newspapers had mentioned him as a candidate for leadership of the new party. "Ask Herminio Martinho." "I didn't relish [seeing my name] there." The only plausible explanation was, once again, "my public and well-known relationship with the president of the republic and the former CNARPE." And the final point: "If I had some relationship with the party, I would have been in Troia, don't you think?"

Many Others

As for Medeiros Ferreira, another supposed future leader, he "never knew there was any talk of this." He is following the creation of the party "with great interest," but, as to any commitment, he offers the Sibylline truth: "To everything, there is a season." He admits that he took part in drafting the programmatic texts of the PRD, "as did many others, incidentally." Increasingly mysterious, he says that, for the present, he gives "more importance to the political actions of General Eanes"--and to his professional life--than to the movement originating from the former CNARPE.

This was also more or less the state of mind in which we found Melo Antunes, whose relationship with the future party, even in rumors, appears very remote. "I have no organic ties with the PRD," he assured us. Whether he would come to have them "depends on so many things. Time will tell."

Venturing a personal opinion on the position of the new party, the former Revolutionary Council member "would say that it is situated on the center left: it covers the space which takes in the PSD, passes through the PS [Socialist Party] and reaches areas to the left of that."

This opinion, incidentally, was also endorsed by Jose Carlos Vasconcelos, in an interview granted this week to DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, an opinion with which Herminio Martinho apparently does not entirely agree: according to Martinho, the [PRD] would be purely in the Center, without modifiers.

Although Nobre da Costa has been held up as no less than the Fanists' possible presidential candidate, he shot at us that he does not belong to any political party and is not even interested in politics. Regarding the new party, in particular, he only knows it "at a distance, through the newspapers." On the other hand, there is no reason to attribute any significance to his absence from the luncheon commemorating the reelection of General Eanes. "I wasn't at the earlier ones, either; it didn't fit my schedule." Regarding his reputation as a supporter of General Eanes, which led to our brief--and, in his opinion, ridiculous--telephone conversation, Nobre da Costa said: "General Eanes only needed supporters to be elected." Period.

In this brief survey, the greatest expression of pleasure in the PRD came from Dr Salgado Zenha, but Zenha is a militant Socialist and states clearly that he has no intention of joining the competition. Meanwhile, he describes the appearance of the PRD as a "positive factor for the nation's life": in a democracy "still in the making," the formation of new parties is a sign of vitality and could even lead to a "healthy competition" and broaden the field of choice for the voters.

Program

A party defines itself to the country in two ways: by the people in it and by its program. In the case of the PRD, the only faces which have shown themselves are still Herminio Martinho and Jose Carlos Vasconcelos, inasmuch as the 300 former CNARP delegates who met in Troia are, for the time being, unfamiliar figures to the public at the national level.

Regarding the basis of the program, the Declaration of Principles approved last weekend faithfully reflects the "total democracy" in which it was drafted and in which the PRD takes so much pride. Revised by several CNARPE groups and subjected to evaluation and joint reevaluation, it reconciles the "diverse political and ideological origins" of the authors, by carefully avoiding any political and ideological definition. There is nothing there that might offend anyone.

These broad principles, it is said, will serve as the basis for a general program for a government whose mission is "the spiritual elevation of Portugal and the betterment of the living conditions of the Portuguese." The big innovation that leaps out from between the lines is not this, however, but the implied proposal to achieve these objectives with very few cabinet trips abroad and other such manifestations of morality.

Both Jose Carlos Vasconcelos and Herminio Martinho, president of the National Provisional Committee which will direct the PRD until the national convention, have established the fact that it takes more than an excellent president to solve the problems of the country, which is the victim of less than excellent governments.

Hence, the PRD must have a chance to take part in early legislative elections, to assert its merits while the iron is hot. Whether or not it is counting on a little help from the president in this regard is not entirely clear; whereas

Jose Carlos Vasconcelos referred to the legislative elections in the aforementioned interview with DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, Martinho continues to talk about the local and presidential elections as the first probable test.

On the other hand, if Eanes dissolves the parliament(which would have to occur before June), time is already against the "Renovadores," who are only beginning to collect signatures, to look for party headquarters and to take all the other steps necessary to establish the party, but if Eanes does not dissolve the parliament, God only knows when the PRD will manage to make its debut in the Assembly of the Republic. There is no guarantee that the future president will want elections. Speaking of the future president, the mirage of the desired harmony between organs of sovereignty (for which, at one point, the Eanist camp appeared to be made to order) now appears severely threatened. Considering the PRD's reluctance (if it does not refuse) to support Pintasilgo, Jose Carlos Vasconcelos is now taking care to downplay the importance of the presidential elections--just like another candidate for "nonresident" of Belem, i.e., the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], with which the PRD swears it does not wish to form an alliance. (Here, at least, the PRC has dotted the i's and crossed the t's.)

All Brand New

Who are they, finally?

"Portuguese of various political backgrounds and ideologies," says Line 1 of the Declaration of Principles.

What unites them?

The fact that they "are deeply and patriotically concerned with the present and future of the country," says Line 2.

What are they seeking?

"Concrete solutions and adequate replies to the issues that affect Portuguese society."

Well, as a distinguished leader told us, "ideological tirades only serve to add to the confusion," and he added a spiteful comment on the PS and PSD programs, which have never been carried out and which, incidentally, you will not find for sale, or in any other available form, in the respective party headquarters. It is not surprising.

To return to the Declaration of Principles: Upon verification of a "deep crisis" in every Portuguese, with a "moral crisis of the most serious and transcendent dimensions," it proposes "a new frame of reference," in which the basic values would be "democracy, liberty, progress and justice."

The bold, innovative strokes do not stop here, however.

A second section takes up the "ethical-cultural principles of a new model of society." To wit: the real democratization of society. The primacy of men over the economy. The basic value of work. A policy of the equitable sharing of the economic costs of overcoming the crisis, as well as of the benefits derived. Reform of the educational system.

Effective accountability of the officials of national and local political organs, and the clear declaration of a policy for youth.

No less replete with proposals never before seen or heard, a third chapter, dedicated to the political organization and role of the state, proposes profound reforms in public administration; the creation of a social and cultural environment which will stimulate the most positive values of a civilized society (work, organization and method, sobriety, honesty and social unity); a clear definition of regional policy; improvement and strengthening of the local governments of the Azores and Madeira; the introduction of effectively participatory forms of planning; formulation of a cultural policy; the development of relations between Church and State; promotion of formulas for a clear relationship between the political power and the armed forces.

On the item, "an economy in the service of men," the declaration notes, as the "idea-force," a "breaking away from recessive policies" with "development as the basic goal." Among other novelties, it proposes: to break the circle of foreign dependence; to conduct a financial housecleaning; to relaunch and guide productive investment; to promote equity and profit-sharing.

Why has no one thought of this before?

The next to last chapter is devoted to public communications "in the context of a changing society," and the last chapter deals with ways to "restore confidence and organize expectations"--basically, "with energy, ability and imagination."

These are, in summary, the principles. Regarding the statutes (approved only in part), they provide for the rank of "supporter," on a par with that of militant; they call for an advisory council of eminent figures and give PRD deputies freedom to vote independently--except in the case of approval of the program for a PRD government, from which they may not be excused, and the same applies in the case of motions of confidence or censure of such a government.

Pintasilgo's Role

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 2 MAR 85 p 3

[Editorial by Victor Cunha Rego: "The Counter-Party"]

[Text] The independence of a presidential mandate, the constitutional power, the resources which, despite false modesty, Eanes has at his disposal, the availability of a host of political cadres and, above all, the laceration of a PS divided to the point that it enabled him to return to the government: all this has contributed to make the spirit of the CNARPE continue to hover over us and, one day, to descend to the earth.

Strangely enough, only Sa Carneiro and his comrades have never tired of emphasizing this fact. Once the threat of "real socialism" was dispelled by the results of the 1980 legislative elections, public opinion, even those who voted for the AD [Democratic Alliance], accepted the fantasy of a CNARPE devoid of partisan interests. Mario Soares himself had misgivings, but with his proverbial indifference, he relaxed and forgot about it. Now the CNARPE is there as it has always been: a party, or a "counter-party."

It was born of a fraud, but this fact is unlikely to cause embarrassment in a country where impunity has reigned. It is probable that, in this first phase, the new party can present itself as a model of virtues, with the help of PCP specialists, who have already succeeded in turning huge "gulags" into small white doves.

Moreover, most of the population respects the president. People are tired of a "nomenklatura" that talks about regeneration but acts as if this were only a change of clothing, as if ethics were (as they are) external to its being. The popular majority supports the president because he has known how to use the mask of serenity and rectitude, and the people admire the prince when he appears to be what they would like him to be.

If Eanes were the Robespierre of 25 April (it is already proven that he was not the Bonaparte of 25 November), the despotism of the social utopia could serve as the foundation of the new party and a new revolutionary phase--but Eanes is not a Robespierre. Without a program or an ideology, he has only managed, up to now, to be the counter-power to Sa Carneiro, in 1980, and to Soares, in 1985. For this reason, it is doubtful that the new party can be anything more than a counter-party, the fruit of the disillusionment of a handful of idealists and of legions who have knocked at the door of the government day after day, seeking a position, a deal, alms, and have gotten no response from those who are enjoying the banquet at the Budget table.

It is not evident how, without early legislative elections, this counter-party can free itself of the only presidential candidacy rooted in the social utopia, proper to the civilian cold war we are experiencing: the candidacy of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo.

Without legislative elections and a possible early defeat of Mario Soares, what can Eanes do? Is he to wait around for a Pintasilgo defeat which will strengthen the PS or a Pintasilgo victory, which will create a two-headed Eanism?

There will be a great effort to rescue the party from the candidacy of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, but if she insists on it, she has it in the bag.

Martinho's Mission Accomplished

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 2 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by P.A.: "Herminio Martinho: Mission Accomplished"]

[Text] Last weekend, a proposal signed by representatives of all the district organizations of the Democratic Renewal Party (Eanist) named Herminio Paiva Fernandes Martinho as president of the Directive Committee of the new party. Martinho is an agricultural regent from Santarem, aged 38. He is not the party leader; this spot is reserved for Gen Ramalho Eanes. He does not even appear to be a particularly gifted political leader. Besides, as someone connected with the movement told us, the lack of debate over his name had much less to do with the leadership qualities that he displays than with the certainty instilled in more ambitious members that Martinho will not be dangerous competition.

What the party did, when all is said and done, was to recognize the decisive role of Herminio Martinho as the motivating force and perpetuator of a whole lengthy and slow organization process. And now it can be said that his post is almost honorific, the crowning of a career. In effect, the mission of this young agricultural technician from Santarem is almost accomplished. When the party is ready to be placed in the hands of General Eanes, it will be the turn of the politicians, technocrats or not. The rank and file of the movement, who have made a point of taking pride in their rurality and of remaining aloof from the national figures, will have to give way before this truth. They have already surrendered. Martinho himself confided to us that he thinks there is every advantage in calling prominent figures like Joao Botequilha and Miguel Caetano to assume the political leadership of the PRD. In his opinion, they performed intensive and useful work in the former CNARPE.

This is not to say that Martinho peacefully accepts being relegated to the background.

Those who know him well tell us that ever since he returned to Santarem in December 1974 (after military duty in Cabinda), he has always been in politics in one way or another. He began as a resister to the PREC [Revolutionary Council], in activities linked to the CAP.

After 25 November, he collaborated with Centrists and Social Democrats, although he had no formal affiliation. In 1977 he joined the Organizing Committee for the National Agricultural Fair, in which, according to those who knew him then, he also opposed the participation of the UCP's in the exposition.

After the AD was formed, the PS invited him to run for the Santarem chamber, as an independent, in the 1979 local elections, with the specific goal of being the councilman who would preside over the Agricultural Fair. He accepted. It was at the fair that he met the president of the republic, who presented him with the Agricultural Medal of Merit. His friendship with Major Pimentel, chief of the office of the president, which dates back to the Cabinda period, helped to bring him closer to Eanes.

The son of a small farmer in Tancos, Martinho was going to study for the Railroad, and he finished his 7th year in Santarem. In 1969 he entered the army (to which he would be called up again, in 1973, as a captain of the militia). Having been assigned to the Practical Cavalry School, he was graduated from the Agricultural School of Santarem. His father, a native of a village where the number of men in uniform outnumbered the few civilians there, would have liked his son to pursue a military career, but his son had other ideas.

After an internship in fruit farming, he was employed on the agricultural estate of the earl of Ribeira Seca, which is divided between Santarem and the Alentejo. When the earl decided to sell his property, Martinho went with CIBA-GEIGY, and continued to farm, as a tenant, a 140-hectare area that had belonged to his former employer (where he has a house which the earl had granted to him). He later purchased the land, with a partner. Business has been going well for him lately.

Vasconcelos: No PCP Alliance

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Feb 85 p 7

[Text of interview with Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos, one of the founders of the Democratic Renewal Party, by Simoes Ilharco, date and place not specified]

[Text] Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos is 44 years old. Attorney, politician, poet and journalist: one man, four facets. Which does he prefer? That of journalist--and also that of lawyer. Together, journalism and the law are, to Vasconcelos, "a form of struggle for freedom and justice." Poetry is essential, but, he confided, it is at another level, "an involuntary activity," to use the exact words of a man who does not see himself as a politician. He prefers to see himself as a civilian who intervenes in politics "only when I think it is absolutely necessary." With the creation of the PRD, this is one of the moments when it is absolutely necessary. This interview focused primarily on the PRD, to attempt to find out what it is, what it seeks to be, what it will be. In traditional terms, an observer would place the party politically at the center-left. However, it is also a party which advocates a new political practice. Struggling for the primacy of change and honesty, the party rules out any alliance with the PCP, but other alliances are possible, although the PRD's central goal is to achieve a majority.

Interview

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: According to some observers, the real reason behind the creation of the PRD had to do with the idea of putting an end to the PS. These observers say that the PRD was born to kill off the other one, the Socialist Party, which had strayed from its origins and identity and is now a clearly conservative party.

Vasconcelos: Absolutely untrue. If observers are saying this, they are making an absurd statement. Anyone who thinks this way must have some kind of persecution complex. The new party is not against anyone, and certainly not the PS.

DIARIO: And what is it for?

Vasconcelos: We declare ourselves positively. We will continue to declare ourselves this way, and not in relation to other parties--and certainly not, I reiterate, against other parties.

DIARIO: If I asked you to locate the PRD for me in the classic Left- Center-Right triad, where would you put it? How would you classify it?

Vasconcelos: I think that any classification in terms of this triad is largely out of date, because it has often represented ideals and values which no longer correspond to the realities and needs of the period in which we now live. In Portugal, at this moment, the Left-Right dichotomy is less important than

the choice between change and stagnation, between honesty and corruption. We are clearly for change and honesty. If an observer wanted to classify us in traditional terms, it is natural that he would locate us at the center-left.

DIARIO: But that space is claimed by the PSD....

Vasconcelos: It is also claimed by the PS. But, as I said, what is most important to us are the two vectors I referred to initially. It is one thing for parties to have excellent programs and, in many cases, excellent leaders and members. It is another thing to act in accordance with these programs. Obviously, if the PS and PSD had been faithful to their programs, their promises, to the things that many Portuguese expected of them, it would never have been necessary to create this new party.

With or Without Eanes

DIARIO: So we have arrived at the primary reason for the new party. Do you agree with the statement that, with Eanes, the party could be many things, but without Eanes it will never be anything?

Vasconcelos: I think this statement is excessive, to say the least. The PRD is intended to be a party of programs, of principles, a defender of new ideas, of a new morality and a new political practice, without which there can be no change. We have already had enough parties created by one person or for one person. It happens that General Eanes best reflects the image of honesty and dignity, namely in the exercise of political power, which the PRD seeks to project. Obviously, we are also well aware that the vote which the party receives will depend greatly on whether or not General Eanes has a direct involvement with the party.

DIARIO: Could it be said that Herminio Martinho is a transition figure, the provisional leader, and that when the president leaves office he will be the definitive leader?

Vasconcelos: I was, I suppose, the first person to argue the need to create this new party, basically from the citizens who worked in CNARPE in 1980. I am much more concerned, I repeat, with programs and principles than with individuals or with these issues of leadership that stir up the other parties so much. My dear friend Herminio Martinho was, quite handily, elected president of the provisional directing committee, which was justified, incidentally, by the work he had already done. Regarding the future president of the party, all I can say is that we would all like it to be Gen Ramalho Eanes and that we feel this is very important to the party.

Pintasilgo and the PRD

DIARIO: The PRD is totally distinct from the Pintasilgo movement?

Vasconcelos: I don't know that there is any such Pintasilgo movement. .

DIARIO: I will inform you that there is already a committee in support of the candidacy of Eng Lourdes Pintasilgo and that it is already fully engaged in her campaign....

Vasconcelos: Good. If I understand you, you are referring to the so-called candidacy of Lourdes Pintasilgo.

DIARIO: I would say that, in fact, there is certainly a movement.

Vasconcelos: I can tell you that our movement and future party has strictly nothing to do with it. As I have already said, and even wrote some time ago, I think that the new party cannot take any position regarding the presidential elections without broad debate, and naturally this would be after the party is constituted. So whatever has been said up to now in this regard is without any foundation.

DIARIO: Speaking personally, without theorizing on the position of the party, do you favor a civilian or a military candidate? And should the PRD support Lourdes Pintasilgo?

Vasconcelos: I consider any discussion of civilian versus military to be secondary. I would even say that there are military officers who appear to be 'civilians' and there are civilians who look to be "military." Furthermore, in 1976 Ramalho Eanes was a military candidate and in 1980 he was a civilian candidate. With regard to Eng Lourdes Pintasilgo, I consider her a distinguished figure, both because of the important posts which she has occupied and because of the popularity which the polls demonstrate, placing her well ahead in the so-called race to Belem.

Several Choices

DIARIO: And regarding PRD support for a presidential candidate. You haven't answered my question.

Vasconcelos: I believe that the PRD must choose its candidate only at the proper time and having considered all the circumstances, not in favor of or against any individual, namely Lourdes Pintasilgo, but looking at all the choices that will be offered then--and theoretically there are several--to select the one which seems best to us.

DIARIO: Would you say that the question will be put in terms of a dichotomy--either Pintasilgo or a military candidate?

Vasconcelos: No, I wouldn't. Some months ago, I myself, as a political commentator, listed the names of several civilians as possible candidates.

DIARIO: Turning from the presidential elections and going to the politics of alliances, what is the natural ally of the PRD?

Vasconcelos: Given the present performance of the various parties, I would say that we have no natural ally at the moment. I think that any eventual alliance, which presupposes the failure to achieve an absolute majority (which

is still not entirely ruled out), could only be really decided when the question comes up, and taking into account the evolution of the other parties, specifically the PS.

DIARIO: What about alliances with the PCP? Will they be possible?

Vasconcelos: It is my personal feeling that an alliance with the PCP is beyond the realm of any prediction or possibility, since the PCP is in an area and defends certain principles that have nothing to do with us. This is not to say that I don't believe the PCP should be treated like any other party or that we should maintain a dialogue with it, because the PCP has registered a significant expression of support among the voters and has even more significant weight in the world of labor.

Preferred Alliances

DIARIO: Then can we deduce from your words that the PRD's preferred alliance would be with a reformed PS and large segments of the PSD?

Vasconcelos: That is your deduction.

DIARIO: And what is your opinion?

Vasconcelos: The reality will be subject to the test of time and to developments in those parties. One thing is certain: I am against any form of Manichaeism and I have some hope that the appearance of the PRD and the new political practice which it will try to impose will have some influence on those parties.

DIARIO: To conclude: does the PRD advocate dissolving the parliament or dismissing the government, both of these or neither of them?

Vasconcelos: I can't speak for the PRD, which has not taken a definite position in this regard. I can say, however, speaking personally, that only the dissolution of the parliament and new legislative elections will permit the full presentation of a new political project like the one that we are promoting. It is in this light that I emphasize that, at this moment, I consider this project and its success to be more important than the presidential elections, particularly because the very program and powers of the president of the republic are contingent on the success of our project.

Political Scenarios Examined

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Mar 85 p 2

[Commentary by Dinis de Abreu: "The Countdown"]

[Text] The impatience of which the "Fanists" have so often complained no longer has a reason for being. After a difficult gestation, the new party was born last weekend in Troia.

As is the custom, the first act with regard to the infant was the choice of a name. The "godfathers" argued for a while, but--also according to form--they reached a consensus and the "Fanist" family approved it without any major problems.

Having been baptized, the Democratic Renewal Party now needs only to be officially registered to achieve the "citizenship" so eagerly awaited and so long delayed.

A few months away from his compulsory "retirement" from the presidency of the republic, Eanes agreed to allow the former CNARPE to deliver the new party, although he preferred not to attend the "birth." He does not deny paternity and he certainly will not withhold the "food support," but he is not going to be in close contact with the new party in the coming months.

Thus, the PRD will have to learn to take its first steps under the eye of the "godfathers," and only later, when circumstances warrant it, will the party "be delivered into the care" of the "father."

Significance

What, in the end, will the PRD mean politically?

Particularly in the last 2 years, Eanes has employed an ambiguity that at times must have driven even his unconditional supporters to despair. Some of them, tired of waiting, had no inhibition about changing direction and others were close to doing the same.

Was there any reason for his hesitation? By principle and temperament, Eanes is not the model of a gambler, who is willing to place his bet with less than the best odds. He is cautious and calculates the risks with studied detachment. Although these are characteristics which no one would dare classify as defects, in politics there is always a risk factor.

It could be asked what risk there would be for Eanes in the appearance of the new party. At first glance, practically none, but, on further reflection, we would have to conclude that, although he is not immediately involved with it, the president's entire political future rests with the PRD.

After Troia, everything the PRD does (or does not do) will reflect on Eanes, even though Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos and Herminio Martinho have made an effort to give the new party an ideological and social profile. Sooner than expected, however, Vasconcelos is already inviting the president to make a clear commitment, as evidenced a few days ago, when he declared to this newspaper that "the electoral results for the party will be very different, depending on whether or not General Eanes is directly involved with it."

This is the thread of the plot, and the novel is a voluminous one. How can General Eanes "involve himself" more in the party without resigning the presidency?

It is known that the plot is outlined by several Fanists: the president would resign his office (a possibility that was not ruled out, incidentally, in his interview on Radio Renascença) and would assume full leadership of the party to compete in the elections. Before resigning, he would dissolve the parliament, this moving up the legislative elections.

It is theoretically possible, but we do not believe the president of the republic would make so bold as to choose this path. Without resigning, he might, however, find a good pretext by June to dissolve the Assembly, and there are those who think that the new political leadership of the PSD would not look with disfavor on such a possibility.

In the last few days, Rui Machete has been warning the PSD militants that they must be prepared for the possibility of early legislative elections. His reasoning is odd, however, because he based this conviction on the fact that an Fanist party was being created, whose "first priority would be the legislative elections," but he ignored the fact that this supposed priority will only be realized if the coalition falls apart because of a rift between the partners or because of an uncontrollable crisis in one of them.

So the possibility of early legislative elections is not owing to the appearance of a new party (no matter how high a priority the new party places on them), but to the pretext it gives to the partners in the coalition.

It might be worth investigating if it is not actually in the PSD's interest to offer Eanes this chance and give the new party its priority.

In fact, with or without Eanes as the actual leader, the PRD's primary adversary is, for obvious reasons, the Socialist Party. The Communist Party understood this long ago and hence has always cherished the project.

In a scenario of early elections, including a new competitor with the president's stamp of approval, the Socialist Party could be seriously hurt, to the benefit of the PSD (which has suffered less erosion in the government, as evidenced by the most recent polls) and of the PCP, which can count on a solid constituency and on added support because of mounting discontent created by the crisis.

In such a context, it would apparently be highly advantageous for the Social Democrats to submit to early elections, even if they could not prevent some desertions to the PRD.

For this reason, Soares is concerned with softening all the factors for erosion within the coalition, to keep the government intact until June, and to prevent Eanes from exercising his authority to dissolve the assembly.

Soares is aware that a poor showing by his party in early legislative elections could irremediably compromise his presidential candidacy. On the other hand, if the PSD came to choose a civilian and party candidate, and there were no justification for calling general elections, the Socialist leader would have a twofold advantage: he would have blocked the PRD and would be closer to the presidency.

In that case, the future of the PSD would not be so bright and Machete would come to be suspected of closet "Soarism" (of which he is already being accused); the Social Democrats would be subordinated to the Socialists, at least for the foreseeable future.

As for the PRD, if it is not soon tested in legislative elections, its alleged "calling" at the local level (natural for a party that takes pride in being provincial) is not going to be projected nationally. Without deputies seated in the parliament, or a visible and credible presidential candidate (the Eanists are known to have doubts about Lourdes Pintasilgo and some of them also have reservations about the reliability of the polls, or at least whether they reflect the reality of the nation), the PRD would risk remaining in the orbit of the power without managing to penetrate it, which would certainly not be pleasing to the man who agreed to be its patron.

To summarize, after Troia, there are three parties--PRD, PSD and PCP--which are potentially affected by early elections, there is a president who may not be interested in being prime minister and a prime minister who wants, at any cost, to be president.

The plots that Portuguese democracy weaves are strange indeed. We will be closely following the next chapters, in which the action promises to be varied and filled with surprises.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLITICS TODAY: 'FANISM' VERSUS 'ANTI-FANISM'

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 23 Feb 85 p 4

[Commentary by P.A.: "The Fanist Spectre"]

[Text] The spectre of Fanism is a thick cloud hovering over the nation's political horizon. It is the reference point seized desperately by all those who have nothing to propose or to offer, all those who are utterly devoid of any program or ideology.

There are those who perpetuate the myth of Fanism in order to reject it--and thus appear to have something to say--and there are those who are simply waiting for the descent of the savior Messiah to the terrestrial palace.

This weekend, while some centrists in Aveiro are preparing to bring together the internal opposition to the party labeled "Fanist," a group of faithful souls in Troia are attempting to give the spectre an earthly name.

For many broad sectors, politics in Portugal today is simply this: Fanism and anti-Fanism. Mario Soares, with eyes fixed eagerly on Belem, is the first to maintain this bipolar logic--Soares, who fought furiously against the bipolarization promoted by Sa Carneiro through the AD [Democratic Alliance]. The attitude of the Socialist leader is understandable, however; anti-Fanism is obviously the best and easiest way to broaden Soares' support in the presidential campaign.

It is not by chance that Basilio Horta, after appearing in DIARIO DE NOTICIAS to say that Eanes is the political enemy and Mario Soares is only a political adversary (to accuse Lucas Pires of being Fanist), was soon invited to defend this theory on Telejornal [television news station].

It was really Sa Carneiro who launched Fanism when, in late 1978, he invited Ramalho Eanes to lead a presidential movement--for which he sought to use the prestige and popularity of the president of the republic. When the president refused, the old Social Democratic leader came forward with the AD and, in the bipolarization thus created, placed Eanes on the other side of the fence. After the 1980 elections, the political power blamed its inability to act on Fanism, the Revolutionary Council and the constitution. When the constitution was revised and the Revolutionary Council was gone, that left only Fanism, a real thorn in the side of Mario Soares who, without his approval, had seen the PS mobilize in support of the reelection of Ramalho Eanes in 1980.

And the Fanists? They wait--and they use the time to build an organic structure. They have no ideology, no program, no solutions. They have faith, hope and patience.

Fanes, the flesh and blood Fanes, is in Belem. His plans are unfathomable.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

'BOURGEOIS' CDS POLITICAL TENDENCIES ANALYZED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 23 Feb 85 p 3

[Commentary by Victor Cunha Rego: "The Bourgeois Party"]

[Text] The CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] Congress: will it merely mean the assignment of posts in a conformist arrangement, depressed and depressing, or will it come up with a clear strategy of opposition to the central bloc and to Eanism?

One can look at the CDS as a party which does not offer and does not allow a new regime, or as the cornerstone on which to rebuild the present regime. We start from the latter premise.

There are two political lines in the CDS. One of them wants to remain in stubborn competition with the PSD [Social Democratic Party], because the AD [Democratic Alliance) was, in its view, a bitter and unforgettable lesson. The PSD was the big gainer and the CDS was the loser. These centrists cannot join again with the right wing minority and they cannot share a presidential candidate with the PSD. Conclusion: a stoic opposition struggle for as many years as necessary, taking votes and cadres from the PSD, step by arduous and determined step, hoping for the day when the CDS will overtake and dominate its competition.

This would be comparable, in a restricted sense, to the strategy which the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] pursued for decades in opposition to the old regime and which actually brought it to the brink of power on 25 April 1974. It would be a reasonable strategy if the bourgeoisie were a more energetic social class, if it were willing to accept discipline and, finally, if Eanism does not give the system its second wind. Otherwise, the CDS will be a "ghetto" and, at long range, it will develop touches of paranoia.

The other CDS line starts from the premise that 10 years have been enough to demonstrate that the CDS is a marginal party which cannot hold out for very long as the opposition. In this case, an alliance with other parties is essential to its very survival. Those who think this way note that, in 10 years, the centrists have not been able to assert their most valid leaders (Freitas do Amaral, for example); to bring their best cadres (e.g., Bagao Felix or Nogueira de Brito) into the party leadership; to publicize their most fruitful initiatives (e.g., Ofer meetings); to reconcile their most influential

political leaders (e.g., Adriano Moreira and Azevedo Soares); or to mobilize their most esteemed and generally accepted figures (e.g., Morais Leitao). In short, the party would have grown if it had been driven by the talents of Adelino Amaro da Costa and of a group of leader-founders; without this driving force, the brilliance of Lucas Pires and the shrewdness of his lieutenants will not be enough to bring together the necessary political cadres for the party's renaissance and the long opposition stand.

From this perspective, the CDS should devote itself to building a new AD, in which the leadership would necessarily fall to the PSD leaders who are under no obligation to the central bloc. If the PSD presents a presidential candidate for change, the CDS should join in his promotion and in the launching of his campaign, for tactical and strategic reasons.

Which of these two lines will prevail in the CDS congress? They will probably not even come into confrontation.

It is difficult to believe that the CDS will find the necessary energy to build and dominate an alliance on the Right or the iron discipline needed to remain for years and years as the opposition. Nor will it be easy to execute a strategy of alliance with a PSD which lacks, at least for the moment, a charismatic leader.

If this is the case, if the CDS continues on its path of lethargy, interspersed with assertive "slogans," Eanism will stand to gain.

The body politic appears to be transfixed, hypnotized by Lucifer, the demonic light bearer who, knowing the weak vision of the many good militants of the PSD and the CDS, seeks to blind them so they will not see the only immediate political reality: if Eanes does not put a stop to it by June, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo will overtake him and then Eanism will be two-headed.

When, for tactical reasons, the PSD radicals accept unity to frustrate Eanes, they soon come under the fire of those who, having been with the central bloc, now accuse them of selling out to Soares. When the CDS could revitalize itself in combat with the new Eanist party which is preparing to prolong the life of this constitution, it prefers to take another course and to define its strategy primarily in terms of the PSD, a strategy which cannot succeed.

The bourgeoisie in this country wavers between blindness and illuminism. Or doesn't it?

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PCP DELEGATION'S GDR VISIT REPORTED

PM131111 Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 7 Mar 85 p 3

["Visit to GDR"--AVANTE! headline]

[Excerpt] The PCP delegation's visit to the GDR started with the meeting in Berlin between PCP Secretary General Comrade Alvaro Cunhal and First Secretary of the SED and Chairman of the GDR Council of State Comrade Erich Honecker--a meeting given great prominence in the GDR media. In a very cordial and fraternal atmosphere the SED and PCP representatives had a detailed exchange of opinions on international matters and on the two parties' policies.

During the meeting agreement was noted on essential matters such as the safeguarding of peace and the elimination of the threat of war as the central task of all peoples; the value of the peace policy of the USSR and the socialist community both in its offer of constructive proposals and in its demonstration to imperialism of the impossibility of attaining strategic military superiority; the importance of the latest Soviet-U.S. negotiations; and the correctness of the USSR stance, in view of the need for a combined examination of the arms race as a whole and of the militarization of peace.

At the official luncheon which Comrade Honecker gave for the PCP delegation and which was attended by members of the SED Politburo, Comrade Alvaro Cunhal said in his speech that the visit was another demonstration of the mutual friendship, cooperation, and solidarity that have always characterize and which still characterize relations between the two parties.

Crisis in Portugal

Referring next to the Portuguese situation, Comrade Alvaro Cunhal went on.

"The democratic transformations carried out by the Portuguese revolution in the socioeconomic structures--particularly the nationalization of banking and of the basic sectors of the Portuguese economy and the agrarian reform--opened the way to the exploitation of national resources and potentials and to a rapid economic development for the good of our people and our country.

"The counterrevolutionary process of the past 9 years, which has dealt heavy blows to nationalized enterprises and sectors and to the collective units and cooperatives of the agrarian reform--carrying out an actual crusade for centralization and for the capitalists' accumulation of the surplus value created in the country, of capital, resources, and goods, and restoring processes of the unrestrained exploitation of the workers--has driven Portugal into a profound crisis."

Having referred in greater detail to the counterrevolutionary process and to the workers' struggle to defend the April gains, the PCP secretary general said:

"The present year will undoubtedly see some important political events.

"If the present government were to succeed in remaining in power not only would the situation become worse and worse but even political democracy and national independence would be seriously threatened."

"We are struggling and will continue to struggle," he said at a later juncture, "for the formation of a government that will end the counterrevolutionary process; honor the constitution and democratic law; and mobilize the nation's resources, energies and potentials so that Portugal can return to the shining path of freedom, progress, peace, and national independence taken by the April Revolution.

"Despite the complexity and dangers of the situation, we will remain confident that these objectives will be attained."

International Situation

Next Comrade Alvaro Cunhal broached the international situation. "We share," he said, "the SED's anxieties concerning the gravity and the dangers of the present international situation, stemming from the policy of interference, intervention, aggressions, and warfare of imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism.

"We share the SED's anxieties concerning the new and serious threats of nuclear war stemming from the arms race, the deployment of the new U.S. missiles in Europe, and the plans for the militarization of space.

"Not only do we understand the measures taken by the USSR, the GDR, and other Warsaw Pact countries to maintain strategic military parity, but we consider them essential to the security of the socialist countries and a contribution to the defense of peace in Europe and the world.

"We consider the proposals for negotiations and peace from the Soviet Union, the GDR, and other Warsaw Pact countries a solid basis for the alleviation of international tension and for the solution of the serious international problems that now exist."

"The defense of peace (inseparable from the struggle for freedom, democracy, national independence, social progress, and socialism) is now a central, general, and joint task of all peoples and nations."

Before winding up his speech Alvaro Cunhal said: "The unity of the socialist countries and the joint or convergent action and mutual solidarity of the socialist countries, the workers movement in the capitalist countries, the national liberation movement, and the progressive countries constitute the basic precondition for the victory of the joint struggle."

In his speech Comrade Erich Honecker said that the present international situation demands more than ever a struggle for a change of course in favor of peace involving all states, large and small, and all those working against war and for peace, particularly the peace movement. Next he asserted the usefulness of proposals aimed at reducing tensions and at detente, as well as creating nuclear-free areas and corridors in Central and Northern Europe, in the Balkans, and on the Iberian peninsula.

In his speech the SED first secretary condemned the outcome revanchist aims of certain FRG forces which challenge the outcome of World War II and of postwar developments, and also voiced his conviction of the need for greater cooperation within the international communist movement in order to be able more effectively to oppose the escalation of imperialism's most aggressive forces.

Comrade Honecker mentioned the close relations of friendship and trust between the SED and the PCP based on the principle of proletarian internationalism and on the traditions of many years of joint struggle for peace, democracy, and socialism.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PCP'S CUNHAL POLISH VISIT REPORTED

PM131010 Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 7 Mar 85 p 3

["Visit to Poland"--AVANTE! headline]

[Excerpts] The PCP delegation's visit to Poland and particularly [PCP secretary general] Comrade Alvaro Cunhal's meeting with Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Central Committee First Secretary Comrade W. Jaruzelski were given great prominence in the Polish press. A communique released to PAP states that the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee briefed the leader of the PCP on the country's present political and economic situation and on the party's present tasks.

The PCP secretary general talked about the PCP's tasks and activities in the country's present situation and on the international scene. He reasserted the PCP's understanding of and solidarity with the PZPR's activity within the framework of its line of socialist renewal.

The first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee conveyed to his guest cordial greetings to Portuguese communists for their struggle in defense of the vital interests of the working masses, social progress, and peace.

During the meeting the hope was expressed that the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva will help attenuate international tension and open the way to disarmament accords.

It was stressed at the same time that the preservation of the strategic military balance is the only realistic basis for world peace.

During the meeting there was also discussion of matters relating to the continuous intensification of cooperation and friendship between the PZPR and the PCP.

The meeting was also attended by PCP Central Committee Political Commission and Secretariat member Domingo Abrantes and PZPR Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat member Jozef Czyrek.

The delegation had talks with other PZPR leaders, including PZPR Politburo and Secretariat member Comrade Czyrek and PZPR International Section Chief [post as published] Comrade Sujka.

On 25 February at the Belweder Palace Chairman of the State Council Comrade Henryk Jablonski presented Comrade Alvaro Cunhal with the Polish Order of Merit, in the presence of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and PZPR Central Committee First Secretary Comrade Jaruzelski.

Socialism Source of Experience

On that occasion speeches were delivered by Comrades Jaruzelski and Alvaro Cunhal.

In his speech Comrade Alvaro Cunhal said:

"Relations between the PCP and the PZPR have always been characterized by fraternal friendship inspired by the principles of proletarian internationalism.

"Both during the period of the tough clandestine struggle against the fascist dictatorship and since the April 1974 revolution, both at times of success and victory and at the most difficult moments of our struggle, both at the time of the advance of the Portuguese revolution and during the past 9 years, when there has been a succession of counterrevolutionary offensives due to action of successive governments, we Portuguese communists have always enjoyed the support and solidarity of the PZPR and of socialist Poland.

"We in turn have always been at socialist Poland's side, rejoicing in its successes and achievements in building the new society and worrying about its difficulties, in active solidarity with the PZPR and the Polish people.

"The existence of the socialist community and of numerous countries building a new society from which capitalist exploitation and oppression have been banished constitutes the greatest gain of the workers and peoples of the entire world, the greatest obstacle to the attainment of imperialism's plans for world hegemony, and the most solid guarantee of peace and progressive development for human society.

"Ever socialist country is more than the historic achievement of the liberation of its people. It is a source of strength and experience, of support and stimulation to other peoples.

"Therefore just as on the one hand the socialist countries show active solidarity with the other major forces active in the world process of liberation--the workers movement in the capitalist countries, the national liberation movement, and the progressive countries--it is also the duty of these forces to show mutual solidarity with the socialist countries.

"This duty acquires particular significance in the dangerous international situation that we are experiencing.

"In order to achieve its plans for world domination imperialism, and in particular U.S. imperialism, is using every means at its disposal--false economic aid to gain positions of domination and dependence; loans as a means of exercising further financial strangulation; economic, commercial, technological, and political embargoes; interference; provocation; terrorism; intervention; aggression; and warfare.

Fraternal Friendship and Solidarity

"The present international situation," Comrade Alvaro Cunhal said at a later juncture, "makes the peace struggle a central and universal task for all peoples, and also emphasizes the complementary nature of the struggle for peace, democracy, social progress, national independence, and socialism.

"The present international situation creates an even more imperative need for the unity of the communist movement and for joint or convergent action and mutual solidarity on the part of all anti-imperialist forces.

"Within the context of this situation we consider PCP-PZPR relations exemplary because of the principles which guide them and their development in practice.

"We Portuguese communists are certain of socialist Poland's shining future. And we are pleased that Polish communists express to us their confidence that the Portuguese people will succeed in defending and continuing the democratic Portugal won by the April revolution.

"The lofty honor conferred on me is a manifestation of the PZPR's esteem for the patriotic activities and internationalist stances of the PCP, which I have the honor to represent on this solemn occasion. This lofty distinction is also in itself an expression of the solidarity of Polish communists and socialist Poland with Portuguese communists.

"It would be appropriate now to confirm that the PZPR, socialist Poland, and the Polish people can for their part be confident of the PCP's fraternal friendship and solidarity."

Recalling the antifascist struggle for the democratic revolution in Portugal, April and its gains, and the present struggle to defend them, Alvaro Cunhal said that this experience "explains why, at the time of most critical danger, the PCP understood the necessity [apparent word drop] and measures taken by the Polish Government and the PZPR and spoke out resolutely to express its solidarity with socialist Poland."

"The reason for the deep interest with which Portugal follows the situation in Poland is the continuing hysterical anti-Polish campaign conducted in Poland by our country's most reactionary forces and by the spokesman for imperialism."

After his speech the workers present asked several questions about the situation in Portugal and the PCP's activity.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

TIMES NOT FAVORABLE FOR NEW EANIST PARTY

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 23 Feb 85 p 8

[Commentary by Jose Miguel Judice: "In the Shoes of General Eanes"]

[Text] I would not have wanted to be in General Eanes' shoes. As long as things go on as they have until now, I will continue to feel sorry for him and might even offer the praise and eulogies that are customarily intoned to drown out the noise of the dirt being shoveled over political corpses. To arrive at this conclusion, which might not seem so obvious to others, I have tried to adopt the viewpoint of the interests of Eanism, however difficult this theoretical exercise may be for someone like me, who had already lost his illusions when others were still willing to heed them.

General Eanes has natural political ambitions. Without the knack of intellectual participation in Portuguese life and not of an age to accept a kind of golden retirement, he is condemned to create a political party. This is a natural decision (because no one would expect him to seek active membership in any of the existing parties, least of all the ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Party, which copied him]); it is an advantageous decision (because, in a country of myths like Portugal, it would be unhealthy if Eanism did not become incarnate); it is an unpostponable decision (because if a new system of power relations is established before the party comes forward, Eanes will have lost his chance, in a country which is unmerciful and shabby toward those who have lost power).

Like any political decision, however, this one requires minimal objective and subjective conditions and favorable instrumental factors. The birth of a new party always involves a period of labor, painful or not, but always with the possibility of complications. The subjective conditions are fulfilled with the availability of the president, the existence of some political cadres and a space opened up by the PS [Socialist Party] shift to the Right. The objective conditions are what they are: a certain crisis among the current parties; the Portuguese messianism; the prominence of Eanes; the central bloc; and the political Stalinism (which coexists with a certain cultural Gramscianism, but that's another story) of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party].

With these objective and subjective conditions, one would think that the Eanist party would have to be a success. It is obvious that it could be a more (over 30 percent) or less (under 15 percent) significant success, but it would

certainly be a force to be reckoned with in the future and, with any luck, the new party might become the hinge that the PSD dissidents who formed the ASDI naively dreamed of becoming. As with everything in life, however, something more is needed and, in this case, what is essential, or at least highly desirable, is that the above-mentioned instrumental factors are favorable to the venture. I have already made my meaning clear, but, in any case, I will continue to submit that these factors could not be worse, and there is no reason to believe they will improve. This is where the shoe pinches.

If the Fanist party is to be successful, the stellar conjunction will have to be favorable. This would mean the active and public participation in a moderate and victorious presidential candidacy; the holding of the legislative elections before the presidential elections, to trivialize the political weight of the existing parties in the selection and support of candidates; and, finally, the PS "shift to the Right," as the price of PSD support for the presidential candidacy of Mario Soares.

By contrast to this favorable conjunction of the stars, it is possible to describe the constellation that would be most unfavorable to the birth of the Fanist party. The party in formation could become divided by the inability to support a presidential candidate; it could be impossible to hold legislative elections while Eanes is still in office; there would be Soares' strategy to gain support on the Left, plugging up the political hole which 2 years in office (and some prior "sins") had opened up.

Real life is always filled with shading and blendings, a mixture of colors and fragrances. The unrealism of political life in Portugal is measured by the existence of cases that are all black and white. One of these cases is the Fanist party; the astral configuration which will preside at its birth could not be less favorable. Everything that would be desirable will not happen and every disadvantage is in plain sight, as I will attempt to demonstrate in a few words.

In the first place, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo will be a candidate, against the wishes of the Fanist leaders and of the president himself. In the second place, the PSD is not going to support a military candidate acceptable to the new party, such as Firmino or Almeida Costa. Third, because of the way in which the PSD crisis was resolved, Eanes will only be able to dissolve the assembly if Mota Pinto wins the PSD congress--but, in this case, a hypothetical military candidate would work against the Fanist party.

In the fourth place, the conditions are no longer there for an electoral confrontation between a Soares/civilian/bourgeois/anti-Communist campaign and that of a Firmino Miguel/military/ Castro/lesser evil for the PCP. This means that none of the instruments that would constitute a favorable constellation for the new party is present.

On the other hand, all the elements of a negative constellation are on the horizon (if not already here). First, the Fanist candidacy would be supported by part of Fanism, while the other part would reject it, liminally and dispiritedly; this will be its downfall. In the second place, the legislative elections will not be moved up, which means that the new party will not have

an opportunity to be tested nationally until after Eanes has left office. In the third place, feeling his right flank is protected, Mario Soares will devote the coming months to winning the Left over to his candidacy (and more difficult things than this have already been done). He will be plugging up the hole that had been opened for the Eanist party.

This is the environment in which the party founder will meet in Troia. I see no reason for them to be optimistic. Even the mass media have taken it upon themselves--without wishing to--to strengthen support for Soares among the local Socialist office-holders, despite the departure of Rosado Correia. Can officials elected by the PS really be expected to run the risk of changing shirts when the newspapers are saying that Soares has already won the presidential elections, above all, when this is being said by right-wing newspapers that dislike him?

This is where we are now, and I don't see that we could be anywhere else. The proposed Eanist party was a clumsy project. It was an attempt to win an attentive, reverent electorate, grateful to the president, and local sectors of the moderate Left and unemployed political figures, to fill a political space between the PS and the PCP, pretending it was filling some other place. Behind every Herminio Martinho is a Melo Antunes; behind every anti-Communist and antipartisan there is a Pintasilgo follower. Behind every Miguel Caetano there is a Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos. Eanism comes down to this, because this is what Eanes is. And the others are not stupid.

6362

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

VPK PARTY MEMBERS URGE GREATER DISTANCE FROM SOVIET UNION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Mar 85 p 3

[Op Article by Stellan Lindqvist and Thomas Eskilsson, VPK members: "Ideological Stagnation"]

[Text] Is the communist system basically good if democratic freedom and justice are lacking? Is the system good if a parasitic upper class develops? The questions were asked by VPK [Left-Party Communist] members Stellan Lindqvist, lecturer in sociology, and Thomas Eskilsson, research student in political science, as they here review the party's policies toward East Bloc communism, among other things. Critical party members believe that lack of clarity in foreign policy can be the death of VPK.

Is there any room for socialist policy in Sweden? If by socialism one means something so old-fashioned as a democratic economy based on people's needs and equal value, and people's emancipation from goods to all people? Meaning something other than social democratic policy.

If one should now be so bold as to see VPK as an exponent of a socialist policy, the answer would be rather depressing. In 35 years time voter support has varied between three and five percent, not too exciting. Seen in this perspective socialism would be nothing more than a foreign bird croaking incomprehensibly before a fickle public. But it is not that simple. Because during the same time--outside the parties--there has been the anticapitalist struggle, the struggle for a people's culture, antiimperialism, the struggle for a clean environment and alternative lifestyles, and all have been vital and dynamic. Here thousands of people have found meaning and happiness without national subsidies and party-financed courses.

This can appear unusual since rather many of this group agree with the socialist ideology, and thereby reasonably with VPK policies. Then why has VPK had so little success in attracting these people, or even developing a dialogue? The answer is complex, and can be sought on several different levels. On a very general level one can say that the party always regarded

marxism as more of a faith than a critical theory that gives power to democratic demands and humanistic morals.

This has led to loyalty to the interpreting party becoming more important than ideas and morals. And this is how one loses his way in the maze. Or more correctly said, the course is straight ahead, terribly straight. In spite of party splits, noisy agreements and "new ways," most of it is surprisingly alike.

Lenin's soul still floats over the party's inner life; democratic centralism is in a crisis as the leading organizational principle, and this principle consistently allows the higher levels to make binding decisions for the lower levels. If that is not sufficient to keep order they can bring out the prohibition against fractions. And in such a closed room only cagebirds fly.

Domestically this ideological stagnation has meant that the party has no policy of its own. Instead we have been working at the policy which is available, namely the social democratic. And so the policy has come to rest on two levels: one for rhetoric and one for practical.

Two examples illuminate the perplexity. The first relates to the party's view of capitalism. It is almost identical with the party's view of the "crisis." That is to say that capitalism is in a continuous crisis. We seldom see authoritative statements or issues of NY DAG where we do not see something about the "capitalistic crisis."

Of course in ordinary language crisis means something which will either end in a foul hasty death, or in a restructured new order. And capitalism has neither died nor been restructured. No, it is tough and long-lived.

Behind this error in judgment lies another and more theoretical error in judgment, namely the hard eastcommunist division between foundation and superstructure--there a crisis in the foundation necessarily leads to a crisis in the superstructure, and thereby to a breakdown of the whole society. Think if they instead had read a little more of the Italian marxist Gramsci, then they would have better understood that the society is a unit, that the civilian society and the predominant ideology in a country is a sluggish field which, in order to be won over, requires its entirely own policies and strategy.

The other example applies to the public sector. Here one can speak of the unique logic of the political retreat: in the absence of ideological scenarios one must use what one has, meaning the public sector, which in this remarkable situation has come to represent "real live socialism." Something that one can point at when there is nothing else to point at.

That this public sector contains its own hierarchy and its own dominant class, on its way to begin competing with the business-based elite, is merely a problem in a shadowy margin.

We can surely live for a long time with lack of clarity and weaknesses in the party's domestic life--a long four percent life. It will take a long time to find a need for a room where people can shelter their socialistic dreams. It is worse with lack of clarity in foreign policy. That can very well be the death of the party.

The most serious error in judgment here is the analysis of East Bloc communism. The method of production is socialist, they say, but the superstructure is something else, something evil. This is both a faulty and a dangerous analysis. Faulty because it avoids an analysis of the whole, of the formation of the entire society. Dangerous because it very easily leads to socialism being reduced to a matter of the method of production. As if socialism were similar to national economic planning. Then one finds himself in a hopeless situation if he wants to argue for a socialist economy, and that does not make the situation any better.

When it is pointed out, for example, that the state apparatus in the Soviet Union suffocates people's development and initiative, when it is pointed out that politicians and bureaucrats shop in special stores with special goods. Yes, they say: shortages. In plain language that means: basically we think the system is good, but it is burdened with certain shortages. And the shortages can be corrected within the framework of the system.

Is this true? Is the system basically good if democratic freedom and justice is lacking? Is the system basically good if a parasitic upper class develops? In that case what is the basis? Many observers of the United States have said that the war in Vietnam was a mistake, it was caused by shortcomings in the decision-making structure. Did we buy that argument? No. We said that the United States' aggression was systematic. And we were right.

Another and related impossibility we can call "spotted vision." Here it is a matter of preferring to see spots than patterns and structures. When Solidarity pointed out to us that free trade unions were needed in Poland, we saw that and supported their demand. But we do not see the need of free trade unions in other places in East Europe. When Charta-77 members are sentenced to prison we see it, but we do not see the pattern.

We allow the nonsocialist press to illuminate the source of the disease, and follow kindly after with a heavy aching in the stomach. In the best case the tactic can be called masochist defensive. It is that we do not have our own analysis, we do not dare to ally ourselves with anyone. Officially we say: We will not become involved in other brother parties' and other socialist countries' internal affairs.

A third impossibility is the tendency to prefer to be quiet rather than to speak, to prefer to explain away rather than to explain ahead. Surely we have been quiet about Afghanistan. We have seldom returned to Czechoslovakia after 1968 in order to examine and criticize and to support the forces of freedom. And how attentive are we to developments in Poland?

other party. And realize somewhere inside us that something very important has gone awry. That later the party appears ready to blame its cut-off head on the executioner is almost tragic.

The other way of behaving takes hold of the morals and the basic ideas and reviews the rest. Sees that the anticapitalistic rills which actually exist in the masses and which are risking to change the opposition to a slough must be brought into the main furrow in order to mean anything for the future and for socialism.

9287

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

MOSCOW-ORIENTED COMMUNIST PARTY DEFENDS AFGHANISTAN WAR

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Kaa Eneberg: "APK Leader Supports Soviets--Right to Occupy Afghanistan"]

[Text] "Prime Minister Olof Palme and the entire Swedish public opinion is misled by the mass media as to developments in Afghanistan," said Rolf Hagel, leader of the Workers' Communist Party (APK) to DAGENS NYHETER.

The small, strong, Moscow-loyal party, which received 0.2 percent of the votes in the last Riksdag election, stands alone in its conviction that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was justified.

Just as the Conservatives, the APK will therefore not appear in the large solidarity demonstration across political parties for Afghanistan's people which will take place on Saturday.

The Conservatives' motive is that they are in principle against appearing in such political manifestations. They do participate in criticism of the occupation, however, and are active in the nonsocialist actions against the wage earner funds.

New Society

APK believes, however, that the entire demonstration has a faulty objective. They do not share the other political parties' views that the Soviet Union should leave Afghanistan.

Therefore during Easter Week they are going to have their own campaign week for Afghanistan. The theme will be that the occupation is entirely justified since it is creating a new society.

As the main attraction they have invited the minister of education, Anahita Ratebzad, from the government in Kabul. The theme for her different appearances is to show how the Soviet Union has opened up new possibilities for women in the strict Muslim society.

The 50-year-old party leader Rolf Hagel told DAGENS NYHETER how he had a conversation on a "very, very high level" with the Afghan delegation at the funeral of Soviet leader Chernenko in Moscow last week.

Rolf Hagel said that he carefully followed developments in Afghanistan before the April coup in 1978. He has not been in the country himself, but he has met official representatives of the Kabul regime.

Furthermore APK journalists have been admitted to the country, and have reported in, among other papers, the party organ NORRSKENSFLAMMAN, which is published in Lulea.

Hagel said that at the funeral in Moscow he was able to confirm that the Soviet view of Afghanistan, which he himself shares, is approved by other Communist Parties in the world.

He refrained from commenting on the fact that the Swedish Left-Party Communists (VPK) criticize the Soviet Afghanistan policy and are participating in the demonstration on Saturday.

To the question of how they view his small party in Moscow, Hagel replied:

"In Moscow they do not measure Communist Parties by their size, but by their political line. It is rather clear that we strive to follow a communist line," said Hagel.

The Peace Issue

Besides unemployment the peace issue is the most important question in the election campaign which APK began in the shadow of the Riksdag party VPK. Hagel sees no conflict in his party advancing the peace issue at the same time as it recommends continued occupation of Afghanistan.

"On the contrary! If the Soviets withdraw there would be genocide. That would have happened if the Soviets had not given the country their support when it was asked for," said Hagel, who sees the invasion as a socialist revolution.

He calls the guerrillas who are fighting the Soviet troops counterrevolutionaries who should be driven out of the country.

That can be done, said he, because it is not a question of a domestic rebel force, but a force using American money trying to undermine the government. He draws parallels with the coup supported by the CIA against Salvador Allende's democratic government in Chile.

According to Hagel the party has 5,000 active members, of which many are Finns. He also speaks of his good contacts with the Finnish communist minority which is led by Moscow-loyal Taisto Sinisalo.

Activists are trained in different courses, and also have the possibilities of training in Moscow.

In August, ready for the final dash of the election, a newly trained group will arrive direct from one year's school in Moscow.

APK was formed 10 years ago when a group of old communists mainly around the newspaper NORRSKENSFLAMMEN broke out--or were kicked out--of VPK.

The breach marked the end of a long conflict within the party about the Soviet assault on Czechoslovakia in 1968 and others.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

INDUSTRIAL SPYING BOOK AUTHOR ON USSR EMBASSY ACTIONS

Urges Limiting Diplomats' Number

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 13 Mar 85 p 3

[Op Ed Article by Charlie Nordblom]

[Text] Charlie Nordblom is a journalist and his book "Industrial Espionage" was published in the fall of 1984.

The Soviet Union has stationed a permanent officer corps in our country in peacetime. This Russian corps consists of 80 intelligence officers who represent the "shield and sword of Soviet power" on the side of the Sea of Peace that still belongs to us.

The Russian corps did not cross the border of this unallied neighboring state illegally. Eighty Soviet intelligence officers were not smuggled in via truck convoys marked TIR [expansion unknown], elusive minisubmarines or nighttime airplane landings.

They have been duly welcomed by the Swedish authorities. Visas and work permits have been routinely issued by the proper authorities at the Foreign Ministry and the Immigration Agency.

Majority Uncovered

The majority of the 80 Soviet intelligence officers here have been uncovered. They were revealed and pointed out publicly in the book "Industrial Espionage" which came out in the fall of 1984. In the book I named and identified almost 50 of them.

The "resident staff" of the KGB, the security and intelligence service, consists of about 60 officers. This staff is led by Major General Vladimir Batchkirov and Major General Nikolay Seliverstov. Its intelligence activity is aimed at Sweden's political life, national administration, industry, research, defense and refugees from eastern and central Europe.

The general staff's intelligence organ, the GRU, has a smaller but highly efficient resident staff of about 20 officers. The GRU resident leader is Major General Yuriy Kiselev. Its concentrated intelligence activity is aimed at our armed forces and the defense industry.

Various Cover Jobs

The three leading Soviet intelligence officers in Sweden--Major Generals V. Batchkirov, N. Seliverstov and Y. Kiselev--have cover jobs at the embassy with full diplomatic immunity. The Swedish Foreign Ministry has accredited them. They are included in the Foreign Ministry's "List of Diplomatic Corps Personnel in Stockholm" as embassy counselors.

All 80 KGB and GRU officers in this country legally have various cover jobs with the Soviet legation or quasi-official institutions.

About 20 intelligence officers have cover jobs with the Intourist tourist agency, the Aeroflot airline company, the APN news agency, other Soviet media, the Matreco trading company, the ScanSov shipping firm or the import-export firm Elorg.

Accepted Soviet Demand

The 60 Soviet officials who work for these institutions lack formal diplomatic status. But in practice Swedish authorities like the Immigration Agency have accepted the Soviet demand for official rank for these institutions.

The tourist agency is a totally-owned subsidiary of the KGB, Aeroflot is part of the armed forces, the news agency is known as the embassy's press division and Matreco represents 14 of the Foreign Trade Ministry's companies. This background strengthens the Soviet demand for official status as does the fact that individual officials first work for Intourist, for example, before coming back with a cover job at the embassy.

The expansive superpower, the Soviet Union has stationed 50 diplomats with full immunity and almost a hundred officials with lower diplomatic rank at its legations in our country.

Fifteen Swedish Diplomats in USSR

Thus the Foreign Ministry has accredited and recognized a total of almost 150 Russian diplomats and civil servants. They work at the Soviet Embassy and consulate in Stockholm, the general consulate in Goteborg or the trade delegation in Lidingo. Among them are almost 60 intelligence officers from the KGB and GRU with various cover jobs.

Fifteen Swedish diplomats are stationed in the Soviet Union. They work at the embassy at Mosfilmovskaya Ulitsa 60 in Moscow or at the consulate in Leningrad. This is a delegation of a reasonable size to promote correct relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union.

Thus the Swedish foreign policy administration has assessed the extent of Swedish-Soviet contacts and decided that only 15 diplomats are required at the embassy and consulate in the Soviet Union. Why then is the Soviet Union allowed to station 50 diplomats and 100 civil servants at its diplomatic legations here?

Unreasonable Size

The Soviet diplomatic representation in our country is unreasonably large and is clearly out of proportion in relation to Sweden's nonallied status, trade, tourism and cultural and scientific contacts between the two countries.

No other great power considers it necessary or justified to have as many official representatives here as the Soviet Union. The other superpower, the United States, has placed 31 diplomats at its embassy in Stockholm. Great Britain has 17, West Germany 15 and France 13 diplomats in our country.

Mutual trade, tourism and cultural and scientific exchanges with each of these countries is far greater than corresponding Swedish-Soviet exchanges. For example trade with Great Britain had a total value of 50.5 billion kronor in 1983, trade with West Germany totaled 58 billion and trade with France amounted to 19 billion kronor. In 1983 Swedish-Soviet trade totaled 9.5 billion kronor. Compare that to Japan whose trade with Sweden in that year was worth 10.7 billion. Japan's representation consists of 10 diplomats.

It can be argued that the Soviet nation must be represented here by an official trade delegation of 50 officials since the Soviet Union is a state trade nation. This argument does not hold up.

Japanese companies are represented in our country by various general agents, and so are the Soviet foreign trade companies. Swedish agencies for the 47 different Soviet foreign trade companies include Novacast R. Sillen & Co., Intermelt, Inc., Allan Sjostrand, Inc., Profila, Inc., Betoma, Inc. and Matreco Trade, Inc. Incidentally, spokesmen for Matreco claim that "most of the trade between Sweden and the Soviet Union goes through this firm."

There is now a motion before Riksdag calling for an examination of Sweden's practice in exchanging diplomatic officials with other countries. The three people presenting the motion--Elver Jonsson (Liberal), Martin Olsson (Center) and Rune Ryden (Conservative)--favor a limitation of Soviet representation here based on the Vienna conventions of 1961 and 1963.

Limitation Request

According to the Vienna conventions each host country has the right to demand a limitation of diplomatic personnel to the level considered reasonable by the host country. Under the conventions a question about the needs of the delegation can form the basis for such a demand.

Steps to limit Soviet diplomatic representation under the Vienna conventions have been taken in the past by Great Britain, Portugal, Norway and a number of non-European countries.

After hearing detailed testimony from Russian and Czech defectors Great Britain expelled 105 Soviet diplomats and officials in 1971 because of alleged espionage activities. After that the Soviet delegation was limited to 46 diplomats, exactly the same number as Great Britain sent to Moscow.

Portugal decided in 1982 that the embassy staffs at the Soviet, Polish and East German embassies should be cut immediately by one-third.

In connection with the Treholt affair in 1984 Norway expelled six Soviet diplomats and declared three envoys persona non grata. At the same time the Norwegian government decided that the Soviet Union could not replace the nine people with new personnel.

Sharp Increase

In our country a sharp increase in Soviet intelligence pressure has been noted since the end of the 1970's, especially in high-tech industries and in defense. In 1982-83 seven Soviet officials were expelled for serious violations of diplomatic conventions and Swedish laws. Five of them were intelligence officers with full diplomatic immunity attached to the embassy in Stockholm or the consulate in Goteborg.

In the present uncertain situation when Sweden is "feeling the heat," it is vitally necessary to actively check the illegal Soviet intelligence activity being directed against Sweden from Swedish soil. It is necessary that while retaining our freedom from alliances we ourselves act to protect our country's defense capability, industrial and technological competitiveness, political stability and independence from the expansive superpower on the other side of the Baltic Sea.

Stop Illegal Activity

Limiting the Soviet Union's diplomatic representation in our country would effectively contribute to stopping the illegal Soviet intelligence activity aimed at our nation's defense, industry, political life, national administration and the refugees from eastern countries who have sought asylum here.

For 27 of the 38 Soviet "diplomats" at the embassy and consulate in Stockholm are intelligence officers. Five out of six "diplomats" at the general consulate in Goteborg belong to the KGB-GRU. And two of the three "diplomats" at the trade delegation in Lidings are intelligence officers.

Reciprocity

Thus the KGB and the GRU have placed a total of 34 Soviet intelligence officers in cover jobs that are protected by full diplomatic immunity. At least three other diplomatic posts at the embassy have been requisitioned by the

international division of the Soviet CP. That leaves only ten regular diplomatic envoys to handle the needs of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Consequently Sweden should refer to the principle of reciprocity under the Vienna conventions--as many Russian diplomats here as we have Swedish diplomats there--without fear that the limitation of the Soviet delegation will harm correct relations between the two countries in any way.

Soviet Stockholm Property Increasing

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Mar 85 p 10

[Article by Roland Berndt]

[Text] The Soviet Embassy is cramped for space and wants to expand. On Thursday the Building Board gave advance approval for both a school and staff housing in Stora Essingen.

The lots for the embassy buildings are located close to the intersection of Essingeringen and Badstrandsvagen near Essingeleden.

According to the plans the residential building will contain around 15 apartments on three stories. The school will be a two-story building with eight classrooms.

A city planning change is needed to allow the embassy to build the school and the staff housing units. The architect in charge at the city building office has no objections to the plans but the matter has been withdrawn several times from the Building Board's list of recommendations.

Many groups in Stora Essingen are sharply critical of the idea of getting a school and staff housing.

"We are definitely opposed to new construction that will neither provide residences nor improve services," said K. A. Kohler, chairman of the Essinge-St. Goran-Kungsholmen Art and Culture Society.

The Building Board decided on Thursday to ask the city building office to examine the possibilities of building several new residential buildings in the nearby area of Tvattbradan.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

SOLDIERS' CONFERENCE BACKS NORDIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Mar 85 p 19

[Text] Orebro (TT)--Swedish soldiers have now also advocated a Nordic nuclear-free zone. But this did not go entirely smoothly.

At the draftees' conference in Orebro 155 of the 176 delegates voted, with 87 supporting and 68 opposing a statement by the conference on the zone issue.

Most of those who voted against said it was not the task of the draftees' parliament to make statements on foreign policy and security issues.

But the soldiers' conference also approved two other statements on issues concerning national security:

"Sweden must have a defense system" and "We must defend the principle of universal conscription."

One topic that went through on Wednesday without debate was the demand for local soldiers' councils for each military unit. The demand was brought up before the conference in a motion from Sweden's Central Council for Draftees (SCVR), which is the executive committee of the draftee movement.

The reason for this demand on the part of the draftees is a desire to improve the influence soldiers have by setting up local soldiers' councils. A man from each platoon would be elected to these councils while the present unit committees are made up of the unit leaders and a soldier from each company.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

SCHORI ATTACKS SWEDISH REPORTERS DURING WASHINGTON VISIT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Mar 85 p 2

[Commentary by Mats Johansson]

[Text] The Swedish foreign policy leadership's indefatigable battle against unfair journalism has approached new heights. This happened Thursday at a press conference at the Swedish Embassy in Washington when Undersecretary Pierre Schori launched an attack on the Swedish correspondents present for having deliberately painted a black picture of the American attitude toward the Social Democrats' foreign policy.

During his visit to the American capital the undersecretary had not heard any negative remarks in his meetings with representatives of the administration. On the contrary, he had encountered a "continued high appreciation" of Swedish policy and the prime minister's peace efforts.

He knew nothing of the concern expressed by American experts that the prime minister's view of the Soviet Union might affect Sweden's security policy. Nor could he comment on the commonly expressed criticism of the Palme Commission for its Soviet leanings. He advised the journalists to ask commission member Cyrus Vance (!) about the matter--as if Carter's unsuccessful secretary of state and colleague is representative of the Reagan administration.

The present undersecretary is not a true diplomat like his predecessors, Astrom and Leifland; he is the envoy of the prime minister and the Socialist International to both Washington and Havana. And at some point in the press conference he started to reproach the correspondents in authoritative tones.

There is a "difference between reality and the picture presented in certain articles." There is a "nonrepresentative depiction" of Swedish-American relations. The government cannot (like the journalists) "turn over stones and fish out strange things" or "some academic figure" who will criticize things.

Stig Fredriksson, the timid reporter for TV News who has specialized in foreign policy and security questions, objected that "the distrust felt by the current power structure in Washington with respect to Olof Palme's international involvement which several of us have experienced over a long period

of time is not something we suddenly came up with or invented just now," and he wondered if this distrust worries the Swedish government.

With a firm grip on his socialist slant the undersecretary came up with the following answer: "If you interview a Ku Klux Klansman about what he thinks of Olof Palme, then of course you will get the answer you want."

Fredriksson, who was unable to reveal his white-cloaked source, was followed by colleague K. G. Bergstrom of "Report," who had gathered a similar impression during his years in the United States: "The picture we get without having to turn over stones is that there is more distrust of Olof Palme than of a good many other Social Democratic leaders. Does that bother you?" Schori dismissed this by saying: "There is nothing in that."

And that was not all. Schori saw the recent American protest against the prime minister's linking of the American aid to the opposition in Nicaragua and the Soviet genocide in Afghanistan as a result of "repeated questions" by Swedish correspondents which supposedly provoked the reaction in Washington.

When several reporters protested this remark and informed him of the true facts of the matter, which embassy personnel could also have done, the undersecretary said this was "of no interest."

The undersecretary's frustrated theories about a journalistic conspiracy and sources in the Ku Klux Klan are interesting as symptoms of the mood within the foreign policy leadership. There are several possible explanations for the outburst.

One, of course, is the approaching election; the government has been unsuccessful in the foreign policy area and cannot afford more negative publicity. This must be nipped in the bud, so why not stigmatize a few more journalists in tactics similar to those used against Lars Christiansson of SVENSKA DAGBLADET and Harald Hamrin of DAGENS NYHETER?

(K. G. Bergstrom and Stig Fredriksson have unquestionably distinguished themselves; the former by allowing the highly-regarded arms control expert Strobe Talbott, who is critical of Reagan, to say on Swedish TV after the meeting of the Palme Commission in Chicago last year that the prime minister is "liberal to the point of softheadedness," in other words, a simpleminded reformer; the latter by such things as giving conservative military strategist Edward Luttwak a chance to say on Wednesday that the prime minister was "international policy's answer to Jane Fonda," the woman well-known from communist statements and for posing on an anti-aircraft gun in Hanoi during the Vietnam War. This sort of thing must not be permitted on TV, according to the Social Democratic election plan.)

Another explanation is that the people in the administration who are friendly enough to see the undersecretary did not find it especially appropriate to criticize his employer to him. Thus the undersecretary actually did not hear any criticism and therefore does not believe any exists and gladly interpreted their politeness as agreement.

A third explanation is that the Palme-centered undersecretary got the impression that Reagan has suddenly realized that he needs the prime minister's help and that Sweden plays an important role as far as the fate of the world is concerned. Therefore the Swedish Social Democrats can count on strong support from the White House for their anti-American line.

As a step in establishing the new power center of international policy, the Stockholm-Washington axis, the prime minister will be rewarded with a visit to Reagan at which Reagan will confess that he has secretly always been a Social Democrat and admired the prime minister for his support for North Vietnam.

A fourth explanation is that like the prime minister the undersecretary believes that Carl Bildt lies behind all sorts of things in collusion with the CIA.

It is true that Schori belongs to the foreign policy leadership, but he is a capable person even so. It is true that he was named by party comrades in the deposed junta on Grenada as "a staunch supporter of the revolution," but he has done his homework on security policy and it is said that the Americans find him as interesting to talk to as Defense Minister Thunborg and Carl Bildt.

It may be a little farfetched that he opens a press conference in Washington by seriously claiming that the image of his prime minister is the most important problem in Swedish-American relations. But he should be able to leave the more academic things to masters of the genre like the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs.

Especially since he should know from embassy reports to the Foreign Ministry that at least four of the Swedish correspondents in Washington have said at several recent embassy press conferences that they received this impression independently of each other as a result of contacts not with terrorist organizations but with various sources within the administration.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

CONFIDENCE IN PALME GOVERNMENT DROPS; CONSERVATIVES MAIN THREAT

Palme Uneasy Regarding Election

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing: "After 10-Day Tour Around Sweden--Election Worries Palme"]

[Text] "Where did you go, sweet dreams?" Monica Zetterlund sang the old hit song for several hundred Kista residents in their light blue center on Saturday morning. Prime Minister Olof Palme hummed along in tune--from here he would take the subway to the inner city and conclude his 10-day tour around Sweden. The first bite had been taken out of the election campaign!

Olof Palme summarized the 10-day trip by describing the optimism he noticed from Kalix to Malmo. "It is encouraging to travel around," he said at a press conference in Kista, "People want this social system, not the new liberal way with a multitude of cuts."

Olof Palme admits his concern about the autumn election without reservation. But he believes that opinion in the land has swung to the advantage of the Social Democrats, especially since the presentation of the national budget in January. "Dramatic improvement," said Olof Palme. "People realize that the harsh beginning which the Social Democrats were forced to employ in the government in 1982 is now giving results."

Many People

Olof Palme claimed that the nonsocialist parties, with the Conservatives in the lead, made such far-reaching statements about how they will change the society that they have become prisoners of their own agitation.

"People have greater confidence in our ability to manage the country's economy, and for me that is the central question of the election," he said.

The meeting in the market-place at Kista Center, the large building which contains two department stores, four banks--with Stockholms Enskilda Bank just across from Konsum--and 40 shops in addition to public service, drew an unexpectedly large number of people. One man, delighted with the local party organization, said that they had not had such a large public gathering before. Kista's Social Democrat Association has only 200 members--but it cooperates well with Kista's Conservatives, with whom they like to hold joint meetings.

Not on Saturday, however, when Olof Palme drew so many interested people that the 500 red roses ran out immediately. Kista, which was completed in 1980, has 7,000 inhabitants in the industrial area, which is mainly electronics industries where 13,000 people work--but most of them live in other places than Kista.

Two Favorites

There is a Social Democratic majority in Kista. The Conservatives have 40 percent. Ten percent pensioners, 12 percent immigrants.

"I see that a number of you were present in the 30's," said Olof Palme as he spoke from a leaf-shaded spot with the usual gathering of woolen-capped children before him.

"That was a time of renewal in Sweden, but now the nonsocialists want to roll back the film to the 20's, with it's large unemployment and egoism. There is no more important task than to ensure that people have work to go to.

Olof Palme has two favorites in his speeches--so far. One is the parallel between the nonsocialist parties and the New Year sketch on TV about the countess and the manservant. The nonsocialist parties are the servant, Mother Sweden is the countess, and it is "the same procedure as last year." Olof Palme contrived this theme in this year's general political debate, he said, an idea that he had when he looked out over the Riksdag chamber.

The other theme is pants pockets.

"I began to pull out the pants pockets in Kalmar, and then it became somewhat routine," confessed Olof Palme during his rather exhilarated press conference.

1,000 Kronor Per Week

Pants pockets are the Conservatives' description of how social contributions function--a roundtrip from one pocket to the other, they say.

"How is it in practice?" asks Olof Palme in his speeches. "What do the average wage earner's pockets look like? If the Conservatives get to decide, it will

cost 1,000 kronor to be sick for a week. The pants pockets are empty, but where has the money gone? To the benefit of those better off, to the heavenly kingdom of the speculators. The pockets of the ordinary wage earner are not big enough to hold all the money that the Conservatives allow to leave Sweden. One would have to have clown's britches, which have more room."

The listeners applaud this picture, and Olof Palme says that the Social Democrats want a classless society with economic justice and security.

'Hall of the Mountain King'

From Kista Olof Palme took a blue subway train, pretty in Kista's blue station with glass windows looking out over the forest and snow. The union for Greater Stockholm Local Traffic, Municipal 3, is celebrating its 100 year anniversary, and wanted to have the party chairman and prime minister drive the train as a manifestation of the occasion. But in the end he did not, he sat beside the regular driver Mohammed Zeki, an Iranian who has lived in Sweden for 8 years and been a train driver for 4.

"It is pretty here in the tunnel, as in the hall of the mountain king," said Olof Palme, whose visit to the driver's cabin went unnoticed by the passengers on the blue train.

When he got off the train at the Akalla Line end station at Kungstradgarden, an automobile took him to the cold storage house at Hammarby. The cold storage house now has room for 130 rock bands, basketball games and other activities that Anders Carlberg has drawn there. Yes, it is the same Carlberg who was the Liberal Party leader in 1968 during the Karhus occupation. Olof Palme was called to the Karhus by students during the occupation to defend the government's proposal about UKAS [the Working Party on Fixed Courses of Study of the Chancellor of the Swedish Universities]. Olof Palme heard from the students, and mostly from Anders Carlberg in the same breath about UKAS' miserableness, the Wallenberg family, lackeys of imperialism and himself.

Anders Carlberg later became, among other things, a concrete worker, union representative and Social Democrat.

And now Anders Carlberg and Olof Palme do not particularly disagree.

Support For Government Down

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Nonsocialists Give Government Low Marks--Confidence Declines"]

[Text] The voters' confidence in the Palme Government has declined by 2.5 percent since last summer. This is shown by DN/IMU's latest confidence barometer. The decline is

due to the fact that the nonsocialist voters increasingly give low marks to the government. Among the socialist voters the confidence has increased somewhat.

The investigation of confidence was done in February, at the same time as the election barometer which was published in DN last Sunday. Above all the election barometer showed an increase in approval of the Social Democrats and a decline for the Center Party.

The investigation of confidence in February shows that 55.9 percent of the voters approve of Palme's policies. That is a decline in confidence of 2.5 percent compared with the previous investigation in May of last year. At that time 58.4 percent of the voters gave the government their approval.

However the February figure is above the figure of 2 years ago, February 1983, when 51.8 percent accepted the government policies, and clearly above the bottom grade of 47.4 in December 1983 after all the "affairs." The highest confidence figure, 59.0 percent, was reached in June 1983.

Split Picture

On the other hand the number of voters who give the Palme Government disapproval increased from 39.7 percent in May of last year to 41.5 percent in February of this year. The increase is therefore 1.8 percent, and the number of uncertain voters also increased somewhat.

The confidence picture is split. The decline in February this year depends exclusively on reduced confidence among the nonsocialist voters. An explanation could be that the election is approaching, another that economic development appears more uncertain and a third that the tax policies of the social democrats are more controversial.

In May of last year the Palme Government's confidence figure increased because a record number of nonsocialist voters--28 percent--thought that the Palme Government was doing a good job. All the economic curves pointed upward. Now the nonsocialist confidence figure declined from 28 in May of last year to 21 percent in February of this year.

In the latest barometers the Social Democrats' figures have increased. Therefore it is not surprising that confidence in the Palme Government's policies also increased among the socialist voters.

Touches the Top

Ninety-one percent of these voters believe that the Palme Government's policies deserve high marks, 92 percent of the Social Democrats. Both figures touch the top points in the confidence index from June 1983.

The detailed figures within the nonsocialist bloc show that above all it is the Liberal Party voters who have confidence in the Palme Government's policies, followed by the Conservatives, while voters from the Center Party are the most critical.

Every third Liberal Party member, 33.0 percent, approve of the Palme Government. The corresponding figure for the Conservatives is 19.4 percent, and 17.6 percent for the Center Party.

In the poll, which included 832 persons and was conducted 28 January-27 February, the voters answered the following question:

"Do you have great or little confidence in our present government?"

The voters answered by giving a figure from minus 3 to plus 3, depending on the degree of confidence or lack of confidence.



- Key: 1. Very little confidence
2. Very great confidence
3. This is how it is
4. The voters respond by giving a figure from minus 3 to plus 3 depending on the degree of lack of confidence or confidence respectively in the current government.


These were the results of the February poll in percent:

Plus 3: 13.3
Plus 2: 19.1
Plus 1: 23.5
Total: 55.9
Minus 1: 15.2
Minus 2: 15.2
Minus 3: 11.1
Total: 41.5

The number who answered "don't know" was 2.5 percent, compared with 1.9 percent in May of last year.

The highest grade--plus 3--was given by 30.9 percent of the Social Democrats, while only 8 percent gave the lowest grade.

Fully 21 percent of the Communist Left Party voters are dissatisfied with the government. The highest marks for lack of confidence--minus 3--were given by 23.5 percent of the Conservative voters, but the Center Party was close behind with 22.2 percent.



Caption: The confidence curve has turned down for the Palme Government following rises in three polls in a row. In February 1985 55.9 percent of the voters thought that the Palme Government was managing things in a satisfactory manner. The corresponding figure in May 1984 was 58.4 percent, in February of the same year 51.8 percent. The bottom was 47.4 percent in December 1983 after "the affairs." Palme attained his highest mark in confidence in June 1983 with 59.0 percent.

SDP, Conservatives Dominate Campaign

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Mar 85 p 15

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Election a Struggle Between the Two Large Parties--Class Warfare Suffocates the Middle"]

[Text] The 1985 election campaign is now in full swing. It is all the more developing into a grim fight between the two large parties, between two different views of society. After a collapse in public opinion, former Prime Minister Falldin is reduced to the "third man."

Both the Center and Liberal Parties are frantically seeking new profile questions. The autumn election will be the purest class struggle election in a long time. Two different views of society are opposed: on one side is the Social Democrats' demand for collective justice and solidarity, on the other side the Conservatives' party cry of individual freedom in the struggle with the great collectives and bureaucrats.

In the fighting between the two large parties, the Liberal Party and the Center Party are looking for their own niches where great discretion is the key word.

The hard confrontation between the two extremes of Swedish politics is self-chosen. Both the Social Democrats and the Conservatives believe in the usefulness of continuous quarrels, and speculating about the future in loud colors which emphasize the differences between the parties.

The Social Democrats believe that such quarrels help the mobilization of uncertain voters, and the Conservatives believe that the best way to win the election is to scold Olof Palme. For many nonsocialist voters the overriding political goal is to get Olof Palme out of Rosenbad.

Before the historical shift of power in 1976 Thorbjorn Falldin was the uncontested nonsocialist leader. The nonsocialist parties then determined that the shift of power would not be experienced as a revolution.

Mistake in the Equation

The problem for the nonsocialist governments was that for a long time they followed a Social Democratic expense policy, but a nonsocialist tax policy. The social-economic equation did not come together.

The final result became steadily rising national budget deficits and strong inflationary pressures in the economy.

The first break with the old social democratic government policies came with the Ullsten plan and the arrival of the Falldin-Ullsten Government in 1981.

Before the 1985 election the Social Democrats will protect Welfare Sweden with strong collective inputs and rising tax pressure, while the nonsocialist parties will to a greater extent speak of the need for a change in the political system.

That especially applies to Conservative leader Ulf Adelsohn, and also to a certain extent Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg (Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin will adopt a wait-and-see policy).

The Conservatives' change in the system consists primarily of a strong reduction of the public sector and greater freedom of movement for the private

sector, mostly through all kinds of "business." A cherished thesis of the Conservatives is that one should be able to live on his wages.

Bengt Westerberg speaks openly of getting rid of the wage earner funds, reducing income taxes, breaking public monopolies, increasing competition within Sveriges Radio and abolishing the unions' collective adherence to the Social Democratic Party.

Center Party

It is more difficult to get a grip on the Center Party. Thorbjorn Falldin tried earlier than both the other nonsocialist parties to represent the little people. That position collided with the earlier recommendation for a new nonsocialist three-party government, with Ulf Adelsohn eventually as the head of government.

The latest poll figures indicate that the Center Party can be on its way into a deep identity crisis after three election losses in a row.

After his opposition to nuclear power Thorbjorn Falldin is frantically looking for a new profile question. There is hope that acid rain and other environmental questions will give strength to the election campaign and draw the youths back to a party consisting partly of old men and old women.

The 1985 election campaign is underway at full speed with strong words and other tactics. In several ways the campaign will be different from its predecessors.

No special issue such as nuclear power appears to be dominant, not even the economic-political competence within the two blocs.

It is more likely that the different views of society that the Conservatives and the Social Democrats represent will have the greatest strength. Collective security will be balanced against individual freedom and "business" capability.

In that case political movement across the magical bloc boundaries will probably be reduced further in the 1985 election. According to Soren Holmberg's polls, 5.9 percent crossed bloc boundaries in 1979 and 4.9 percent in 1982.

In previous elections in modern times there has been only one unopposed nonsocialist candidate for prime minister--Thorbjorn Falldin.

That rule no longer applies. In 1985 there are both Ulf Adelsohn and Thorbjorn Falldin. Judging from the polls, Adelsohn today has a certain lead, but the voters will make the final decision.

Banished

If Adelsohn succeeds in becoming prime minister, an old Conservative dream will be fulfilled. The Conservatives have been banished from the prime minister post since the end of the 20's.

The last Conservative-led government fell after the 1928 so-called Cossack election, when Per Albin Hansson of the Conservative Party was presented as a lackey of the Soviet Union.

The election resulted in factory manager Arvid Lindman being asked by the king to form a minority government. Lindman survived one and one-half years.

In order not to be worse than his Norwegian and Danish colleagues, Kare Willoch and Poul Schluter, Ulf Adelsohn has consciously trained for the post of prime minister. He has toned down his spontaneity, gotten married, had children, moved to Strandvagen and stopped doing the hula.

Both nonsocialist prime minister candidates have their credibility problems. Thorbjorn Falldin has already been tested twice, and that counts against him. Ulf Adelsohn is untested, and that counts against him.

Falldin is known for his indecision, while Adelsohn's competence is questioned because of his too vast promises.

In the noise of battle between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, both the Liberal and Center Parties may experience difficulty in being heard and seen. Ulf Adelsohn has been selected as Olof Palme's main opponent, and the middle parties must therefore try to gather voters on their own.

In the fight for voters the middle parties will therefore try to play on Adelsohn's weaknesses, at the same time as they appeal to great discretion. Certain of the Conservatives' election promises are too indigestible for some nonsocialist voters.

Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin places great hopes on the election campaign itself lifting the Center Party out of the dumps. The party has a large organization. If the election workers get started, perhaps a miracle can come out of the tumult.

Spurt

It has been thus in all elections since 1968 with the exception of 1973.

In June 1976 for example SIFO [Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research] showed 21.5 percent for the Center Party, but the election result was 24.1 percent. In the 1979 election the election barometer showed 16 percent, but the election result was 18.1 percent. And in the 1982 election SIFO showed 11.5, IMU [Institute for Market Research] showed 12.0, but the election result was 15.5 percent.

It is far from certain that this development will take place this time also. In a previous election Thorbjorn Falldin was the candidate for prime minister. In Goteborg and Kalmar he met Olof Palme in heated debates, and now it is up to Ulf Adelsohn. The change can be decisive for the Center Party's chances to lift itself up by the hair.

The rise which the Center Party made at the end was furthermore largely at the expense of the Liberal Party. Ever since 1968 it has gone much worse for the Liberal Party in the elections than what the polls indicated during the summers.

In 1979 for example SIFO showed 15.5 percent, but the election gave 10.6 percent, in 1982 SIFO showed 8.5 percent, IMU showed 7.0, but the election gave only 5.9 percent of the votes.

What has now happened is that Bengt Westerberg has broken off from his role as engineer of cooperation with the Social Democrats and from middle cooperation with the Center Party.

It is probable that middle cooperation is an important explanation of why the Liberal Party fell during the election campaigns. When the election approached, many party sympathizers clearly thought they could just as well vote for prime minister candidate Falldin directly instead of going the roundabout way through the Liberal Party.

The aggressive attitude which Bengt Westerberg now shows both toward the Social Democratic and the Center Parties, and lately even toward the Conservative Party, has given him increased independence within the nonsocialist bloc.

Westerberg is more egotistical about his party than his most recent predecessors in the Liberal Party. The objective is primarily to take rightwing workers from the Conservative Party who do not like Adelsohn's more vulgar presentation and to steal Center Party voters in the big cities.

9287
CSO: 3650/205

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BODSTROM REPLIES TO RIKSDAG QUESTIONS ON AFGHAN, VIETNAM AID

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing]

[Excerpts] Afghanistan

Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom answered Karin Ahrland's (People's Party) question on aid to Afghanistan. "Will the Swedish Afghanistan Committee receive appropriations for food aid?" Lennart Bodstrom answered that the government will maintain its' preparedness to provide support to suffering Afghans and is prepared to increase this humanitarian aid, but wants to know that the aid really reaches its' goal.

"Act according to the circumstances," said Karin Ahrland, "it is war in Afghanistan and it is really an issue of confidence in having a given support reaching its' goal must come before all too precise monitoring."

Lennart Bodstrom could not determine how SIDA (aid organization) would decide on the Swedish Afghanistan Committee's renewed application, or on what position the Catastrophe Group (the advisory organ with SIDA, the Foreign Ministry and the Red Cross) would take. "However, I also do not want the monitoring to be taken into absurdity. "Within reason, the chances must now have increased for a recommendation and approval of the renewed and more detailed application from the Swedish Afghanistan Committee," said Lennart Bodstrom, whereupon Karin Ahrland became dissatisfied.

Vietnam

Lennart Bodstrom also had a question to answer from Margit Gennser (Moderate Party) on the forced recruitment for the Vietnamese logging project. "The Swedish Government believes that bilaterally and directly with Vietnam it is more suitable to take up the problems concerning living standards for logging workers in Vinh Phu," said Lennart Bodstrom, who stated that the Vietnamese have now submitted concrete proposals on improved conditions for logging workers.

"It is a misnomer to talk of working conditions," said Margit Gennser, "doesn't the Foreign Minister understand that one must do everything for the poor 17,000 women in forced labor in this aid project?"

"Sweden has done a lot more than any other country to review the problems," answered Lennart Bodstrom. But Margit Gennser was not especially impressed: "We certainly have the responsibility." "It is our project."

12562

CSO: 3650/203

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NORDICS JOIN TO EXPAND CIVIL PILOT TRAINING, STEM AIR FORCE DRAIN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Mar 85 p 5

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Civilian Flying School Being Established"]

[Text] The pilot crisis in the defense will be solved: a Norwegian civilian flying school will be established in cooperation with Sweden and Denmark. The Swedish civilian flying school will have increased capacity. Sweden and Denmark will contribute more instructors, so that the Swedish school can double its training capacity. Further there will be a bonus system for pilots who remain in the air force.

As to economic compensation for those who remain in the air force, individual contracts will be worked out in which a form of bonus system begins to operate after a certain period of time. These individual contracts will distinguish between those who have decided on a civilian aviation career--and those who desire to remain in the defense. The latter group will benefit from the economic advantages.

This is a negotiating issue between the authorities and the organizations concerned. The fact that pilots are already paid more than other officers of the same grades in the defense will probably not make these negotiations simple.

Nordic Unity

Following a meeting between the defense ministers of Norway, Denmark and Sweden the other day there is unity over the establishment of a civilian flying school in Norway. A fast-working committee was established which will deal with setting up the school.

Further it is clear that the civilian flying school in Sweden will be expanded. Today the school has a shortage of instructors. But AFTENPOSTEN has learned that both Denmark and Sweden have obligated themselves to contribute qualified instructors. That means that the school can increase its training capacity from 30-35 to 65 students.

This expansion of capacity will happen quickly. Setting up the Nordic school in Norway will necessarily take longer. An alternative which was also considered was a civil flying school in each of the three Nordic countries.

SAS and eventually other aviation companies must pay for this training. It is clear that all the steps which are taken for SAS in this connection will be coordinated between the governments of the three countries. It was pointed out that SAS is one of the few large aviation companies that does not have its own flying school.

The leadership of the defense has for a time been considering alternatives to prevent SAS from taking experienced pilots from the Norwegian Air Force. The departure of pilots from the air force for better paying jobs in civil aviation was characterized by Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad as one of the Defense Department's most acute problems at the present time. That is because it affects the fighting power of the air force. The minister hopes this situation will change through the above described actions. These hopes can be placed into action as quickly as possible.

9287

CSO: 3639/98

MILITARY

FINLAND

POLL: INCREASED SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE AFTER USSR CRUISE MISSILE

Helsinki BELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Feb 85 p 7

[Text] After what took place at Inarijarvi, we Finns are more desirous of increasing the Armed Forces' ability to perform than before the missile strayed [into Finland]. We would especially like to strengthen our Air Force. In December one out of every four Finns wanted to strengthen the Armed Forces and in mid-January one out of three.

The National Defense Information Planning Committee commissioned an extensive poll to be conducted in December of Finns' opinions on our security policy and in January several central issues were repeated in a new poll. The new poll was conducted before the missile that fell near Inarijarvi was found.

In December 33 percent of those polled would have been willing to increase defense expenditures and in January 36 percent. One out of 20 Finns was willing to reduce the Armed Forces' ability to perform in both December and January. On both occasions 12 percent of those polled were willing to cut defense appropriations. About half of the respondents would have preferred that they remain unchanged.

In both December and January 90 percent of all Finns felt that the Armed Forces were necessary. In December 36 percent of the respondents felt that the Armed Forces were poorly equipped and 30 percent did in January.

In December 36 percent of the respondents wanted to strengthen the Air Force and 47 percent did in January. In December 47 percent of the respondents would have preferred to strengthen the Army or the Navy or all branches of the Armed Forces and 34 percent did in January.

In the December poll 2,000 Finns were interviewed and 1,000 in the January poll. The respondents were from 15 to 69 years of age. Taloustutkimus Oy [Economic Survey Company] conducted the interviews.

11,466
CSO: 3617/87

MILITARY

FRANCE

EXPORTS ACCOUNT FOR 40 PERCENT OF ARMAMENTS PRODUCTION

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Feb 85 p 22

[Text] The armaments industry in France employs a total of 400,000 workers, accounting for 1.3 percent of the work force or 5.6 percent of national industrial workers. With an annual turnover of more than 86 billion francs, this activity represents 2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product in terms of the production of merchandise. It has been growing regularly since the 1970's, at a rate of 5 to 6 percent per year in volume. Exports account for 40 percent of annual turnover in the armaments industry.

These evaluations appear in a study which the Ministry of Defense has just completed. It consists of a series of analyses of economic data on military expenditure.

In the armaments industry employment consists of 300,000 workers directly involved in the manufacture of equipment and 100,000 others employed in making the ongoing purchases necessary for the construction of armaments (raw materials and electronic components). These estimates do not, in fact, represent the total number of jobs created by defense activity in France, which amounts to about 1,112,000 people, if we add to the employees of the armaments industry the civilian and military personnel under the Ministry of Defense and certain other workers included in the total but outside the armaments industry.

If we exclude equipment for the nuclear forces, which still is prohibited from being exported, nearly 40 percent of the French production of armaments is shipped beyond our borders. This represents 5 percent of the value of all French exports and 17 percent of its exports of equipment goods. France is in third place, on a worldwide basis, in arms exports, far behind the United States and the Soviet Union, the study by the Ministry of Defense notes.

Finally, this official analysis notes the role of defense research in all research and development expenditures financed each year by the French state.

Out of about 20 billion francs earmarked by the Ministry of Defense for the financing of research and development, 12 billion francs (or about 60 percent) are provided to individual, publicly-owned companies, representing 17 percent of their financial resources in this area. The Ministry of Defense notes that

the state finances about 66 percent of research in France, and the Ministry of Defense finances 20 percent of this research by itself.

For the most part, the resources available for military research go to the electronics industry (25 percent), the nuclear industry (21 percent), and to the aeronautics industry (19 percent). The remaining research funds are divided among industries producing conventional armaments (such as munitions), naval shipyards and equipment factories, and plants producing land vehicles.

5170

CSO: 3519/195

MILITARY

GREECE

DESCRIPTION OF 'HURRICANE' NAVAL MANEUVERS

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 15 Feb 85 p 24

[Excerpts] With high winds of up to 10 and 11 on the Beaufort Scale [full gale], low cloud-cover and limited visibility, the ships of the naval fleet are plowing "full speed" through the Central Aegean Sea, due east of Skyros, while their guns are hammering at a moving enemy naval force that has penetrated the national sea space.

This was one of the most interesting phases of the "Hurricane" exercise, which were observed from the flagship FF "Elli" by the chief of GEN [Naval General Staff], Vice Admiral Pappas, by top officers of the various branches and by military correspondents of the newspapers.

The tremendous floating fortress of our Navy is also bound to be affected by the furious waves as it vibrates because of the high revolutions of its engines.

The extraordinary mobilization of the fleet is especially impressive as the reverberations of the far-away explosions shake the far ends of the archipelago.

"Only once before in my long naval career did I face such weather conditions," Vice Admiral Perissakis, commander of the Fleet, who is in command of the exercise, declared to reporters.

The "Battle" Begins

In explaining the plan of the exercise, Admiral Perissakis referred to the maneuverability and speed of the units in order to reach the point to intercepting the enemy at a given moment and to stop the enemy before it can accomplish its objectives.

Thus, the succession of clashes began with changing pictures on the stormy waters of the Aegean.

The maneuverings and the fire by the ships were determined by electronic means aboard the flagship "Elli" that registered every movement of the enemy in combination with control centers for reconnaissance on the islands.

As Admiral Perissakis explained, the supposed enemy penetrated the Greek archipelago with the objective of occupying two of our islands with landing operations.

"It is self-evident, therefore," he said, "that the enemy must be intercepted on the open sea before the landing and crushed as it approaches our coasts.

"Our counterplan is absolutely realistic and aims at the total paralysis of the aggressive capability of the enemy.

"Of course, included in this scenario is the enemy's effort to seek the 'striking arrowhead,' that is, the direction of our counterattack, in order to repulse it.

"Consequently, the invulnerability of our fleet is included in the plan of our reaction, a fact that means the maximization of the positive result and the minimization of the risks that may result."

At 8:00 p.m., through the darkness that had spread over the Aegean, the electronic radiolocators of "Elli" gave warning of the presence of another enemy force that was sailing at full speed on a given course.

The captain of "Elli," Commander Paliogiorgis, sounded general quarters and the commander of the Fleet, Vice Admiral Perissakis issued immediate orders to the other units.

Amidst the roar of the ocean, as the seas grew heavier, the destroyers "Kanaris," "Sakhtouris," "Velos" and "Kriezis" began to fire illuminating shells in order to aid the other ships to trap the enemy.

And, as it became evident from the generalization of the hostilities, the strike by formation now belonged to the romantic days of the old naval battles because of the modern techniques.

Special Missiles

Today, the contest took place at great distances because our naval units, as Admiral Perissakis assured us, are equipped with the most up-to-date guided missiles of advanced technology.

At 2:00 a.m. there was a concerted attack against enemy submarines that attempted to attack the Greek formation with self-guiding torpedoes.

The sonar listening devices of the battle units located three enemy submarines that were neutralized with depth charges from automatic launchers and by multiple-rocket launchers of great explosive power.

At 3:00 a.m., as ordered by Vice Admiral Pappas, there began the countermeasures against the enemy landing attempt with the immediate intervention of the Ranger Forces supported by the Tactical Air Force.

"The Green Devils," as the Rangers and the Marines are known in Army circles, immediately hit the backbone of the enemy land units and the fleet's weapons systems cut to pieces the enemy's naval formations before they were able to escape.

On the occasion of the successful development of this critical phase. the chief

of GEN added that our Navy, with its present structure and the spirit of cooperation with the other Services that distinguishes it, is in a position to guarantee effectively the security of the Aegean and the island network.

9731

CSO: 3521/199

MILITARY

GREECE

NEW POLICIES IN ARMED FORCES; VOLUNTEER CORPS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 24 Feb 85 p 33

[Excerpts] A new policy, "the barracks policy," as it is being called by many, began to be applied recently and quietly in the Armed Forces in combination with the national defense doctrine. The rationale of this new "defense policy," as it was officially called, is to contribute certain social concessions to the draftees and to retain the already combat-worthy element of the Armed Forces.

That is, beyond the defensive protection of the country with the designing and manufacture of Greek weapons "that will significantly decrease the dependence on third countries," the aim of the National Defense General Staff is the improvement in living conditions in the military units. The program for the implementation of this policy has already been finalized by the staffs of the GEA [Air Force General Staff], GES [Army General Staff] and GEN [Naval General Staff] and has already begun to be applied experimentally in one unit of the Air Force, the 124th Training Wing in Tripolis where the barracks are very different. New buildings, with all sorts of comforts, even for recruits, have been built with specially designed rooms so they have nothing to envy from the most up-to-date bases in foreign countries. The menu of the enlisted men has also been significantly improved; their leisure time has been increased with the operation of the movie theater and the renovation of the famous KPsM [recreation centers] and, overall, with the technical equipment that is not even found in the usually well-organized university student centers.

Better Living Conditions

The aim of the GEETHA [National Defense General Staff] is to extend this policy during 1985 to all the bases, with priority given to the units receiving the recruits. As reported to TO VIMA by a top military source, the aim of this policy, which will soon begin being applied in every military unit of the country, is to improve as much as possible the living conditions of the draftees, the regular NCO's and the officers of the units where they serve.

Although GEETHA has not yet given more details about this new policy as it awaits the results of the experiment with the 124th Training Wing in Tripolis, in the meantime it has let it be understood that the definitive implementation of the policy is bound to definitely change the rules of barracks life.

In addition to this, the National Defense Ministry is about to "admit" (in view

of the fact that it already has advertised the positions) the first volunteer soldiers in the history of the Greek Army with a 5-year enlistment. Although the law that was recently approved by the Chamber of Deputies provides for only 1,000 men to be enlisted each year, nevertheless, the ministry, whose main objective is to fill as soon as possible key positions in certain units, called for 2,000 men the first year, confirming at the same time that under no circumstances will the total number of volunteers exceed 5,000.

The reason that moved the National Defense Ministry to take this measure, which has been in effect in many European countries for quite a number of years, is the serious lack of personnel that has plagued the Army during the past decade. The many and varied deferments "because of studies" (there is even a deferment for attending a "barber college" and other similar schools!), the draft evaders living abroad, the acute demographic problem and even the call-up at age 21, and many times the call-up at age 28 or even age 30, because of repeated deferments, forced the military to call for volunteers who will serve for 5 years and receive the pay of an NCO. This pay presently amounts to 45,000 drachmai per month, without certain allowances.

Extremely Expensive Weapons Systems

There is, however, one more reason for the need for volunteer enlisted men to be trained to handle, for a number of years, the extremely expensive equipment that is indispensable for the defense of the country, and this is the most important reason.

The volunteer will be enlisted for a specific reason. He will be trained, if he is not already trained, in a specialty and, more importantly, he will serve for 5 continuous years, in the same specialty, in the same tank and he will not only know how to handle it well, but also how to maintain it so that it will be combat-ready at all times. Because, we must point out, and this is no longer a secret, that as things were, the (extremely expensive) tanks, the missiles and other so-called "essential weapons systems" were mostly used to train recruits. The wear and tear of these weapons systems, because of the continuous practice on them, was incalculable.

Numerous Applications

The first volunteers are expected to be called prior to Easter [14 April in Greece]. According to categorical statements made by alternate minister of National Defense, Mr. A. Drosogiannis, women will be excluded from the first phase in the beginning. Those who have a specialty, those who are in the service at present and have only 2 months to serve or have been recently discharged from the Army will be given preference. Their selection will be made--as Mr. Drosogiannis assures us--under very strict criteria.

Immediately after their enlistment, the volunteers, after receiving a special uniform, will proceed to nine training centers all over Greece to complete (those who are already trained) their training in a specific specialty. Those who are not trained will be trained regularly almost like the regular technical officers are trained.

When they have completed their 5-year obligation and are discharged they will be entitled to a bonus of 300,000 drachmai and they will be placed at the top of the list whenever the ministry publishes vacancies for permanent employees. They will also receive preference in the academies of the Armed Forces (Military, Naval and Air Force Academies) as well as the academy of the Greek Police. They will, of course, have certain obligations, which, if not kept, will result in their being discharged and they will not receive the bonus, as happens in any job. One of these obligations is for them to try not to decrease their performance, which, should it decrease, will be considered a "breach of contract." They will have the rank, the pay and working hours of regular NCO's and can, under certain circumstances, attain the rank of Sergeant Major.

With these two measures: the radical improvement of the living conditions in the barracks and the volunteer enlisted men, in combination with the new defense doctrine and the modernization of the Armed Forces, a basic part of the government policy will have been completed.

9731

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MILITARY

NETHERLANDS

OFFICIAL ON RISING COSTS OF DEFENSE MATERIEL

Amsterdam DE TELEGRAAF in Dutch 9 Feb 85 p 23

[Article by H.F. Van Loon: "Defense Threatens To Become Unaffordable. In Fifty Years, Only A Single Fighter Plane And A Single Frigate?"]

[Text] The Hague--Defense specialists use different words for it. One speaks cryptically of "structural disarmament," the other sensationally of the "impossible figures," a third one philosophically of "the road towards the absurd"; but they all mean the same thing: the fact that our defense is threatening to become unaffordable.

With a calculator in hand it is easy to figure it out: if the costs of modern weapon systems continue to grow in the same rate as they have in the past 20 years, then the Netherlands in the year 2035 will be able to buy only one single fighter plane to replace the 170 which the air force now numbers and only one single frigate to replace the 18 frigates which the Royal Navy now still has at sea. The costs of literally everything that has to do with defense, from wrenches to tanks and submarines, appears to be subject to a Gargantuan inflation, compared to which the "normal" inflation is mere child's play.

Some examples:

--The price of a fighter tank for the Dutch army has increased in the past 30 years from 500,000 guilders each to 5.4 million guilders each, an increase of 980 percent.

--When in 1978 the first two Walrus submarines were put out to contract, the their price apiece was determined at 237 million guilders. The year after, attitudes on safety changed considerably after an accident with an American submarine, and the design of the Walrus had to be changed drastically. This led, in turn, to a new cooling system. For this, the boat had to be extended, after which still other weapons had to be planned for it, while a different rudder also appeared to be necessary and a new escape system for the crew. Around 1984, the Walrus in fact had become a completely new prototype, with a new price tag, as well: 470 million guilders. In six years, the price had increased by 98 percent.

--He who thinks that this hyperinflation only goes for large systems and only affects Dutch defense is wrong. The American army pays 4,550 guilders for valves, which are for sale for 350 guilders at the garage, and to the question why a settee in the officers' wardroom aboard a destroyer had to cost 63,000 guilders, an admiral answered that "it would be in use for a long time".

--In the 13 years which the development of the British-German-Italian fighter aircraft Tornado has taken, the costs increased by 800 percent to 60 million guilders each. Within four years, the original cost of the new British Type 23 frigates increased by 92 percent from 250 million guilders to 480 million guilders each.

--In the American army, the dependable M-113 armored vehicle, the "front-line taxi" (price: 280,000 guilders each) has been replaced by the Bradley (6.8 million each), but in this armored infantry vehicle there is hardly room for the infantry: with some difficulty, five foot soldiers can be transported in it. Another example is that of the Viper antitank weapon, which was budgeted at 260 guilders each, but which ultimately was to cost 2,750 guilders, and subsequently turned out not to be able to penetrate the front armor of the Soviet T-27 [as published] tank. The solution that was found: the weapon now just has to be used to attack Soviet tanks from the side.

Against such impossible figures, the only logical solution is to drastically decrease the costs. How far one can go with that without exposing the Netherlands to unacceptable risks, that is the question that it is all about in this defense dilemma.

The Dutch defense top, with State Secretary Jan van Houwelingen in front, has passionately thrown itself upon this problem, under the slogan: "Keep defense affordable." Deputy DGM (Director General for Materiel) of the Ministry of Defense, Dr. M. Vermaas:

"Our philosophy is: by more European cooperation where the research is concerned, the development and production of new weapons systems, we can achieve larger series, and therefore lower costs. The tide is with us inasmuch as this idea is not only alive with us, but with all European NATO partners. Such a form of cost management does presuppose a strong political leadership which is prepared and able to strictly supervise the wishes of the military users. Against pressure, politics should be able to hold firm. During the acquisition of the newest generation of tanks, for instance, we consciously opted for a somewhat smaller number of expensive tanks, supplemented by a large number of cheap antitank weapons. In cost management it also helps to put a ceiling on costs. In this manner, it has been determined that the new M-frigates of the Royal Navy should not cost more than 360 million guilders each. Thus, we have the guarantee that a good and operational modern frigate can be built, but without costly and superfluous things which the users perhaps would have liked to see on it."

From what has been said in past days by top people at the Ministry of Defense, it can be gathered by which route the Netherlands wants to counter the unbridled increase of defense materiel, with the intention that the Netherlands will maintain an adequate defense also far into the next century.

1. Far-reaching cooperation of the European defense industry, which will result in larger series and lower prices. If possible, also exchange of defense materiel. In that way, the Netherlands last year exchanged Rolls Royce engines (used in frigates) for Goalkeeper systems (an antimissile system of Hollandse Signaal). W.C.J. Kuijpers, director of defense affairs at Philips, stated in regard to this matter: "Such an exchange means no extra costs and a certain degree of specialization. Let one country make what it is good at making, then that [effort] does not need to be duplicated elsewhere."

2. The Ministry of Defense, which spends 4 billion guilders a year on materiel, must support Dutch industry by as many orders as possible, but must not forget either that it should purchase as efficiently as possible. Van Houwelingen: "Extra costs occasioned by using Dutch industries are not acceptable if they only serve to temporarily preserve employment. Such extra costs are allowable, if because of them the technological level in the Netherlands is being improved structurally, and industry therefore can better stand the competition with foreign countries."

3. Selectively applying new technologies. "Defense can perhaps remain affordable in this manner, because improved fighting power in some cases can be achieved more cheaply by quality improvement." In this respect, it is good to keep in mind that the threat of the Warsaw pact continues to increase. The Soviet Union spends no less than 13 percent of its gross national product on armaments, as opposed to 5.3 percent in NATO, and there is (except for manned bombers) not a single category to be found in which the Soviets do not have a giant superiority over the West.

Quality

4. As well as high-tech weapons, keep in mind somewhat less sophisticated weapons, but in larger quantities, in accordance with the saying "Quantity is a quality by itself." Chief of Defense Staff General G. Huyser: "We should remain on guard that the quantity of the superior weapon systems which we bring to the field does not become so small that it no longer affords any deterrence." For example, one of the possibilities which is being studied (in Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany, among other places) is to combine a relatively small number of very modern (and costly) tanks with a relatively large number of (less costly) tank killers; these carry less armor, are less versatile, slower and less mobile, and therefore cheaper.

Whatever the solution, it is clear that thought should be given and decisions made in order to prevent our being able to buy fewer and fewer weapons with more and more money. The goal should be a kind of European industrial defense community. If that is not accomplished, then the time will soon come when Western Europe will not be totally dependent on American nuclear arms.

MILITARY

NORWAY

PAPER COMMENTS ON POLL SHOWING STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NATO

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Mar 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Solidarity--Both Ways"]

[Text] A new opinion poll by the organization People and Defense shows that approval of Norway's NATO membership has never been higher. Fully 67 percent believe that the alliance gives Norway security, only 10 percent say that it represents a danger. It is especially favorable that youths are in the average, a clear improvement in relation to previous polls. And to supply some material for reflection to the current SV anniversary congress these days: every third SV voter is a NATO supporter. Only 41 percent were opponents.

The will to defend among the Norwegian people is at its peak within NATO. Another opinion poll shows that 87 percent favor a military defense in the present situation, while only 5 percent are opposed to Norway defending itself with military means.

This very important approval of the western defensive alliance, and the people's record high will to defend, indicate a development corresponding to the fact that the entire world picture, year after year, has removed Norway more and more from any possibility of maintaining neutrality in a conflict. Therefore Norway must, within a western alliance, political and military, maintain a readiness which makes attack less tempting.

Solidarity is a key word here. The increasing NATO approval can conceal a dawning illusion that Norway can behave like Greeks or Danes. That we will be defended to the roots of our hair, regardless of whether we sit passively. As is known, solidarity is a reciprocal word, just as peace is indivisible. Individual tensions in our security policy debate here at home give reasons to emphasize the requirement for solidarity more strongly than in a long time. We are talking about the campaign for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries, "regardless of what NATO might think," as AUF [Labor Party Youth Organization] puts it. We are thinking about Einar Forde's "infighting in NATO" and other show-offs. That applies also to the freeze question, space weapon exhortations and other negotiation-bungling actions.

We must not come to the point where full approval of our membership in the alliance is attained at the expense of our will to stand together with the alliance on the conditions and obligations to the common security. If we distance ourselves from reciprocal solidarity on concrete issues, we will be in the most fortunate case "footnote countries" such as Denmark and Greece. In the worst case we will be sitting outside the entire alliance.

Norway is less able than the two countries named to take such a position. It is a fact which can not be emphasized enough that the northern areas are becoming more and more important strategically. Nonetheless these areas have relatively low tension, which has taken a long time to establish, and which can be upset if security policy illusions gain ground. It is now less appropriate than ever to have "infighting in NATO." Today's situation and consideration for a secure future also call for solidarity from us.

9287

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MILITARY

NORWAY

ADMIRAL ON THREAT TO NORWAY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS ROLE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Mar 85 p 2

[Op Article by Vice Admiral Carsten A. Lutken: "Defense and Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] The credibility of our defense is dependent on the credibility of NATO, and that is built on the doctrine that nuclear weapons produce such a terrible effect that the other side can not take the chance of an armed conflict, or at least they will think twice before going too far. It is in that light that we must look at the nuclear weapon-free zones and our own defense situation.

At the same time we can not be unaffected by the nuclear weapon reduction measures which NATO is in the process of carrying out.

If, however, there is to be any meaningful debate, there must be greater openness. It is no longer useful to say, as a general once said, "If you knew everything that I know you would agree with me."

So let us make a new effort to penetrate this subject. I will begin with our own defense and the philosophy behind what we are doing.

The threat against Norway is naturally conditional on our geography. With our location, neither the East nor the West will want to leave us alone in a conflict, regardless of alliances. Only Moscow knows whether it will be sufficient to destroy our airfields, harbors and communications, command and control and defense installations, or whether an invasion is considered necessary.

Discouraging

In order to discourage the other side from something like this, he must be convinced that what he can expect to accomplish is not worth it in relation to his input. Perhaps it is enough to create a reasonable doubt as to the outcome, with uncertainty about which weapons he can expect to be used, among other things. At the same time we must avoid actions which the other side will see as a threat that they can not live with.

This balance between discouragement and reassurance is seen as something typically Norwegian, and we have been clever in living up to this principle through a set of self-imposed restrictions in peacetime. As far as reassurance goes, it is up to our politicians to explain that side of the issue. My theme is how to establish sufficiently strong and credible discouragement.

Reinforcements

The first condition for that is the ability and the will to receive allied reinforcements, primarily aircraft squadrons and land combat units. In order for the sending of these units to have any significance, we must hold out until they come, and we must hold the counterattack structure, meaning airfields, harbors and communications, intact. The troublesome thing is that the defense that the 1974 Defense Commission proposed as an acceptable minimum is now a nearly unattainable maximum.

The circumstances around this is material for at least an article of its own, but let me list the most important elements. It is a story of a lack of compensation for inflation and new tasks, it is overtime and expenditures for activities which the commission did not foresee and which must be covered by the defense budget, and it is the working environment law and welfare measures. That means more difficult assignment of priorities between actions to strengthen the ability to counterattack and actions to strengthen the ability to fight.

Doubt about the outcome of an attack and its deterrent effect also depends, according to NATO doctrine, on the possibility of using nuclear weapons from Norwegian territory. So NATO has difficulty accepting nuclear weapon-free zones.

The question of the first use, on the other hand, as a part of the doctrine, must be subject to discussion. Restrictions on such use from Norwegian territory should be possible, but it is hardly so for our middle European partners. For them the question of whether nuclear weapons will be used, and who will use them first, is probably not decisive. With their location and density of population a new war, regardless of what kind, will destroy them as nations.

Recognizing this they therefore approved the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime, simply because they believe that nothing less will be a sufficient deterrent. They will hardly be able to understand or accept that their alliance partners, Denmark and Norway, are participating in a Nordic zone solution. In that case we will no longer have anything to do in the NATO organs which work with these problems.

Reduction

And work is going on. Despite the fact that it has not been possible to reach an agreement on mutual, controlled and verifiable disarmament, NATO is going in for unilateral reduction. In this way NATO has also recognized that deterrence can be obtained with fewer weapons, if one does not go so far that the doctrine lacks credibility.

Public opinion in West Europe must have part of the credit for recognizing this. Reduction measures, however, should be sold much more as confidence-creating actions. The Soviets should also be able to recognize that that is what they are.

It is of course immediately clear that the fewer weapons, the more important is the combination of types, the size of the warheads, delivery capability and the accuracy. The work going on is therefore a laborious process, and the results are important for us all. We should retain our possibilities to affect this process, and continued Norwegian participation in NATO's nuclear planning is important.

Norway's Role

All participating nations are heard, even though I have no illusions that the so-called "footnote" nations--those who take exception to one point or another or most--are given special weight. Our country's role should not be underestimated. We have had politicians and civil servants in this work who are respected. It is often easier for a small country which is not itself directly involved to anticipate the unfortunate consequences of and reactions to something which has been proposed. Many wise compromises have been made through the intervention of the small countries.

The importance of this work can not be overestimated. As known, the goal of the Geneva meetings was the so-called "zero solution," and it still is in considering the medium range missiles. However the United States has so far withdrawn 1000 warheads, and following the advice of NATO an additional 1400 are being prepared for withdrawal. At the same time, as is known, two older warheads are being withdrawn for every new one deployed.

Confidence Building

It is a large question whether this is more confidence building than any so-called nuclear weapon-free zone could be. In both cases it is a small thing to bring the weapons in again, so let us not be naive. It is, however, not good to know how an eventual zone arrangement would affect the will to further expand the weapons arsenal in the West.

Our allied reinforcements will presumably be able to manage without nuclear weapons, and we will not have the deterrent effect that uncertainty over this point would bring. It will be natural that the countries which send aircraft and troops here will expect of us that we invest more than we have so far in our defense in order to contribute to the general raising of the so-called nuclear threshold which their country will in any case depend upon.

In conclusion I will say that regardless of what we think about nuclear weapons and their importance for Norway's position, we must be loyal to those of our alliance partners who believe that such weapons are their only reliable alternative. Otherwise we no longer have anything to do in NATO, even if they would have us.

I believe that NATO is working on reduction of its own arsenal, which is much more important than zones. Let us forget them so that we can continue to participate in this process.

9287

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MILITARY

NORWAY

ARMED FORCES DEVELOPING PLANS TO USE CIVIL COPTERS IN CRISIS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Mar 85 p 11

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Crisis Plan For Civil Helicopters"]

[Text] Norway's rapidly growing number of civilian helicopters will now be utilized as an extra resource in defense plans for crisis and wartime, according to information from the Defense Staff. The chief of defense has given the project top priority in solving the army's, and especially the field brigade's great need for rapid movement, and at the same time to improve the ability to fight enemy armored forces.

In addition to the rescue squadrons and the Defense Department's own helicopter squadrons, there are about 100 civilian helicopters registered here in Norway. Of these 50-60 are heavy transport helicopters with large lift capabilities, while the rest are medium heavy and light helicopters of different types.

This resource of very expensive material, and the entire apparatus behind it of administration, fliers and technical personnel with their knowledge and understanding, will now be utilized in the defense mobilization and war plans. The necessary reports have been prepared: first by the Training Inspector's Staff following an order from the army leadership, later by an ad hoc committee appointed by the chief of defense, and now the implementation of a working and control group which has been in action for a while.

Major H. C. Wilhelmsen at the Training Inspector's Staff has worked on organizing air transport and fixed air routes for the Defense Department, has also worked on organizing the helicopter sections.

Following the beginning of oil activity on the Norwegian shelf there was an almost explosive development of civilian helicopters. At the same time it became clear that the field brigades had a growing need for rapid movement to meet a military threat at the right place at the right time. That need has not become less as Soviet forces steadily acquire more helicopters and their offensive ability improves.

In addition to the need for rapid tactical movement of battle units, the brigades also need helicopters to bring up supplies and evacuation of the wounded, besides recognition and communications. In order to meet these needs the Defense Staff plans to organize a number of squadrons in both North and South Norway.

In case of crisis or mobilization the civilian helicopter bases, which are today exposed in the Tromso and Stavanger areas, will rapidly be evacuated to a central place within each section of the country so that positioning flights are reduced to a minimum, at the same time as the bases are secured as much as possible against attack.

According to the plans, the senior military officer in each section of the country will deploy the helicopter units, but for concrete tasks the squadrons will be subordinate to the individual division or brigade. To obtain the best possible cooperation with the army units they serve, and at the same time to avoid the "dead" time which would reduce their range, the squadrons should be deployed near the front. This system has already been proved in exercises with good results. The most natural assignment would be to place the helicopter squadrons in the brigades' administrative area, together with the supply sections. In that way a certain protection is achieved, at the same time as the helicopter sections are tied to an incorporated communications and supply unit.

Within the Defense Staff it has also been decided to arm the civilian helicopters for self-defense. This is not technically difficult, but the question has been temporarily set aside until the units are organized, and there has been experience from the exercises. Three solutions for arming can later be used: missiles or machine guns mounted on the outside, or machine guns which fire through the side doors. On the other hand it is not recommended that the helicopters be used directly as fighting helicopters. That will require training, otherwise the losses would soon be unacceptably high, and helicopters are too valuable to be used this way. But the helicopter squadrons will also contribute to improving the brigades' fighting ability by bringing the weapons quickly into positions where they are needed, for example TOW antitank weapons if critical situations arise.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

DEFENSE BUDGET GROWTH FOR 1984 LESS THAN PLANNED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by Eivind G. Karlsen: "Defense Strengthened, 3.5 Percent Growth Last Year"]

[Text] The defense budget grew last year in real terms by 3.5 percent, exactly as assumed, announced Minister of Defense Anders C Sjaastad to AFTENPOSTEN. The average increase for the years 1982 to and including 1984 is also about 3.5 percent, entirely in line with the goals of the coalition.

Real growth in the defense budget, according to Minister Sjaastad, has been as follows: 4 percent in 1982, 2.8 percent in 1983, and 3.5 percent in 1984.

The figures are based on calculations of the total defense appropriations in each year, in other words the original budget plus supplementary appropriations.

On the other hand NATO is based on accounting figures. According to NATO's definition, that would mean that in 1984 there was a negative outcome of 4.6 percent, because in December the department had to transfer about 830 million kroner for use in 1985, appropriations which it was not practical to use at that time.

That will, however, benefit us in NATO calculations for this year, in which the growth in Norwegian defense expenditures can be measured at over 15 percent.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

DISARMAMENT GROUP PRESSING FOR 'NUCLEAR-FREE' PORTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Mar 85 p 5

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Action for Nuclear Weapon-Free Harbors as an Election Campaign Issue"]

[Text] "No to Nuclear Weapons" is trying to make nuclear weapon-free ports a political election campaign issue. In cooperation with peace movements in other countries, they will take action for the countries on the North Atlantic and the Pacific to approve this demand. Foreign ships which could be expected to carry nuclear weapons on board must deliver a statement saying that that is not the case before they get permission to visit the ports of these countries. This demand is a means of focusing the attention of public opinion on cruise missiles--especially those which are seabased.

It is quite clear that "No to Nuclear Weapons" and its sister organizations have the prohibition of cruise missiles as one of their highest priorities.

In the June action the peace movements in Norway, Denmark, Iceland, England, the United States, Canada and Japan will participate, among others. It was a shot of vitamins for "No to Nuclear Weapons" when there was a breakthrough for the demand for "nuclear-free ports" at the annual county party meetings of the Labor Party, Left-Socialist Party and Liberal Party in Troms. These parties make up the majority in the Troms county council.

Furthermore there is great satisfaction in the peace movement that the government of New Zealand wants a statement that foreign ships do not have nuclear weapons on board before they enter the country's ports.

It is claimed beyond a doubt that the peace movement will coordinate its input in the work on this issue in the future. In Japan, which has an important strategic location, the effort will be strongly mobilized. The Japanese city of Kobe has for example already resolved that ships will declare that they are free of nuclear weapons before a visit.

In Denmark a committee has been appointed in the Folketing which will determine whether visits by ships with nuclear weapons are in conflict with Denmark's nuclear policy.

Also in the United States the peace movement works actively. In New York, where a base is planned for a battleship, there has been a movement to get the city government to make a resolution which will prohibit the production, transport, storage and deployment of nuclear weapons within New York city.

Also in War

We asked Magne Barth, information secretary for "No to Nuclear Weapons" if whips which would come to our aid in a given situation would also be included in the demand of the peace movement.

He answered in the affirmative. "It is Norway's sovereign right to decide what our defense planning be."

"But is it not naive to think that such an order would apply in wartime?"

"In war all restrictions, agreements and zone declarations can be broken. It is also important to change plans which assume use of nuclear weapons. The point is that NATO today has a strategy which is based on the possible first use of such weapons. We must stop that in peacetime. That is the only thing we can do to prevent in the strongest way possible that such weapons are used in war," said Magne Barth.

9287

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MILITARY

NORWAY

WOMEN ORGANIZE GROUP TO PRESS FOR INCREASED ROLE IN FORCES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Mar 85 p 5

[Article by Anne-Lise Hammer: "Women's Contributions in War Are Noted"]

[Text] "Myths are being created about women. Especially the antidefense circles are trying to create myths about women's behavior, in order thereafter to use all women for the benefit of their views. We wish to bring forth women's contributions as active participants in the resistance movement at home and abroad for Norway's freedom and for peace," said Grethe Vaerno, the newly elected leader of Women's Volunteer Preparedness [KFB] and Storting representative to AFTENPOSTEN.

This will be KFB's contribution to the 40-year anniversary of the liberation and the celebration of the conclusion of the UN's Women's Decade. The UN International Women's Conference in Nairobi is also going to deal with the theme of women and peace, women's role in the liberation movement and women's situation during foreign aggression.

"At a conference which takes place on 6 May at the Home Front Museum in Oslo we will try to assemble some women who themselves were active in the Norwegian liberation struggle, historians who write the history of the war and the women's history. We will take up themes such as the contributions of women's organizations just before and during the war in Norway, women's contributions in Milorg on the home front as border guides, couriers and the illegal press, besides women's contributions tied to the defense in England, Scotland, Canada and Sweden," said Grethe Vaerno.

"KFB was founded in 1951 on the basis of experiences from the war. When the war broke out in 1939 women and women's organizations wanted to make a contribution. Women's Working Help was founded in December 1939, and created the model for KFB, which joined with Birth Help from Crown Princess Martha, former Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen and Claudia Olsen. The latter was the chairman of the Norwegian Women's National Council. Once more women did not want to meet a crisis or war situation unprepared."

KFB is neutral politically, and consists of nine nationwide women's organizations, or organizations with a large number of women, among others LO [Federation of Trade Unions] and Norwegian Women's National Council. The purpose is to place women and their organizations in a better position to make a contribution in war and during crises, catastrophes or even large accidents, said the newly elected leader.

Grethe Vaerno does not deny that the working field of KFB is problematical. It covers all of the total defense, which is complex matter, both as to information, practical work and planning. The public preparedness system has problems, and it makes it no easier to be a volunteer organization. It seems that the authorities are not ready to utilize the resources which are here. For example Grethe Vaerno mentioned that KFB has pressed for 4 years to get the right public authorities to plan and shape the lines of direction for preparedness for care for children and others who need supervision and care. "Now that both sexes participate in military defense, rules are also needed for responsibility for care in mobilization. One would think this is a little thing, but it is like wading in syrup," said Vaerno.

She said that in the future KFB will place most of its weight on information about the total defense. "The people's knowledge about that is small, mostly those who have not been through any form of military service." Furthermore the organization has been through a period of reorganization. "We feel that we have a very important task. We have an apparatus with clubs in all the counties and most municipalities. Our rules are modernized, we have a working plan and a reorganized secretariat which we share in the offices with People and Defense. Training of confident women is one of the most important tasks, something we will be working very hard on in the future," concluded Grethe Vaerno.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

BRIEFS

COMMAND CONTROLS FOR NAVAL SHIPS--Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk has signed a contract with the Defense Department to deliver command, control and information systems for frigates and corvettes. The order has a value of 100 million kroner, and the deliveries will take place during the period 1986-1989. The Defense Department reports that the contract applies to equipment for ships of the "Sleipner"-class and the "Oslo"-class. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Mar 85 p 40] 9287

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCIES UNDERGOING REORGANIZATION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Ake Ekdahl: "Reorganization of Civil Defense"]

[Text] The management of the Civil Defense is changing the name to The Rescue Service (RAV). The supervisory board of the Economic Defense (OEF) will be called the supervisory board for Civil Preparedness (OCB), according to two government bills which will be presented to the Riksdag next week.

The change of names will take place in connection with a reorganization of the leadership of the civil parts of the total defense and the rescue service.

The aim is to get a coordination of resources and responsibilities for the entire civilian side of the defense. Twenty-two authorities and 40 functionaries are involved in the reorganization.

The government's plans have been sent out in portions for comments by those most closely involved, to decide if there are still any objections which were raised during the preliminary work.

The nonsocialists have proposed a parliamentary debate to solve the most difficult problems, but the Defense Department did not agree with that.

An original thought was to create a position of "Civilian OB" for the total civil defense, which was not approved by the management of Civil Defense, the present RAV.

In addition there are now protests against the Energy Bureau in OEF being transferred to the Energy Department. Conservative Gothe Knutsson remains in the OEF management, and he has the support of the union.

As the same time as the tug of war goes on between the authorities over the best jobs, and apprehensions rise about increased instead of reduced bureaucracy in the new organization, a power struggle has broken out about is to be the new head of the Rescue Service.

The current director general of the Civil Defense, Gunnar Gustafsson, has explained that he is ready to retire in advance if the government prefers in order that the reorganization can be carried out.

Immediately three defense politicians showed an interest in the job. These were MP Roland Brannstrom (Social Democrat), chairman of the Committee on Conscription, MP Olle Goransson (Social Democrat), vice chairman of the Riksdag Defense Committee, and Per Borg, permanent secretary to Minister of Defense Anders Thunborg and former bureau head in OEF.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

DEFENSE MINISTER ON INCREASED AIR VIOLATIONS, ESPIONAGE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Dick Ljungberg: "Defense Minister Tells KU of Several Serious Air Violations"]

[Text] Several incidents of a serious nature have taken place in Swedish airspace in recent years which the Swedish people have not learned about. That is what Minister of Defense Anders Thunborg said when he spoke to the Riksdag Constitutional Committee [KU] last Tuesday.

He spoke of a Polish military aircraft which in 1984 was over Skane for 48 minutes, and a NATO helicopter which in 1981 violated western Swedish airspace for 12 minutes.

Furthermore there were several incidents in the 70's, including an American overflight over Faro. These events were previously reported.

Thunborg was called in before the KU to explain why the newspapers informed the public before the government did about the serious events of 9 August last year when a Soviet fighter plane followed a chartered aircraft from Scanair in over Gotland.

Protest

On 17 August the OB [supreme commander of the Swedish Armed Forces] was ready with his report, and a protest was transmitted to the Soviet Union. A reply first came on 4 September--almost an entire month after the event--and then the government began to speak.

Anders Thunborg explained the delay in this way:

"In cases like this one must consider whether to go out and inform the public immediately, or wait until the foreign power concerned has answered the protest. There can be diplomatic reasons for waiting. But in serious cases it can be better to go public immediately. Of course the information can leak out."

Thunberg pointed out that the rules for announcement have been changed since the serious event over Gotland. Before that, violations were reported in a summarized annual report from the OB. That way serious incidents could be hidden away--as in the cases Thunborg suggested to the KU.

Delay

Now the report from the OB will come quarterly, and in more serious cases the government and the Defense Staff can through consultation decide whether to go out with the information directly to the public. In that way delays such as the Gotland case can be avoided.

Thunberg did not believe that the government and the OB handled the Gotland case incorrectly. But the vice chairman of the KU, Anders Bjork (Conservative), and the former chairman, Bertil Fiskesjo (Center) thought after the meeting that the incident over Gotland--which the Soviets denied--was so serious that the information should have gone out directly.

They think that it shows that the previous rules for announcement were insufficient. If they had to "remind" the defense minister to deal with the matter it would not have happened until now.

The Security Police Chief Sven-Ake Hjalmarth was also present at the hearing in the KU. It concerned Charlie Nordblom's book about industrial espionage, in which it is claimed that the Soviet Embassy contains a large number of intelligence men. Ulf Larsson, permanent secretary to Olof Palme, denied this information.

"I told the committee what I said earlier, that I will neither confirm nor deny the information in the book," said Hjalmarth afterward. "That is to say that part of the book is right and part is wrong. But I can confirm that there are intelligence officers in the embassy under diplomatic cover. I can not comment on how many."

In connection with the publication last fall, a member of the Security Police said something publicly which was interpreted as a confirmation of the information in the spy book. It was that which caused permanent secretary Larsson to react with a denial.

Hjalmarth admitted, after reading through transcripts of what the representative had said, including on TV, that it could be interpreted as though the Security Police confirmed the information. Therefore he believed it is important to clarify the actual position of the Security Police (meaning to either or confirm or deny).

Should be Censured

On this point Bertil Fiskesjo and Anders Bjork were very critical, and were inclined toward having the committee censure Olof Palme or Minister of Justice Wickbom, who sanctioned Ulf Larsson's statement.

"We have freedom of the press here in this country. It is inappropriate for the government to object to something written in a book," said Fiskesjo. "It is serious if a foreign power gets the impression that the Swedish Government can influence what is published. Ulf Larsson's denial provoked a Soviet protest against the book, of course."

9287

CSO: 3650/207

MILITARY

SWEDEN

ARMED FORCES EXPERIENCING LACK OF RESERVE OFFICERS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Mar 85 p 6

[Article by Arne Soderlund: "Defense Has a Shortage of Reserve Officers"]

[Text] Defense has a leadership problem. When mobilization comes there will be two choices: not to set up all units, or send the soldiers out with officers who are too old, too young, or insufficiently trained.

"Very serious," said Tom Hellman at SROF [Swedish Reserve Officers Association] who had a conference over the weekend in Sodertalje. There they discussed, among other things, the lack of sufficiently many and sufficiently trained officers at the company commander level.

These officers will be in combat themselves. That means that they should not be older than 30-35. In this age group the defense has a shortage of about 1,300 reserve officers.

The gap arose during the 70's. Then reserve officer training was divided into four summers. It was not enticing, and fewer applied than before.

Now the training time has been changed, but the shortage remains.

The vacancies can not be filled by professional officers. The defense is based on the reserves being there: if something happens, 5,400 combat company commanders out of 9,000 will be taken from civil life.

SROF wants more to be trained to cover the shortage. But defense prefers a cheaper way.

Later Pension

Johan Palmgren is the chief of personnel in the Army Staff.

"Reserve officers are now pensioned at age 52. We want to add 7 or 8 years to that.

It is not only reserve officers that are short in the war organization. There is a shortage of people in peacetime also. Most recently during the maneuver "Vastgrans" in Varmland.

Many reserve officers ask for and receive postponements of refresher training. Many who are absent out in the field own their own businesses and cannot afford to be absent, or cannot get away.

On that point there is agreement between the defense and the SROF: nobody should lose money by being a reserve. The question is whether it helps. The minister of finance likes reserve officers, who cost 6,000-7,000 per year, better than professional officers, who certainly train the conscripts, but who cost perhaps 150,000 per year.

But at the moment the Defense Department has no plans to alleviate the shortage of reserve officers.

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CSO: 3650/205

MILITARY

SWEDEN


NAVY REVEALS PHOTOS OF NEW YUGOSLAV-MADE MINISUBS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 7 Feb 85 pp 1, 6


[Excerpt] Two divers on the way into a underwater moped--the Navy's weapon for submarine hunts which is no longer secret. The naval staff actually released pictures of the new acquisition from Yugoslavia on Wednesday.

"We now have trained crews on the vehicles," explains Wyn Enqvist, of the naval staff, for SVENSKA DAGBLADET. He maintains that the "moped" and underwater sled will mainly be used to test the system for submarine safety which the Swedish military has successively built up. The idea is not to send the vehicles down "in order to look" upon a new incursion and possible submarine hunt.


The vehicles are powered by an electric motor and travel four to eight knots. They cost just over 8 million. The power was incurred upon Swedish waters in Karlskrona last spring used vehicles similar to these.



The underwater moped--two divers fit inside. They sit encapsulated in a (despite a plexi-glass cover) water-filled space and steer. The moped is 7.6 meters long.



The underwater sled--the diver lays on his stomach and drives. A windshield pushes the water aside.



One of the Navy's new fully trained crews in full diver equipment by the 7.6 meter long "Underwater moped." With this they can reach depths of 40 meters.

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SINO-FRG ECONOMIC COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Beijing LIAOWANG /OUTLOOK/ in Chinese No 43, 22 Oct 84 pp 7-8

/Article by Zhu Minzhi /2612 2404 0030/ and Chai Sikuan /2693 0013 1401/:
"China and FRG Intensify Economic Cooperation"/

/Text/ When Vice Premier Li Peng /2621 7720/ visited the Federal Republic of Germany /FRG/ in May of last year, the press here ran an editorial that said: "We can see that Sino-FRG cooperation is entering a new phase." In October, Premier Helmut Kohl's trip to China deepened further economic cooperation between the two countries, and pushed cooperation between the two countries in all fields to a new, higher level.

I. A New Signal

The most important result achieved during Premier Kohl's formal visit to China was the strengthening of economic and technological cooperation between the two countries. When Kohl met with Premier Zhao for the first time he indicated that he considered that visit a signal in developing a long-term, close relationship with China. He said, the FRG has many reasons for furthering close mutual relations with China, and deeper cooperation between the two countries can make a great contribution to world peace and prosperity. The FRG believes that China is a reliable partner and friend.

From the course of Kohl's visit, everyone realized that both sides have a great interest in and strong desire to strengthen economic and technological cooperation between the two countries. The FRG has highly advanced industry and technology, and has long been an important economic trading partner of China. China, which is carrying out its open door policy in the economic realm and which has an abundance of natural resources and great potential, is of strong attractiveness to the FRG.

What really drew everyone's attention was that among the persons accompanying Premier Kohl were 27 specially invited German magnates of the financial, industrial and economic circles and the heads of large corporations. Among these persons were the director of

Daimler-Benz Corporation, which has long won international acclaim, the director of the Siemens Corp, which is the world's largest electronics corporation, the director of SMS Schloemann-Sismag AG, the world's best steel corporation, the director of the Volkswagen Corp, which is ranked fifth in the automobile industry worldwide with respect to automobile output, the well-known chairman of Deutschebank, and the director of the Mannesmann Corporate Group, the FRG's largest machine building corporation. This gathering in Beijing of representatives of such impressive German corporations was unprecedented in the history of the two countries' economic relations, and it serves to prove that they have a great desire to do business with China.

During the fourth meeting between Premier Kohl and Premier Zhao Ziyang, they made an exception and invited the representatives of these corporations to attend, and had face-to-face discussions with them about the feasibility, ways and means of developing cooperation in each economic field. The lively atmosphere of the meeting and the results it produced fully indicate the enthusiasm of the FRG's economic circles for developing economic relations with China.

During Kohl's visit to China, the two sides signed a number of cooperation agreements. In particular, the Shanghai-Volkswagen project, under joint management by the FRG's manufacturer of Santana trucks, Volkswagen Corp, and three Chinese enterprises is the two countries' largest joint venture project. It is also Volkswagen's largest joint venture in the world. This joint corporation will adopt Volkswagen's latest technology to produce "Shanghai Santana" trucks and engines, and it will have an annual production capacity of 300,000 trucks and 100,000 engines.

Both sides regard this project as a breakthrough. Vice Premier Li Peng, together with Premier Kohl, attended the groundbreaking ceremony for the Shanghai Volkswagen Automobile Corp. Before that, Shanghai's test-produced "Shanghai Santana" car underwent inspection based on international standards, and it has already reached advanced world levels.

The Germans also indicated their willingness to carry out financial cooperation with China, and set out 50 million marks in their budget for a first batch of funds for capital assistance.

II. Diversified Channels

Since the two countries established relations, Sino-FRG economic cooperation has expanded steadily. If we say that in the past few years there were some persons in FRG economic circles who went through a wait-and-see period with respect to economic cooperation between the two countries, we can now say that there are more and more persons seeking to do business with China, and the scope of economic cooperation

is getting greater and greater. When the two premiers met this time they fully confirmed that results have been achieved in Sino-FRG economic cooperation over the past few years and, furthermore, they suggested that a greater diversity of forms of cooperation be developed as cooperation is expanded.

The Chinese side welcomed the West German entrepreneurs to participate in China's energy and transportation key construction projects and the technological transformation of China's old enterprises. Not only is China willing to undertake cooperation with the FRG's large enterprises; it is also willing to cooperate with small and medium enterprises. China welcomes the development of cooperation on a greater scale between the provinces and states of the two countries, and believes that this will be a very favorable new form of cooperation. It also welcomes the German entrepreneurs to go to China's 14 advanced coastal cities to open either joint ventures of wholly-owned and operated factories. The Chinese side hopes that the FRG's entrepreneurs will invest with confidence in China, because China is very trustworthy. Its economic laws are closer to completion every day, and contracts that are signed will have legal effect.

The West German entrepreneurs accompanying Premier Kohl on his visit to China also put forth many ideas on how to develop diversified forms of cooperation between the two countries. For example, Metallgesellschaft AG of Frankfurt; Chairman Dr Dietrich Natus suggested that since the FRG lacks raw materials but has advanced technology, while China's raw materials are abundant, it would be ideal if the two sides could cooperate in the metallurgy area. The chairman of the Association of German Electrical Power Plants VDEW, Frankfurt pointed out that the two countries have already signed a nuclear cooperation agreement. This is a firm foundation upon which the two countries can undertake cooperation in the nuclear field, and the 500 small and medium enterprises belonging to the Association of German Electrical Power Plants have already agreed to a plan for technology transfer to China. Chairman Vogel of Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH, which participated in the manufacture of the "Airbus" airplane, pointed out that he was willing to establish a really extensive cooperative relationship with China, wherein the two sides would cooperate in design, production, and technology transfer, and would develop together. The president of the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry Otto Wolff von Amerongen suggested that three German corporations (Krupp AG, Mannesmann, and Otto Wolff AG) are all willing to help China develop large-scale production equipment for coal resources and, moreover, are willing to transfer technology. Volkswagen Corp Chairman K. Hahn said that the corporation's cooperation with Shanghai had gone very well, exceeding original expectations. The Chinese side clearly indicated that in accordance with market demand, the output of the Shanghai car could expand further.

China's leaders and economists have indicated strong interest in the ideas regarding the expansion of cooperation put forth by the West German entrepreneurs. They especially admired West Germany's good quality and its relative openness regarding technology transfer, but they hoped that West Germany could become more price competitive.

At present, in the area of trade, West Germany is already ranked third behind Japan and the United States as one of China's main trading partners. Last year total trade between the two countries increased 25 percent, 7.8-fold more than when diplomatic relations were established in 1972. This year, the trend in increases continued, and total trade in the first half of the year increased 11.5 percent over the same period in 1983. The areas of economic cooperation between the two countries are expanding every day. According to preliminary statistics, this year the two countries have already reached several hundred agreements for joint projects, including machinery, chemicals, construction, coal, metallurgy, and light industry in the various forms of joint venture, joint manufacture, technical training and labor cooperation. The scope of S&T cooperation is also expanding, and the two sides have already gradually moved from trade in resources, general exchange of investigation visits and technical discussions to joint research, cooperation in experiments, joint exploration, technological consulting, operational meetings and research into organizational cooperation. Through Premier Kohl's visit to China, steps were taken to solidify further the diversified cooperation already developed by the two countries.

III. Long-term Stability

When Premier Kohl visited China, he and China's leaders emphasized that the development of Sino-FRG economic cooperation should be long-term and steady. Both sides believe that the two countries have fundamental conflicts of interest in the political realm, but do not have problems left over from history. Neither side poses a threat to the other. Since the establishment of relations, relations between the two countries have developed in a favorable manner. In the economic realm, China and the FRG each have their own superiorities, but they also have mutual needs and can complement one another. Just as Premier Zhao Ziyang has said: "China fully believes that cooperation with the FRG can develop on a long-term basis. This is not a one-time, expedient measure. Our two countries can become good partners in economic cooperation, but we cannot become rivals in competition. The largest developing country and an industrially and technologically advanced country can carry out long-term cooperation with significance far beyond the realm of the two countries. Cooperation not only benefits the people of the two countries, but also is beneficial to world peace and to the prosperity of the world economy."

Premier Kohl's visit occurred just on the eve of the convening of the Third Plenum of the 12th CPC Central Committee. China's leaders informed Premier Kohl that after the Third Plenum, China's cities, including industry, commerce and other fields, would undergo comprehensive reform. People all over the world will be able to see that China is courageously carrying out its four modernizations. China's open door policy is a long-term national policy, and it definitely will not change. The main targets of China's Sixth 5-year Plan have already been attained, and in 1985 we will begin implementing the Seventh 5-year Plan. During the period of the Seventh 5-year Plan, China's economy will continue to guarantee a fairly good rate of development. The scope of construction will expand even further, and China's foreign economic cooperation will expand along with it. China will strive with one heart and one mind to carry out the four modernizations. Kohl believes that China's resolute and unswerving implementation of the open door policy is wise. He said that through this visit he could clearly see that China's leaders' determination to implement the open door policy and to realize the country's modernization had become a matter not subject to change. He hoped that the FRG's cooperation with China would continue not only through this century but into the next century as well.

When Chairman Deng Xiaoping met with Premier Kohl he said: What makes me happy is that your visit is a good sign that marks the beginning of greater cooperation between our two countries. This cooperation will be even more concrete in the future. He hoped that cooperation between the FRG and China could mobilize cooperation between the European community and China. China needs to carry out close cooperation with a unified, collective, strong Europe.

12582

CSO: 4006/121

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

GOVERNMENT PREPARES PLANS FOR RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC DOWNTURN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Feb 85 p 3

[Text] At a meeting of government party leaders on Tuesday it was evident that the Kalevi Sorsa administration is very satisfied with itself and its achievements. They saw no need for adjusting the government program at this point.

Assembled to reach an interim decision, the chairmen and party secretaries of the government parties nevertheless decided to have those points of the government program that have not yet been carried out investigated.

Once a report has been received, the government will within the next few weeks decide in which order it will start to repair the gaps that are found. It is anticipated that room for improvement will at least be found in the economic policy.

In the discussion engaged in the need for preparing for a future economic downturn was emphasized. The government will probably soon rescind some provisional tax and fee increases to make the economic downturn more gradual.

None of the government parties have at this point expressed their individual wishes with regard to the government program. It was agreed that new issues that arise would be resolved separately, issue by issue.

11,466
CSO: 3617/87

ECONOMIC

FRANCE

TAX INCENTIVES TO BOOST RESEARCH CONSIDERED

Paris LES ECHOS in French 11 Mar 85 p 6

[Interview with Hubert Curien, minister of research and technology, on the occasion of the inauguration of INOVA 85, by Didier Duruy and Jean Deflacieliere; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] Hubert Curien, minister of research and technology, today inaugurated the seventh world innovation week, INOVA 85. For this academic who fulfils the highest functions in several public research institutions, this event constituted a "meeting ground" and a "catalyst" between innovators and their potential clients, while at the same time providing contacts between public and private research.

[Question] What are the results of the 1982 planning bill and what lessons do you draw from it?

[Answer] This bill was beneficial for research. At this point, the organizational problems are behind us. The bill also included numbered objectives for research development. Looking at the unvarnished facts, it can be said that these objectives were not exactly achieved.

On the other hand, if one considers the real growth of the economy, we did meet the standards that were set. We should remember that the bill was an ambitious one, and that this fact enabled us to take a big step in 3 years, even if 1983's results were better than those in 1984 and 1985.

[Question] The goal was to devote 2.5 percent of the gross national product to research. What is our current situation?

[Answer] We have increased our efforts markedly since we have passed the 2.2 percent rate. At the same time, other countries are also making progress, so that by 1990 Japan and the United States will probably devote 2.9 or 3 percent of their gross national product to research.

Consequently, we do not have the right to slacken our efforts since our goal remains to reach a position comparable to the best. That means to go towards a 2.9 percent rate also.

[Question] How will you go about achieving this?

[Answer] A 3-year plan for technological research and development will be submitted to parliament in the form of a bill at the end of the spring session.

[Question] What measures will you propose taking?

[Answer] First of all, the volume of research being done in industry is insufficient. We do not fare well when compared with West Germany or the United States.

There are two remedies for this situation. The optimum solution is to finance more research from businesses' own funds. The other solution is to increase direct or indirect state assistance without at the same time penalizing research carried on in the public sector.

[Question] How will you help industrialists?

[Answer] In particular we are studying financial incentives to promote research activities. We are studying them together with the minister of the economy. For example, the research tax credit can be allocated so as to interest a larger number of industrialists and raise the credit ceiling at the same time. One can also envisage the possibility of a cut in other kinds of taxes.

As far as incentives are concerned, these should be oriented more towards operations in the area of industry or activities which link industry with public organizations. The first planning bill dealt particularly with electronics and biotechnology.

Now we are realizing that we are also running risks in what until now have been considered traditional areas, where little research is yet being done: the areas concerned are the agro-alimentary industry, textiles, engineering and civil engineering.

Technical Centers: Towards Some Competition

[Question] The technical centers constitute one of the essential pivots of industrial research. The least that can be said is that they do not arouse a great deal of enthusiasm among their personnel. The main reproach is that they constitute a monopoly which discourages any competition and consequently results in a sort of bureaucratization of research. Would you consider opening the technical centers up to the competition of

public laboratories and private research companies?

[Answer] As you know, the technical centers differ from one another greatly. Some are very "applied," very concerned with daily living; others on the other hand are way up there and are busy with very advanced research. Whatever the choice made by each of these centers, they open themselves up to criticism. The technical centers are among the easiest institutions to criticize: we should not give in to this pernicious temptation.

For my part, I do not number myself among their detractors at all. But at the same time I believe in the necessity of a great deal of freedom. You mentioned competition. Yes, of course, any business must be able to turn to its technical center as well as to any other public or private research organization.

[Question] For paying exceptional taxes as well?

[Answer] Quite frankly, I will undoubtedly disappoint you. I do not see things in that way, since I do not see much of an argument for maintaining that the technical centers should be penalized and that so far-reaching a reform should be carried out in this area. It would be better to consider ways to use their potential more completely.

[Question] The reform could be partial with, for example, the allocation of 10 to 20 percent of taxes left to the free choice of businesses.

[Answer] That is not an unreasonable idea at all, and I agree with it. Undoubtedly it would create competition. But we must not run the risk of sacrificing medium and long term industrial research, which is more fragile than short term research.

[Question] Still on the question of industrial research, do the nationalized companies take enough risks to valorize the ideas of their engineers?

[Answer] I think that our national companies know how to take calculated risks. On the other hand, when it is a matter of exploiting their know-how outside the company, with or without the transfer of personnel, it seems that French firms are lagging, behind American companies particularly.

Where the latter are concerned, valorization outside the company is quite often the preferred method for making the most of all innovative ideas.

[Question] You are placing a great deal of emphasis on incentives by means of fiscal relief. We would like to draw your attention to the fiscal hypocrisy of state assistance. Thus a healthy enterprise which receives assistance for innovation must

pay back half of it as company tax. And if the innovation proves profitable, it must likewise repay ANVAR [National Association for the Implementation of Research] all the funds received. Are you planning to propose a defiscalization of these subsidies?

[Answer] One cannot speak of the hypocrisy of state assistance when on the contrary the fiscal procedure is transparent. Funds for innovation in fact are added to the total resources of the business, instead of an effort based on the company's own funds.

Therefore it seems quite natural to me on the one hand, that this assistance be repaid to ANVAR when the effort is successful, and on the other that if the business obtains a net profit, it should be subject to the profit tax. The distribution of tax free subsidies would introduce complications in financial channels and would impede administrative simplification.

INOVA: A Very Effective Catalyst

[Question] We are beginning the INOVA week, the innovation exhibition which your ministry sponsors and to which it provides considerable support. What justifies your interest in this event?

[Answer] First of all, it provides an excellent meeting ground for innovators and clients. Secondly, it promotes contacts between public research and industry. It really enables public institutions and universities to gain exposure.

For them, the mere fact of preparing a display for INOVA in itself is a worthwhile step which finds expression in the manifestation of a new state of mind and results in the forging of relationships which would not otherwise be established.

[Question] One has the impression that INOVA acts as a palliative for the lack of a real forum for technological transfer in France. Do you think that INOVA could function like a private enterprise without the financial support of the state authorities?

[Answer] For the time being, I do not think so. In the United States, the transfer of technology is carried out better than in France; most often, it is developed by flourishing private companies.

This is the result of social and university structures that are quite different from ours but which we are beginning to imitate. For example, we now have more and more industrial contracts carried out in university settings.

I can tell you that INOVA is in no way a half measure intended to salve our conscience. It is a very effective catalyst which pushes us in the direction in which we all want to go.

ECONOMIC

GREECE

HUGE INCREASES IN PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPENDITURES

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 15-21 Feb 85 p 16

[Text] The answer of ND with specific instances that prove the extent of the government's squandering with the increase in public expenditures, which in some instances, reached 1,200 per cent, caused a sensation in public opinion. The proof of the statements, offered by comparing the amounts of 1981 with those of 1985, was overwhelming, mainly because of the fact that the enormous increases in expenditures involve public relations and the use of consultants! The related table is indicative:

GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF SPORTS

For Public Relations

1981:	60,000	1985:	100,200,000
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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

For Consultants

1981:	121,000	1985:	44,000,000
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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

For Public Relations

1981:	500,000	1985:	40,000,000
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VICE MINISTRY FOR PRESS

For Receptions

1981:	500,000	1985:	30,000,000
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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

For Conferences and Committees

1981:	778,000	1985:	14,000,000
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MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

Remuneration of Consultants

1981:	10,000	1985:	42,000,000
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MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Remuneration of Committees

1981:	3,700,000	1985:	19,800,000
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According to ND's calculations, if an audit of the expenditures by other ministries in the ... key area of public relations, consultants and committees were to be made, these amounts would surpass 40 billion drachmai.

9731

CSO: 3521/200

ECONOMIC

NETHERLANDS

LIMIT ON ECONOMIC AID TO COMPANIES DECIDED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 23 Feb 85 p 1

[Article: "Economic Affairs Limited in Granting Aid"]

[Text] The Hague, 23 February--The government has decided to significantly limit the freedom of movement of the minister of economic affairs in granting aid to troubled companies. In this way, modifications in existing regulations as well as new regulations must be approved from now on by the council of ministers. Aid operations that fall outside the framework of these regulations must be reported to the prime minister.

These are the most important conclusions drawn by the government from the RSV [Rijn-Schelde-Verolme] report. The government wrote this in response to parliamentary questions in preparation for next week's debate on RSV.

The government points out that aid to troubled companies has been sharply reduced from the second half of the 1970s to today, from a yearly amount of 500 to 800 million guilders to 29 million guilders. In contrast, overall and specific aid to companies in this period has risen from 2 to 10 billion guilders a year, including fiscal provisions.

For aid to troubled companies with more than 500 employees, the so-called recovery financing measure is presently in effect, whereby a board of independent experts advises the minister. The old regimen is still in effect for companies with fewer employees.

With respect to the recovery financing measure, the government has also decided that if the accountable minister wishes to differ from this advice, he must likewise report this to the council of ministers. If the board advises granting aid and the minister wishes to differ, then the prime minister will, in consultation with the accountable minister, look into whether a hearing before the council of ministers is then necessary.

In addition, the government has decided that with government orders to companies with poor solvency, consultation must take place between the minister in question and the minister of finances.

The government has a positive opinion about the operation of the ministry of economic affairs in its aid policy.

ECONOMIC

NORWAY

BRIEFS

INCREASED EXPORTS TO GDR--Norwegian exports to the GDR showed a decline for a short time, but last year there was a sharp increase, and exports rose by fully 107 million kroner, which is double the preceding year. Five Norwegian firms are participating in the annual spring trade fair in Leipzig 10-16 March. Minister of Trade Asbjorn Haugstvedt will be present on the opening day. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Mar 85 p 30] 9287

CSO: 3639/92

ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES CONTINUE TO SHOW IMPROVEMENT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Jan 85 p 10

[Article by Clas Barkman: "Unemployment Continues Downward"]

[Text] Unemployment continues to drop. In December 1984, 2.8 percent were without work. In December 1983, this was 3.4 percent. The improvement between November and December last year was one-tenth of one percent: down from 2.9 to 2.8.

For the present the government is keeping the promise to improve employment in the country.

This is shown by the latest figures released on Thursday by the Statistical Central Office (SCB).

The work force, that is, both those who have and those who do not have a job is now at a record high. In December 1984 it was 4.4 million. This means an increase of over 50,000 this past year.

Over 30 percent of all employees had a job in the public sector last year. The remainder worked in the private sector.


The percentage of the work force employed in industry remained unchanged. Both December 1983 and December 1984 showed approximately the same high percentage (about 23.6 percent).

Of those who were unemployed at the end of last year, 25 percent were young people in the 16-24 age group. In spite of the high number, this is an improvement over December 1983, when 34 percent of the unemployed were in this age bracket.

The explanation for this remarkable change is the youth law introduced at the beginning of 1984.

Although very small, an improvement was also registered for the long-term unemployed. In December last year, 27 percent of the unemployed had been without work for more than 6 months. The figure for December 1983 was 29 percent. In November of last year this was up to 30 percent.

The "artificial respiration" that consists of raising employment figures by means of various forms of labor market policies has been somewhat reduced in the past year. In December 1983 about 7.8 percent of the work force received a job due to these measures. In December 1984 the figure was 7.2 percent.



Kommunerna stod för större delen av sysselsättningsökningen under åren 1974-84. 6) Diagram: RUNE ALMQVIST

Key:

1. Employment 1974-1984
2. Thousands
3. Manufacturing Industry
4. Local Government Employees (incl. county council)
5. National Civil Service Employees
6. Townships accounted for most of the increase in employment figures in 1974-1984.

	Dec 1984	Dec 1983
Public Unemployment	2.8%	3.4%
AMU Training	0.8	0.9
Relief Work	0.7	1.9
Youth Law	0.9	--11
Work Training	0.1	0.1
Placed by Recruiting Support	0.5	--
Latent Unemployed (those wanting work but not looking)	0.8	1.4
Part-time Unemployed	3.4	3.5

Total:	10.0%	11.2%

Even when counting people who got work due to various efforts of labor market policies and to the public unemployment, the figures have improved the past year.

9992

CSO: 3650/138

ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

TRADITIONAL EUROPEAN EXPORT MARKET REPLACED BY U.S., ASIA

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Mar 85 p 11

[Article by Bjorn Anders Olson: "Swedish Exports--Europe Buying Less"]

[Text] Sweden's traditional export markets in Europe continue to be replaced by North America and Southeast Asia. Almost half of Swedish exports consist of manufactured products. Steel export to the United States rose last year by 84 percent in value.

There are several tendencies which can be read from the summary of export year 1984 released by the Central Statistical Bureau.

Total exports rose last year by 15 percent in value--to 242.5 billion kronor--and by 8 percent in volume. Manufactured export rose about as much, which also amounted to 46.6 percent of all export.

Passenger car and truck export reached its highest level ever and amounted together to one-tenth of the total export.

Iron ore export increased by 39 percent and steel export by 23 percent.

Computer export stagnated, while on the other hand weapons export rose strongly.

Shift

In the Swedish export market a slow shift is taking place from the traditional export markets in Europe.

Export to EFTA increased by 9 percent, and to EC by 13 percent. That was below average.

On the other hand export to the United States increased by more than 48 percent, and the United States is quickly approaching West Germany as Sweden's largest export market.

Exports to Southeast Asia are still limited, but that is the market--apart from the United States--which is growing the fastest. Since 1977 Swedish exports there have grown by 27 percent per year, while total exports have grown by only 16 percent per year.

As can be seen in the table below, West Europe is still dominant. Two-thirds of our exports go there. Trade with East Europe is still limited. Two trends were, however, broken during last year. The very large deficit in trade with the Soviet Union and DDR declined. Imports declined strongly from both countries, and Swedish exports to DDR increased by fully 68 percent.

Deficit

That means that the deficit in trade with the Soviet Union declined from 5,085 million kronor to 4,069, and the deficit with the DDR from 2,719 to 2,055 million kronor.

The deficit with West Germany and Great Britain on the other hand remains fairly constant around 10 and 5 billion kronor respectively.

This compares, for example, with trade with the United States, which in 1983 produced a surplus of 1.9 billion kronor and last year a surplus for Sweden of 9.8 billion kronor. The total Swedish export surplus was 24 billion kronor.

Despite the strong increase of exports to the United States, the most spectacular export increase took place in trade with the Philippines, 208 percent. Export there is however still only four per mille of the entire Swedish export.

In a week the National Bank will reshuffle the Swedish basket of currencies. There are 15 currencies which mean the most for Swedish foreign trade, in relation to their importance. The American dollar has, however, been given double weight because of its importance in international payments.

Today the weight of the dollar is 19.1 percent. If the National Bank follows its previous practice the weight of the dollar after reshuffling should be over 20 percent, following the sharp export increase to the United States. The importance of the dollar to Swedish trade has of course increased.

Sweden's 10 largest export markets

	Export in Millions Kr.	Percent Change 83/84	Share of Sweden's Export
West Germany	28129	18	11.6
United States	27502	48	11.3
Great Britain	24807	9	10.2
Norway	22372	5	9.2
Denmark	20117	13	8.3
Finland	13952	14	5.8
France	12182	16	5.0
Holland	10848	8	4.5
Belgium-Luxembourg	8978	4	3.7
Italy	8674	29	3.6

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ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

EXPORTS INCREASED IN 1984--Sweden took an additional 0.5 percent of the world market pie during 1984. Altogether, Swedish exports increased in volume by 7.9 percent compared with 1983, according to the Board of Commerce. The development of Swedish exports vacillated during the year. A very strong upsurge during the first three months of the year was followed by an almost equally strong recession during the second quarter. One explanation could be the employment market conflicts in West Germany and Great Britain which had a stifling effect on Swedish exports of manufactured goods. According to the Board of Commerce, the second half of the year was distinguished by a stable growth especially for exports of manufactured goods. In contrast, the export of raw materials has fluctuated greatly. Exports increased comparatively well between the third and fourth quarters of 1984, according to the Board of Commerce. In volume, exports increased by a total of 8 percent. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 7 Mar 85 p 31] 12562

TRADE BALANCE LESS FAVORABLE--The surplus in the Swedish balance of trade stayed at a mere 0.3 million kronor during February, according to the Statistical Central Bureau's quick-service statistics. The value of imports rose 12 percent compared with last year to 19 billion kronor, while the value of exports fell 4 percent to 19.3 billion kronor. For the first two months of the year the surplus in the balance of trade decreased from 5.9 billion kronor last year to 0.4 billion this year. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Mar 85 p 10] 12562

MORE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS EMPLOYED--The number of workers employed in industry was 557,800 in November, an increase of 900 persons since October. Since the beginning of January 1984, the number of employees has increase by 16,900. Corrected for seasonal employment variations, the increase becomes 13,000. The corresponding increase for 1983 was minus 6,500, seasonally adjusted to minus 10,300. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Jan 85 p 10] 9992

CONTINUED HIGH INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION--Swedish industrial production continued to climb during November, rising by 1.0 percent. Production was thus 8.3 percent higher than in November 1983, according to figures from the Statistical Central Office. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Jan 85 p 25] 9992

12 April 1985

LARGE TRADE 1984 SURPLUS --The trade balance has improved dramatically during 1984. It now shows a surplus of almost 25 billion. Exports also increased sharply last year. Increased market shares and the devaluation contributed to this. The Statistical Central Office presented Tuesday the first figures on Swedish foreign trade in 1984. Between 1983 and 1984, the value of exports rose by 50 percent, up to 252.2 billion kronor. This corresponds to an 8-percent increase in volume. Trucks, paper pulp, steel, iron ore and passenger cars are some of the goods that contributed to the strong upsurge in value. Things went worse for the export of vessels. This was cut in half during the year. There are three factors that have favored the development in Swedish exports. First and foremost there is devaluation, which clearly affected the fourth quarter as well. The record-high dollar exchange rate was also a factor, primarily for cars and paper pulp. Thirdly, Swedish industry sharply increased its share of the market during the year. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Jan 85 p 25] 9992

CSO: 3650/138

12 April 1985

ENERGY

DENMARK

BRIEFS

PARLIAMENT REJECTS NUCLEAR POWER--The Danish Folketing decided today that nuclear power shall not be included in Danish energy planning. With this, the Folketing is going against the government parties. Energy Minister Knud Enggaard, of the Liberal Party, considered the decision as both unnecessary and unwise, and criticized the fact that the Folketing is excluding an important aspect from energy planning. The decision against nuclear energy was taken by the Social Democrats, the Socialist People's Party, the Left-Socialists and the Radical Liberals, while the Progressive Party, together with the government parties, voted for nuclear energy.

[Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Mar 85 p 14]

CSO: 3650/215

ENERGY

GREECE

MORE OIL EXPECTED FROM DRILLINGS IN SUMMER

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 15 Feb 85 p 25

[Text] A floating drill, leased by the Public Petroleum Corporation, will begin oil exploration in the Thermaikos Gulf early next summer.

It involves one of the areas of the country that produce petroleum and about which there are good reasons to hope that there exist large quantities of oil and, that during 1985, there will be three underwater drillings.

As announced yesterday by minister of Energy, Mr. L. Veryvakis, the exploration plan of DEP [Public Petroleum Corporation] will expend 4.8 billion drachmai while there will be six more drillings on land: in northwestern Peloponnesos, in Ipeiros, in Aitolokarnarnia and western Thraki.

In view of the fact that there remain only 6 or 7 years before the Prinos reserves are exhausted, the DEP exploratory program is being especially intensified this year.

The DEP has already saved 4 million dollars in foreign exchange in its geophysical explorations of 1984 because it carried them out with its own laboratories and equipment for seismic tests that it purchased for 3.5 million dollars.

Prinos

In his address at DEP, Mr. Veryvakis emphasized that the contract with the Northern Aegean Petroleum Company resulted in minimal profits for the Greek Treasury from the exploitation of the deposits.

In essence, the treasury received 148 million dollars from the 27.5 million barrels produced since 2 July 1981 when pumping began.

If pumping is continued at the present rate (21,500 barrels per day) the reserves of 65 million barrels will be exhausted in less than 5 years. However, this time is going to be protracted a little because, as the deposits diminish, the rate of pumping will decrease.

The Contract

The minister noted that the contract will be revised very soon and there will be more profits for the treasury and the Greek people.

"This is our firm objective," he added, "and it must be understood by all parties and the Prinos partnership."

Regarding the drillings effected in 1984, Mr. Veryvakis said that they reached a depth of 13,256 meters as compared to 10,753 meters in 1983.

In 1985 the efforts will be intensified and the cooperation of the DEP with other agencies is not to be excluded.

9731

CSO: 3521/200

12 April 1985

ENERGY

NETHERLANDS

REPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF UNDERGROUND COAL GASIFICATION

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 20 Feb 85 p 11

[Text] The exploitation of coal by underground gasification can make an important contribution to Dutch energy management in the next century. The amount of energy which will become available in this way is the equivalent of one to 10 natural gas fields in Slochteren. Exploitation of these natural resources would not only lead to a considerable savings on the balance of payments, but the cost price of energy would go down as well.

That becomes apparent from the report "The Feasibility Of On-Site Gasification Of Coal In The Netherlands," made by Eng H. Boswinkel of the Energy Study Center in Petten. The study has been done in the framework of the National Coal Research Program, which is being paid for by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Boswinkel in his report is advocating continuing research. He comes with a developed proposal which would require between 60 and 80 million guilders in 15 years' time. That project could lead to a putting into use of the first commercial gasification installation in the beginning of the next century. In the year 2020, already five percent of the Dutch energy demand could be covered by the gasified coal.

The study into the possibilities of underground gasification arose from an inventory study by the State Geological Service which by the end of the year should yield a picture of the amount of coal which can be found in Dutch soil. It would be senseless to calculate how large the national coal supply is, if nothing could be done with that wealth. That is why the government instructed the management committee of the Dutch Coal Sites inventory study to make a study of exploitation techniques. Pretty soon, it was decided to limit the study to underground gasification. This is because that technique appears to offer the best prospects for the Netherlands.

Underground coal gasification does not differ essentially from the gasification in an above-ground installation, with which there have been years of experience. In both cases, heated coal is brought in contact with a small amount of oxygen. This releases an inflammable gas. What makes underground gasification a technical feat is that the process has to take place in the natural environment of the coal, at a depth of 1,000 to 2,000

meters. The coal seam itself will function as a gasification and pressure chamber. During the gasification, a low energy gas is created which, after purification and under high pressure, could be mixed with high energy natural gas. If pure oxygen is directed at the coal instead of air, a gas is released with a high energy value, which could be used for example, in the production of methanol.

Drilling

In order to make underground gasification profitable and acceptable, use would have to be made of the so-called technique of directed drilling. This is because only this technique makes it possible to cover a surface of many square kilometers from one single location. In directed drilling, a trajectory is made which initially goes almost vertically, but later on slowly turns until it finally follows the coal seam almost horizontally over a distance of, for example, 500 meters. The underground installation is completed by a second boring which connects to the first one. The one well is necessary for the supply of air which makes the coal ignite. Through the second well, the coal gas which is created this way can be removed directly.

Conventional drilling techniques are already sufficient to accomplish such a gasification system. New developments will probably make it possible in the near future not only to make a curve in the vertical plane, but to also make a curve in the almost horizontal coal seam, so that a kind of horseshoe is created with a total length of 1000 meters. Because of this, the profitability of the underground installation could be increased even further.

In different places in the world, there have already been years of experience with underground gasification. In North America, Russia and Europe, all in all some 20 field experiments have been done. But in most of these experiments, the process was based on a short gasification chamber, gasification at small depth, and a different kind of coal from what is present in the Netherlands. It is precisely these points of departure that make the foreign experiments worthless for most of our country.

For Western Europe it is particularly important how the coal seams and the surrounding rock behave during gasification. If the rock collapses at the place where the coal has been gasified, everything will go smoothly. The gasification chamber will automatically expand itself further and further up to a width of perhaps 300 meters, while the space in the middle will continuously be filled up by coal ashes and mine rock. If the rock does not fall, the volume of the gasification chamber becomes many times too big. In that case the coal gas will burn itself up. Boswinkel considers the probability that the process will come to an early end is not very high. At the same time, he underlines that the present knowledge about the Dutch carboniferous rock formations is absolutely insufficient to be able to say anything certain about the collapse behavior.

In the study, the economic feasibility of underground gasification is tested using two demonstration installations: an electricity plant and a gas

factory. In the electricity plant, the choice has been made for a straight gasification chamber, which can already be realized at the present state of drilling technology. The gas factory is based on a gasification chamber in a horseshoe shape. The difference seen that the gas factory can annually produce 127,000 tons of effectively gasified coal. The electricity plant does not produce more than 58,000 tons.

In the report, the investments for the electricity plant--underground and above ground--are estimated at some 84 million guilders all in all. The cost to get at the coal would amount to between 112 and 187 guilders per ton. Ultimately, the calculations result in a unit cost of the electricity of around 23 cents per kilowatt-hour. In a commercial installation, that price could be decreased to six cents. As a comparison, Boswinkel uses the unit cost of electricity generated from coal and nuclear energy, approximately 12 and 11 cents, respectively, per kilowatt-hour.

The construction of a demonstration gas factory would require about 170 million guilders in all. The cost to get at the coal may vary between 68 and 140 guilders per ton. This construction results in a production price for clean gas of 13.5 cents per cubic meter, which could decrease to 7 cents in a commercial installation. This is considerably more than the unit cost of Dutch natural gas which also has an even larger energy content. But it is much less than the amount which has to be paid for foreign energy.

Boswinkel calculated that underground gasification could yield a savings on the balance of payments of 3.2 billion guilders in the year 2020, calculated in 1984 guilders. The 14 gas factories which could be operational around that time supply employment to some 1,100 people. The consequences for the environment will remain limited to subsidences which in any case will be less than those in conventional mining.

Trauma

Whether it will ever get so far depends according to Boswinkel not only on technical and economic factors, but also on politics. He notices that after the traumatic closures of the mines in the Netherlands, a urge has arisen to never have anything to do with coal again. Our country can indulge in that luxury because of the enormous stocks of natural gas. But that same natural gas is still being used up at a high rate. That is why it is useful, Boswinkel thinks, not to lose sight of coal forever. "In theory, underground gasification offers great possibilities. Further research is certainly justified. Later on, one can always still say: it won't work anyway. But then at least one knows what one is talking about."

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